Third state obligations under the ICESCR: A case study of EU sugar policy

Nordic Journal of International Law

Volumn 76, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 73-100

  Vandenhole, Wouter ^a  

^a TILBURG UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 34547647782     PISSN: 09027351     EISSN: 15718107     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1163/090273507X181665     Document Type: Article

References (210)

1. See e.g. Agriculture and Development: The Case for Policy Coherence (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development OECD, Paris, 2005).
2. Although policy coherence for development features prominently in the European Consensus on Development, tangible commitments and measures to change EU Common Agricultural Policy are lacking (Joint Statement by the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States Meeting Widiin the Council, European Parliament and the Commission, The European Consensus on Development, 20 December 2005, Doc. 14820/05,〈ec.europa.eu/development/ body/development_policy_statement/docs/edp_dedaration_signed_20_12_2005_en. pdf#zoom= 125〉, visited on 20 December 2006).
3. See e.g. L. Stuart, Truth or Consequences. Why the EU and the USA Must Reform Their Subsidies, or Pay the Price, Oxfam Briefing Paper 81, November 2005.
4. A. Aksoy and J. Beghin, Global Agricultural Trade and Developing Countries, World Bank, Washington, 2005, p. 1.
5. Article 37 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community (TEC).
6. The European Parliament's opinion is purely advisory and is not legally binding upon the Council.
7. A qualified majority is a weighted voting system based on the populations of member states (see Article 205 of the TEC, amended by Article 12 of the Act of Accession, OJ L 236/2003, 36).
8. Aksoy and Beghin, supra note 4, p. 9.
9. K. Watkins, Dumping on the World. How EU Sugar Policies Hurt Poor Countries, Oxfam Briefing Paper 61, March 2004, p. 1.
10. Ibid., p. 8.
11. Ibid., p. 16.
12. Ibid., p. 15.
13. Aksoy and Beghin, supra note 4, p. 9;
14. Watkins, supra note 9, p. 10.
15. ACP stands for African-Caribbean-Pacific countries.
16. The Cotonou Agreement is a trade and aid treaty between the European Community and its member states on the one hand and the members of die African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States on the other. This partnership agreement was signed in 2000 and entered into force on 1 April 2003. It has been concluded for 20 years, with a revision every 5 years (Doc. 2000/483/EC, OJL 311).
17. Watkins, supra note 9, p. 13. It should be noted that ACP quota are unequally distributed: 80 per cent is going to five countries: Mauritius, which holds 38 per cent of EU quota
18. (see Aksoy and Beghin, supra note 9, p. 9),
19. Fiji, Guyana, Swaziland and Jamaica (Watkins, supra note 9, p. 10).
20. Moreover, the least developed countries among the ACP countries are seriously under-represented: only five benefit from the preferential trade agreement (i.e. Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia) and their share represents only four per cent of the total (Watkins, supra note 9, pp. 10, 11).
21. P. Fowler, A Sweeter Future? The Potential for EU Sugar Reform to Contribute to Poverty Reduction in Southern Africa, Oxfam Briefing Paper 70, November 2004, endnote 14.
22. It has been pointed out that the increase of imports from the LDCs was accommodated by transferring quotas from the ACP arrangement (Watkins, supra note 9, p. 32).
23. Watkins, supra note 9, p. 32.
24. See e.g. Mozambique and Ethiopia, where guaranteed sugar export to the EU helps to cover the costs of the investment, development and expansion of the industry (Fowler, supra note 17, p. 5).
25. Fowler, supra note 17, p. 40.
26. Watkins, supra note 9, p. 11.
27. Dumping is said to occur when export prices are below the cost of production.
28. British Overseas NGOs for Development (BOND), Our 2005 Challenge to the UK GovernmentEurope's Role in Making Poverty History, 2005, p. 16.
29. Watkins, supra note 9, p. 6.
30. Export subsidies are to bridge the gap between domestic and world prices (ibid., p. 8).
31. Ibid., pp. 12, 13.
32. See also Fowler, supra note 17, endnotes 22 and 23.
33. Ibid., p. 17.
34. Cf the WTO Appellate Body finding on cross-subsidisation, infra note 51.
35. Ibid, p. 28.
36. Aksoy and Beghin, supra note 4, p. 9.
37. Watkins, supra note 9, p. 28.
38. Actionaid International estimates that the current world price is 17 per cent lower due to price distortions (Actionaid International, Don't Make Poverty. What the G8 Must Do to Make Poverty History, 2005, p. 22).
