Rational choice with deontic constraints

Canadian Journal of Philosophy

Volumn 31, Issue 3, 2001, Pages 361-388

  Joseph, Heath ^a  

^a UNIVERSITÉ DE MONTRÉAL   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 34547889183     PISSN: 00455091     EISSN: 19110820     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/00455091.2001.10717572     Document Type: Article

References (30)

1. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, Richard Tuck, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1991), 117
2. See Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Social Action, 2 vols. (New York: Free Press 1968).
3. For a model that gets around this problem, see Drew Fudenberg and Eric Maskin 'The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information', Econometrica 54 (1986) 533-54.
4. Talcott Parsons, The Social System (New York: The Free Press 1951), 210-18
5. Some of the most insightful analysis of the way that everyday social interaction is supported by sanctions can be found in Harold Garfinkel, Studies in Ethnomethodology (Cambridge: Polity Press 1984).
6. See Herbert Gintis, 'Strong Reciprocity and Human Sociality', Journal of Theoretical Biology 206 (2000) 169-79.
7. See Leonard J. Savage, The Foundations of Statistics (New York: Dover Publications 1972);
8. and Richard Jeffrey, The Logic of Decision (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1983), 1.
9. See Roger Myerson, Game Theory (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1991), 5-12.
10. For the full argument to this effect, see Joseph Heath, 'Founda tionalism and Practical Reason', Mind 106 (1997) 451-73.
11. The term 'myth of the given' is from Wilfrid Sellars, Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1998).
12. On the same point, see Michael Smith, The Moral Problem (Oxford: Blackwell 1994), 107.
13. Georg Henrik von Wright, An Essay on Deontic Logic and the General Theory of Action (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing 1968), 58-68.
14. See Joseph Heath, Communicative Action and Rational Choice (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press 2001);
15. and Robert Brandom, Making it Explicit (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1994).
16. For overview of different proposals, see Myerson, Game Tlieory, 310-16.
17. The exposition most people look to is R. Duncan Luce and Howard Raiffa, Games and Decisions (New York: Wiley 1957).
18. Jeffrey, The Logic of Decision, 82-4
19. For further discussion, see Joseph Heath, 'The Structure of Normative Control', Law and Philosophy 17 (1998) 419-42.
20. See Ken Binmore, Playing Fair: Game Theory and the Social Contract Vol. 1. (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press 1994), 104-7.
21. Donald Davidson, 'The Structure and Content of Truth', Journal of Philosophy 87 (1990) 279-328.
22. See also Daniel M Hausman, 'Revealed Preference, Belief, and Game Theory', Economics and Philosophy 16 (2000) 99-115.
23. An example of such a theory for deontic constraints would be the conception of 'practical discourse' developed by Jiirgen Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press 1991).
24. The discussion in John Heritage, Garkinkel and Ethnomethodology (Cambridge: Polity 1983) provides a useful introduction.
25. See also Dennis Wrong, 'The Oversocialized Conception of Man in Modern Sociology', American Sociological Revieiv 26 (1961) 183-93.
26. This proposal bears a certain resemblance to a proposal made by Robert Nozick in The Nature of Rationality (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1993), 56.
27. Eric Rasmusen, Games and Information, 2nd. ed. (Oxford: Blackwell 1989), 48-57.
28. Consider Francis Fukuyama: 'Trust is the expectation that arises within a community of regular, honest, and cooperative behavior based on commonly shared norms, on the part of other members of the community' (Trust [London: Penguin 1995], 26).
29. Compare David Gauthier, Morals by Agreement (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1986)
30. David Gauthier, 'Assure and Threaten; Ethics 104 (1994) 690-721.