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459 n.19 (2004) (citing, among others, E. Norman Veasey as suggesting that, if Delaware does not act, "there are emerging federal statutory duties and SEC Rules ... that may trump Delaware fiduciary law"). 15Del. Code. Ann. tit. 10, § 3114(b) (2004). 16Del. Code. Ann. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2004) (allowing corporations, in their Articles or Bylaws, to exculpate directors from personal monetary liability for breaches of the duty of care that do not amount to bad faith). 17In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006). 18The exculpatory clause, presumably, also would not protect the conduct of individuals who are officers and directors acting in their capacity as officers. 19See discussion infra Part III. 20See infra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
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Edward Rock Michael Wachter, Dangerous Liaisons: Corporate Law, Trust Law, and Interdoctrinal Legal Transplants, 96 Nw. U. L. Rev. 651, 655 (2002)
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at 3. 42Several of the cases cited by Hamermesh and Sparks in fact recognize this notion. See Sparks & Hamermesh, supra note 24. 43Recognizing the agency law basis of officers' duties avoids an awkward doctrinal bifurcation whereby, for some purposes, officers are agents of the corporation and their conduct is measured by agency law standards, but for other purposes that status is ignored and a different set of legal standards is applied. 44This is the case because corporate law fiduciary duties are mandatory, while agency law duties are not. See infra Part IV. Of course, the issues regarding the enabling nature of agency law duties discussed in this article become less relevant as a practical matter if the business judgment rule is applied. 45See Restatement (Second) of Agency § 376 ("the existence and extent of the duties of the agent to the principal are determined by the terms of the agreement between the parties")
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nn.2-3 and accompanying text (1989). See also Orts, supra note 33, at 270 n.22 (citing articles that argue both for reducing mandatory fiduciary duties and for maintaining mandatory fiduciary duties);
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Contract and Fiduciary Duty in Corporate Law
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625 n.79 and accompanying text (1997). If directors' fiduciary obligations were not mandatory, of course, section 102(b)(7) would be unnecessary. While it might be accurate to say that the evolution of the mandatory versus the enabling component of those duties has shifted over time toward a greater enabling component and greater flexibility for corporate actors, it seems equally clear that the duties themselves remain mandatory. See Coffee, supra note 54, at 1650-51. Fletcher's treatise asserts that (leaving aside codified exculpatory provisions) courts might allow exculpation of the duty of care but not the duty of loyalty. Id. at 1651 n.132 and accompanying text (citing 3A W. Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations, § 1047 (rev. perm. ed. 1986)).
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Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law Norms, and the Unintended Consequences of Independence and Accountability, 89 Geo. L.J. 797, 812 (2001)
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