39. Ibid., p. 8.
40. It is generally accepted that subsidies depress world prices and inhibit entry by inducing surplus production by non-competitive (often large) producers, and that domestic farm subsidies in industrial countries have exacerbated a low-price tendency by fostering production beyond what free markets would demand (Aksoy and Beghin, supra note 4, pp. 3, 4).
41. Spedfically with regard to quotas under the EBA Initiative, see also Watkins, supra note 9, pp. 35, 36.
42. BOND, supra note 22, p. 15.
43. Fowler, supra note 17, p. 12.
44. An estimated 36,000 livelihoods in sugar were destroyed in Swaziland, for example, when the export market to South Africa was lost due to EU dumping (Actionaid International, supra note 28, p. 22).
45. Watkins and Fowler have warned, however, for the complex relationship between sugar exports and poverty reduction: there are also, for example, the issues of bad. labour conditions on large estates and the environmental impact of sugar production (iff Fowler, supra note 17, pp. 21 et seq.;
46. Watkins, supra note 9, p. 31).
47. Neverdieless, the sugar industries' potential for poverty reduction has not been questioned (Fowler, supra note 17, pp. 21 et seq.).
48. Aksoy and Beghin, supra note 4, p. 3.
49. Ibid., p. 1.
50. Watkins, supra note 9, p. 28.
51. For comments on the selectivity in preferential market access, see supra note 16.
52. Watkins, supra note 9, pp. 39, 40.
53. Aksoy and Beghin, supra note 4, p. 3.
54. This was brought out by recent research undertaken by the Arkleton Institute for Rural Development Research, University of Aberdeen see 〈www.espon.eu/mmp/online/website/content/projects/243/277/file_1322/fr-2.1. 3_revised_31-03-05.pdf〉, visited on 20 December 2006),
55. and also appears from data made available by die United Kingdom (〈image.guardiad.co.uk/sys-files/Guardian/documents/2005/03/23/CAP. pdf〉, visited on 20 December 2006)
56. and Dutch governments (, visited on 20 December 2006).
57. Information from the Belgian federal and Flemish community government was requested, and eventually provided as well (see, inter alia, 〈www.birb.be〉, visited on 20 December 2006).
58. The European Commission has meanwhile launched a webpage with links to member state websites that provide information on beneficiaries of CAP payments (〈ec.europa.eu/agriculture/funding/index_en.htm〉, visited on 20 December 2006).
59. COM (2003) 554.
60. Sff Press Release 14178/05 of 22 November 2005.
61. The European Parliament hailed the Council for having announced a political agreement before having first obtained the opinion of Parliament see EP legislative resolutions A6-0391/2005, A6-0392/2005 and A6-0393/2005, 〈www.europarl.europa.eu〉, visited on 20 December 2006).
62. These regulations are to be adopted by a qualified majority.
63. Within the World Trade Organization, the Doha Round of negotiations, initiated in 2001, has been labelled a development round. In the Doha Declaration, the 148 member governments committed themselves to "comprehensive negotiations aimed at: substantial improvements in market access; reductions of, with a view to phasing out, all forms of export subsidies; and substantial reductions in tradedistorting domestic support" (Doha Declaration, para. 13, www.wto.org/English/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/ minded_e.htm, visited on 20 December 2006).
64. European Communities-Export Subsidies on Sugar-Complaint by Australia-Report of the Panel, 15 October 2004, WTO Panel, WTO Doc. 04-4209, paras. 8.1(d), (e) and (f) and 8.3, 〈www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/ cases_e/ds265_e.htm〉, visited on 20 December 2006.
65. See also Watkins, supra note 9, p. 16.
66. For more details on the 1994 Agreement on Agriculture, see C. Breining-Kaufmann, 'The Right to Food and Trade in Agriculture', in T. Cottier, J. Pauwelyn and E. Bürgi (eds.), Human Rights and International Trade (Oxford University Press, London, 2005) pp. 343-350.
67. Export Subsidies on Sugar, supra note 47, para. 8.5.
68. Ibid, para. 8.7.
69. European Communities-Export Subsidies on Sugar-AB-2005-2-Report of the Appellate Body, 28 April 2005, WTO Appellate Body, WTO Doc. 05-1728, paras. 346(d) and (f ), 〈www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds265_e. htm〉, visited on 20 December 2006.
70. Ibid., para. 347.
71. In an earlier proposal, limited quota cuts, with a reduction in domestic production ('A sugar') quota of 2.8 million tonnes over four years, were envisaged.
