Formal versus informal institutions in Africa

Journal of Democracy

Volumn 18, Issue 3, 2007, Pages 96-110

  Bratton, Michael ^a  

^a MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 34547789248     PISSN: 10455736     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1353/jod.2007.0041     Document Type: Review

References (24)

1. James March and Johan Olsen, "The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life," American Political Science Review 78 (September 1984): 734-49.
2. See also their "Elaborating the 'New Institutionalism,"' in R.A.W. Rhodes, Sarah Binder, and Bert Rockman, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).
3. Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 4.
4. H.W.O. Okoth-Ogendo, "Constitutions Without Constitutionalism: Reflections on an African Political Paradox" in Issa Shivji, ed., The State and Constitutionalism: An African Debate on Democracy (Harare: SAPES Trust, 1991), 3-25.
5. Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 12.
6. Donald L. Horowitz, A Democratic South Africa? Constitutional Engineering in a Divided Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991).
7. Andrew Reynolds, Electoral Systems and Democratization in Southern Africa (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
8. Daniel N. Posner, Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
9. See also his contribution to the current issue of the Journal of Democracy on pp. 126-40.
10. Goran Hyden, African Politics in Comparative Perspective (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 7 and 78.
11. René Lemarchand, "Political Clientelism and Ethnicity in Tropical Africa: Competing Solidarities in Nation-Building," American Political Science Review 66 (February 1972): 91-112.
12. Sahr J. Kpundeh, "Corruption and Corruption Control," in E. Gyimah-Boadi, ed., Democratic Reform in Africa: The Quality of Progress (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2004), 121.
13. Nicolas van de Walle, "Presidentialism and Clientelism in Africa's Emerging Party Systems," Journal of Modern African Studies 41 (June 2003): 310.
14. Guillermo O'Donnell, "Another Institutionalization: Latin America and Elsewhere," Kellogg Institute Working Paper No. 222 (Indiana: University of Notre Dame, 1996).
15. Gretchen Helmke and Steven Levitsky, Informal Institutions and Democracy: Lessons from Latin America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006).
16. Afrobarometer surveys are based on randomly selected national probability samples ranging in size from 1,200 to 2,400 respondents per country and representing a cross-section of citizens in each country aged 18 years or older. Samples are selected from the best available census frames and yield a margin of sampling error of no more than plus or minus three percentage points at a 95 percent confidence level. All interviews are conducted face-to-face by trained fieldworkers in the language of the respondent's choice. Response rates average above 80 percent.
17. Benin, Botswana, Cape Verde, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe is included since, at the time of the first survey in 1999, it was still a relatively open society. Uganda is also covered because, even in the country's conflict-wracked northern zones, survey research has proven possible.
18. The figure of 61 percent diverges from the previously reported average of 62 percent because it refers to only 12 countries. AB does not yet have three observations for all 18 countries.
19. For in-depth analysis, see Wonbin Cho and Michael Bratton, "Electoral Institutions, Partisan Status, and Political Support in Lesotho," Electoral Studies 25 (December 2006): 731-50.
20. Although only 46 percent expressed high levels of satisfaction ("fairly" plus "very" satisfied), even fewer (36 percent) expressed low levels ("not very" and "not at all").
21. Calculated from AB Round 1 data. See also Michael Bratton, Robert Mattes, and E. Gyimah Boadi, Public Opinion, Democracy and Market Reform in Africa (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 278.
22. Because educated people have developed their critical faculties, education is negative for the perceived extent of democracy, whereas the institutional indicators are positive.
23. Staffan Lindberg, Democracy and Elections in Africa (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006).
24. I am indebted to E. Gyimah-Boadi for helping me think through this puzzle. Other useful comments from Wonbin Cho, Adrienne LeBas, and Daniel Posner were received gratefully.