Constitutional coordination in unstable party systems: The Brazilian constitution of 1988

Constitutional Political Economy

Volumn 18, Issue 3, 2007, Pages 177-197

  Reich, Gary ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS   (United States)

Author keywords

Brazil; Constitutional assemblies; Coordination games; Legislative bargaining; Political ideologies; Social choice

Indexed keywords

EID: 34547843521     PISSN: 10434062     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10602-007-9020-6     Document Type: Article

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