72. COM (2005) 263 final.
73. Council Regulation (EC) No. 318/2006 of 20 February 2006 on the common organisation of the markets in the sugar sector, OJ L 1-31;
74. Council Regulation (EC) No. 319/2006 of 20 February 2006 amending Regulation (EC) No. 1782/2003 establishing common rules for direct support schemes under the common agricultural policy and establishing certain support schemes for farmers, OJ L 32-41;
75. Council Regulation (EC) No. 320/2006 of 20 February 2006 establishing a temporary scheme for the restructuring of the sugar industry in the Community and amending Regulation (EC) No. 1290/2005 on the financing of the common agricultural policy, OJ L 42-50.
76. With regard to the latter, see Regulation (EC) No. 266/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 February 2006 establishing accompanying measures for Sugar Protocol countries affected by the reform of the EU sugar regime, OJ L 1-5.
77. See Press Release of 22 November 2005, Doc. 14178/05.
78. EP Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development, A6-0391/2005, p. 41, 〈www.europarl.europa.eu〉, visited on 20 December 2006.
79. EP legislative resolution A6-0391/2005, Amendment 78, 〈www.europarl.europa.eu〉, visited on 20 December 2006.
80. Aksoy and Beghin, supra note 4, p. 7.
81. Ibid., p. 35.
82. Fowler, supra note 17, pp. 5, 6;
83. Watkins, supra note 9, pp. 46, 47.
84. Fowler, supra note 17, p. 6;
85. Watkins, supra note 9, p. 8.
86. Fowler, supra note 17, pp. 34, 35.
87. Press Release at 21 November 2006, Doc. IP/06/1591.
88. See e.g. Aksoy and Beghin, supra note 4, p. 3;
89. Watkins, supra note 9, pp. 2, 6 and 34;
90. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Jean Ziegler, 24 January 2005, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2005/47, para. 40;
91. F. Coomans, 'Some Remarks on the Extraterritorial Application of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights', in F. Coomans and M. Kamminga (eds.), Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties (Intersentia, Antwerp, 2004) p. 193.
92. Fowler, supra note 17, pp. 4-6.
93. Ibid., pp. 1, 6 and 8.
94. Watkins, supra note 9, p. 49.
95. See Fowler, supra note 17, p. 10.
96. See the publications of the International Council on Human Rights Policy, FoodFirst Information and Action Network (FIAN), Médé cins sans Frontières and 3D, Trade-Human Rights-Equitable Economy.
97. Sff, in dironological order, P. Alston and G. Quinn, 'The Nature and Scope of States Parties' Obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights', 9 Human Rights Quarterly (1987), pp. 186-192;
98. M. Craven, The International. Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights-A Perspective on its Development (Clarendon, Oxford, 1995) pp. 144-150;
99. M. Sepúlveda, The Nature of the Obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Intersentia, Antwerp, 2003) pp. 370-377;
100. S. Skogly, 'The Obligation of International Assistance and Co-Operation in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights', in M. Bergsmo (ed.), Human Rights and Criminal Justice for the Downtrodden. Essays in Honour of Asbjøm Eide (Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden, 2003) pp. 403-420;
101. Coomans, supra note 66, pp. 183-199;
102. R. Künnemann, 'Extraterritorial Application of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights', in F. Coomans and M. Kamminga (eds), Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties (Intersentia, Antwerp, 2004) pp. 201-231;
103. W. Vandenhole, 'Third State Obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Towards a Normative Framework for Development Co-operation', unpublished paper for the AHRI Conference, September 2004;
104. M. Sepúlveda, 'Obligations of "International Assistance and Cooperation" in an Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights', 24 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights (2006) pp. 271-303;
105. more generally on third state obligations, see M. Gibney, K. Tomaševski and J. Vedsted-Hansen, 'Transnational State Responsibility for Violations of Human Rights', 12 Harvard Human Rights Journal (1999) pp. 267-295;
106. S. Skogly and M. Gibney, 'Transnational Human Rights Obligations', 24 Human Rights Quarterly (2002) pp. 781-798;
107. S. Skogly, Beyond National Borders: States' Human Rights Obligations in International Cooperation (Intersentia, Antwerp, 2006);
108. W Vandenhole, 'Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the CRC: Is There a Legal Obligation to Cooperate Internationally for Development?', 15 International Journal of Children's Rights (forthcoming in 2007).
