Distinguishing indeterminate belief from "risk-averse" preferences

Synthese

Volumn 158, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 189-205

  Steele, Katie ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SYDNEY   (Australia)

Author keywords

Ellsberg paradox; Imprecise probability; Indeterminate belief; Risk aversion

Indexed keywords

EID: 34547748878     PISSN: 00397857     EISSN: 15730964     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-006-9119-8     Document Type: Article

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