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Volumn 44, Issue 3, 2007, Pages 475-520

Corporate officer wrongdoing and the fiduciary duties of corporate officers under Delaware law

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EID: 34547692597     PISSN: 00027766     EISSN: 17441714     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1744-1714.2007.00044.x     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (11)

References (21)
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  • 4
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    • Realizing the Dream of William O. Douglas - The Securities and Exchange Commission Takes Charge of Corporate Governance
    • Roberta S. Karmel, Realizing the Dream of William O. Douglas - The Securities and Exchange Commission Takes Charge of Corporate Governance, 30 Del. J. Corp. L. 79 (2005)
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  • 5
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    • In the Wake of Corporate Reform: One Year in the Life of Sarbanes Oxley
    • Symposium
    • Symposium, In the Wake of Corporate Reform: One Year in the Life of Sarbanes Oxley, 2004 Mich. St. L. Rev. 505 (2004).
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  • 6
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    • Delaware's Good Faith
    • 459 n.19 (2004) (citing, among others, E. Norman Veasey as suggesting that, if Delaware does not act, "there are emerging federal statutory duties and SEC Rules ... that may trump Delaware fiduciary law"). 15Del. Code. Ann. tit. 10, § 3114(b) (2004). 16Del. Code. Ann. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2004) (allowing corporations, in their Articles or Bylaws, to exculpate directors from personal monetary liability for breaches of the duty of care that do not amount to bad faith). 17In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006). 18The exculpatory clause, presumably, also would not protect the conduct of individuals who are officers and directors acting in their capacity as officers. 19See discussion infra Part III. 20See infra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
    • Hillary A. Sale, Delaware's Good Faith, 89 Cornell L. Rev. 456, 459
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  • 7
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    • Recalling Why Corporate Officers Are Fiduciaries
    • Lyman P.Q. Johnson David Millon, Recalling Why Corporate Officers Are Fiduciaries, 46 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1597, 1611 17 (2005).
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  • 8
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    • Common Law Duties of Non-Director Corporate Officers
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  • 9
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  • 10
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    • Corporate Officers and the Business Judgment Rule
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  • 11
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    • Corporate Officers and the Business Judgment Rule: A Reply to Professor Johnson
    • Lawrence A. Hamermesh A. Gilchrist Sparks, Corporate Officers and the Business Judgment Rule: A Reply to Professor Johnson, 60 Bus. Law. 865 (2005)
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    • Hamermesh, L.A.1    Gilchrist Sparks, A.2
  • 12
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    • Dangerous Liaisons: Corporate Law, Trust Law, and Interdoctrinal Legal Transplants
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    • Rock, E.1    Wachter, M.2
  • 13
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    • Shirking and Sharking: A Legal Theory of the Firm
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  • 14
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    • Enron and WorldCom Settlements Suggest Risk Factors for Directors
    • at 3. 42Several of the cases cited by Hamermesh and Sparks in fact recognize this notion. See Sparks & Hamermesh, supra note 24. 43Recognizing the agency law basis of officers' duties avoids an awkward doctrinal bifurcation whereby, for some purposes, officers are agents of the corporation and their conduct is measured by agency law standards, but for other purposes that status is ignored and a different set of legal standards is applied. 44This is the case because corporate law fiduciary duties are mandatory, while agency law duties are not. See infra Part IV. Of course, the issues regarding the enabling nature of agency law duties discussed in this article become less relevant as a practical matter if the business judgment rule is applied. 45See Restatement (Second) of Agency § 376 ("the existence and extent of the duties of the agent to the principal are determined by the terms of the agreement between the parties")
    • Shirli Fabbri Weiss David Priebe, Enron and WorldCom Settlements Suggest Risk Factors for Directors, Insights, Securities Litigation Newsletter, Feb. 2005, at 3.
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    • The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law: An Essay on the Judicial Role
    • nn.2-3 and accompanying text (1989). See also Orts, supra note 33, at 270 n.22 (citing articles that argue both for reducing mandatory fiduciary duties and for maintaining mandatory fiduciary duties);
    • John C. Coffee, Jr., The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law: An Essay on the Judicial Role, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1618, 1619 20
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    • Answering the Wrong Question: The Tenuous Case for Mandatory Corporate Laws
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    • Contract and Fiduciary Duty in Corporate Law
    • 625 n.79 and accompanying text (1997). If directors' fiduciary obligations were not mandatory, of course, section 102(b)(7) would be unnecessary. While it might be accurate to say that the evolution of the mandatory versus the enabling component of those duties has shifted over time toward a greater enabling component and greater flexibility for corporate actors, it seems equally clear that the duties themselves remain mandatory. See Coffee, supra note 54, at 1650-51. Fletcher's treatise asserts that (leaving aside codified exculpatory provisions) courts might allow exculpation of the duty of care but not the duty of loyalty. Id. at 1651 n.132 and accompanying text (citing 3A W. Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations, § 1047 (rev. perm. ed. 1986)).
    • Victor Brudney, Contract and Fiduciary Duty in Corporate Law, 38 B.C. L. Rev. 595, 625
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    • The Enforceability of Norms and the Employment Relationship
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    • Rock, E.B.1    Wachter, M.L.2
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    • The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law Norms, and the Unintended Consequences of Independence and Accountability
    • Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law Norms, and the Unintended Consequences of Independence and Accountability, 89 Geo. L.J. 797, 812 (2001)
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    • Bonus Questions: Executive Compensation in the Era of Pay for Performance
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