109. For the ICESCR Committee, see General Comment No. 3 (1990), The Nature of States Parties' Obligations (Art. 2, para. I, of the Covenant), paras. 13, 14;
110. General Comment No. 4 (1991), The Right to Adequate Housing (Art. 11(1) of the Covenant), para. 19;
111. General Comment No. 8 (1997), The Relationship between Economic Sanctions and Respect for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, paras. 7-14;
112. General Comment No. 11 (1999), Plans of Action for Primary Education (Art. 14), para. 9;
113. General Comment No. 12 (1999), The Right to Adequate Food (art. U), paras. 36-41;
114. General Comment No. 13 (1999), The Right to Education (Article 13), paras. 56 and 60;
115. General Comment No. 14 (2000), The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (Article 12), paras. 38-42, 45 and 63-65;
116. General Comment No. 15 (2002), The Right to Water (Arts. 11 and 12), para. 30-36, 38 and 60 (all these General Comments can be found in UN Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.7).
117. See also reports of independent experts/special rapporteurs: Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Jean Ziegler, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2006/44, paras. 17-51;
118. Ziegler, supra note 66;
119. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health, Paul Hunt, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2005/51, paras. 62-66;
120. The Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health. Report of the Special Rapporteur, Paul Hunt, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2003/58, para. 28;
121. The Right to Adequate Food and to Be Free from Hunger. Updated Study on the Right to Food, Submitted by Mr. Asbjørn Eide, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1999/12, para. 131.
122. On the issue of human rights obligations versus inter-state obligations, see W Vandenhole, 'The Human Right to Development as a Paradox', 36 Verfassung und Recht in Übersee. Law and Politics in Africa, Asia and Latin America (2003) pp. 311-404.
123. Third state obligations in no way decrease or obliterate the domestic state's responsibility under the ICESCR. Third state obligations are always complementary-though not necessarily secondary-to domestic state obligations. The obligations to respect and to protect apply simultaneously to the domestic state and any third state. The obligation to fulfil, however, can be argued to be only a secondary obligation for third states, which is only triggered in case the domestic state fails to fulfil a certain right.
124. See Article 1 of the European Convention and Article 1 of the American Convention.
125. ECrtHR, Bankovic v. Belgium and others, 12 December 2001, Decision, No. 52207/99, Reports 2001-XII, para. 59.
126. In López Burgos v. Uruguay, the Human Rights Committee (HRC) opted for a disjunctive reading of the phrase "within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction", as if the undertaking to respect and to ensure human rights covered borh persons within the territory of a state and persons subject to a state's jurisdiction (iff HRC, López Burgos v. Uruguay, UN Doc. CCPR/C/13/D/52/1979, para. 12.3). This reading was recently confirmed in die Committee's General Comment No. 31 (General Comment No. 31, Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, para. 10).
127. See ECrtHR, Loizidou v. Turkey, 23 March 1995, Preliminary Objections, No. 15318/89, Reports 1996-VI;
128. ECrtHR, Cyprus v. Turkey, 10 May 2001, No. 25781/94, Reports 2001-IV;
129. ECrtHR, Ilascu v. Moldova and Russia, 8 July 2004, No. 48787/99, Reports 2004-VII.
130. See ECrtHR, Issa v. Turkey, 16 November 2004, No. 31821/96, 〈cmiskp.echr.coe.int//// tkp197/viewhbkm.asp?action= open&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01Cll66DEA398649&key= 9524&sessionId= 9789273&skin = hudoc-en&attachment=true>, visited on 20 December 2006;
131. ECrtHR, Öcalan v. Turkey, 12 May 2005, No. 46221/99, 〈cmiskp.echr.coe.int////tkp197/viewhbkm. asp?action=open&table= F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649&:key=10275&:sessionId= 9789273&skin = hudoc-en&attachment=true〈, visited on 20 December 2006;
132. Inter-American Commission of Human Rights, Coardetal. v. the United States, 29 September 1999, No. 10.951, Ann. Rep. IACHR, 1999.
133. Inter-American Commission of Human Rights, Armando Alejandro jr. and others v. Cuba, 29 September 1999, No. 11.589, Ann. Rep. IACHR, 1999.
134. C. Cerna, 'Extraterritorial Application of die Human Rights Instruments of the Inter-American System', in F. Coomans and M. Kamminga (eds.), Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties (Intersentia, Antwerp, 2004) p. 158.
135. ICJ, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), 27 June 1986, ICJ Reports (1986) p. 114, para. 220.
136. ICJ, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 9 July 2004, Advisory Opinion, para. 158, 〈www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iniwp/imwpframe.htm〉, visited on 20 December 2006.
