The decline of the African military coup

Journal of Democracy

Volumn 18, Issue 3, 2007, Pages 141-155

  Clark, John F ^a  

^a FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 34547766449     PISSN: 10455736     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1353/jod.2007.0044     Document Type: Review

References (25)

1. Several scholars continue to view military intervention as one of the greatest threats to continuing democratization in Africa. See Chuka Onwumechili, African Democratization and Military Coups (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1998), esp. ch. 4;
2. George Klay Kieh and Pita Ogaba Agbese, eds., The Military and Politics in Africa: From Engagement to Democratic and Constitutional Control (Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate, 2005), esp. ch. 8.
3. On the motivations of officers in considering coups, see the classic studies by Donald L. Horowitz, Coup Theories and Officers' Motives: Sri Lanka in Comparative Perspective (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), esp. chs. 1, 4, and 5;
4. and Robin Luckham, The Nigerian Military: A Sociological Analysis of Authority and Revolt, 1960-1967 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971).
5. See Samuel Decalo, The Stable Minority: Civilian Rule in Africa (Gainesville: Florida Academic Press, 1998), 39.
6. Also, those familiar with Malawi under the dictatorial Kamuzu Banda may find it odd to see the state described as "legitimate." Decalo uses the term here somewhat as Pierre Englebert does in his study, State Legitimacy and Development in Africa (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2000), 4,
7. According to Englebert, "a state is legitimate when its structures have evolved endogenously to its own society and there is some level of historical continuity to its institutions" (italics in original). He goes on to stress that, "As used here, the concept of legitimacy does not imply a normative judgment about the moral righteousness of states."
8. In this study, "political liberalization" refers to improvements in civil liberties and political rights that may fall short of actual democratic transition or consolidation.
9. One of the ablest practitioners of this approach is Patrick McGowan. See his study, "African Military Coups d'Etat, 1956-2001: Frequency, Trends and Distribution," Journal of Modern African Studies 41 (September 2003): 339-70.
10. Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle, Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997): 116-22.
11. For exact definitions of PR and CL, see www.freedomhouse.org.
12. For instance, this was apparently the case with an alleged coup plot in Malawi in 2001. See "Malawi: Brown Bounces Back," Africa Confidential, 6 April 2001.
13. On Mali, see Zeric Kay Smith, "Mali's Decade of Democracy," Journal of Democracy 12 (July 2001): 73-79.
14. See the 2005 U.S. State Department Human Rights Report findings on the Tanzanian elections at www.state.gov. This was true except in Zanzibar - an autonomous island province that has sought greater autonomy or independence-where the elections of both 2000 and 2005 were seriously flawed.
15. Chris Allen, "Republic of Benin: President Soglo Begins to Lose His Grip on Power," Africa Contemporary Record, 1992-1994, vol. 24 (New York: Africana Publishing, 2000): B6. Emphasis added.
16. See, for example, Andreas Mehler, "The Shaky Foundations, Adverse Circumstances, and Limited Achievements of Democratic Transition in the Central African Republic," in Leonardo A. Villalón and Peter VonDoepp, eds., The Fate of Africa's Democratic Experiments: Elites and Institutions (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 2005), 133.
17. On Congo (Brazzaville), see John F. Clark, "The Collapse of the Democratic Experiment in the Republic of Congo: A Thick Description"; on Guinea-Bissau,
18. see Joshua, B. Forrest, "Democratization in a Divided Urban Political Culture: Guinea-Bissau; and on Zambia,
19. see David J. Simon, "Democracy Unrealized: Zambia's Third Republic under Frederick Chiluba." All are found in Villalón and VonDoepp, eds., The Fate of Africa's Democratic Experiments.
20. This episode is not probably called a "coup" since it was the government forces that first went into action against Sassou's militia. The resistance of Sassou's fighters is more properly described as an armed rebellion aimed at overthrow of the state; see Table 2.
21. Since President Dawda Jawara and his ruling party had won five consecutive elections beginning in 1970, however, there was reason to doubt the competitiveness of Gambian democracy, despite its impressive FH scores in the years leading up to the coup. Adam Przeworski and his coauthors argue that electoral regimes which have not experienced alternation of individuals or parties in the chief executive's office should be considered "unconsolidated" democracies. See "What Makes Democracies Endure?" in Larry Diamond et al., eds., Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 295-311.
22. Peter da Costa, "Out with the Old," Africa Report 40 (January-February 1995), 48.
23. See Malyn D.D. Newitt, "São Tomé and Príncipe: Democracy Survives Continued Political Instability," Africa Contemporary Record, 1994-1996, vol. 25 (New York: Africana Publishing, 2002), B264-66.
24. See "Desperados," Africa Confidential, 25 July 2003.
25. Among others who have noted this tendency is Juan J. Linz in The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown and Reequilibration (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), 8-9.