137. ICJ, Case concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide (Bosnia-Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), 11 July 1996, Preliminary Objections, ICJ Reports (1996), p. 616, para. 31.
138. M. Craven, 'Human Rights in the Realm of Order: Sanctions and Extraterritoriality', in F. Coomans and M. Kamminga (eds.), Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties (Intersentia, Antwerp, 2004) p. 251.
139. The ICJ has suggested in passim that the absence of a jurisdictional clause in the ICESCR might be explained by the fact that it guarantees rights "which are essentially territorial" (Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, supra note 84, para 112). This suggestion, which is not substantiated, is difficult to reconcile with the multiple references to international assistance and co-operation in the same Covenant.
140. Alston and Quinn, supra note 72, p. 191.
141. F. Coomans and M. Kamminga, 'Comparative Introductory Comments on the Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties', in F. Coomans and M. Kamminga (eds.), Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties (Intersentia, Antwerp, 2004) p. 2;
142. Skogly, supra note 72, pp. 83-98.
143. UN General Assembly resolution of 8 September 2000, UN Doc. A/RES/55/2, para. 2.
144. Ibid., para. 6.
145. UN General Assembly resolution of 16 September 2005, UN Doc. A/RES/60/1, para. 4.
146. Resolution 1-Monterrey Consensus of the International Conference on Financing for Development, UN Doc. A/Conf.198/11, para. 4.
147. See also Coomans, supra note 66, pp. 190-192, for a number of other relevant documents.
148. UN General Assembly resolution of 4 December 1986, UN Doc. A/RES/41/128, para. 3.3.
149. Ibid., para. 4.1.
150. Ibid., para. 4.2.
151. The Working Group on the Right to Development has decided to work on the assessment of global partnerships for development from the perspective of the right to development (for a confirmation, see Report of the Working Group on the Right to Development on its seventh session (Geneva, 9-13 January 2006), UN Doc. E/CN.4/2006/26, para. 26.
152. See P. Alston, 'Ships Passing in the Night: The Current State of the Human Rights and Development Debate Seen Through the Lens of the Millennium Development Goals', 27 Human Rights Quarterly (2005) pp. 770-778.
153. Ziegler, supra note 66, para. 48;
154. Coomans, supra note 66, p. 190.
155. Coomans, supra note 66, p. 193.
156. Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, supra note 84, para. 112.
157. International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Article 50(l)(b), 〈untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draftper cent20articles/ 9_6_2001.pdf〉, visited on 20 December 2006. For the sources of evidence for this proposition,
158. see Craven, supra note 86, p. 254.
159. General Comment No. 12 (1999), supra note 73, para. 37.
160. A similar argument has been made with regard to the right to health (General Comment No. 14 (2000), supra note 73, para. 41)
161. and the right to water (General Comment No. 15 (2002), supra note 73, para. 32).
162. General Comment No. 12 (1999), supra note 73, para. 36.
163. General Comment No. 14 (2000), supra note 73, para. 39.
164. General Comment No. 15 (2002), supra note 73, para. 31.
165. General Comment No. 2 (1990), International Technical Assistance Measures (art. 22 of the Covenant), UN Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.7, para. 6.
166. General Comment No. 4 (1991), supra note 73, para. 19.
167. General Comment No. 7 (1997), The Right to Adequate Housing (art. 11(1) of the Covenant): Forced Evictions, UN Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.7, para. 18.
168. See supra note 33.
169. See supra note 35.
170. For a general analysis of the limitation clauses in the ECrtHR, see C. Ovey and R. White, Jacobs and White. European Convention on Human Rights (Clarendon, Oxford, 2002) pp. 198-215.
171. See General Comment No. 14 (2000), supra note 73, paras. 28, 29.
172. The EU had expressed its willingness to phase out its agricultural export subsidies on condition that its trading partners also eliminate their export subsidy programmes.
173. See Doc. WT/MIN(05)/DEC, Ministerial Declaration of 18 December 2005, para. 6.
174. Watkins, supra note 9, pp. 46, 47.
175. Fowler, supra note 17, pp. 5, 6.
176. Cf. Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UN Doc. E/C.1/ 2000/13, para. 19: "The obligations of States to protect economic, social and cultural rights extend also to their participation in international organizations, where they act collectively."
177. See ECrtHR, Matthews v. United Kingdom, 18 February 1999, No. 24833/94, Reports 1999-1, para. 32.
178. Ibid, para. 33.
179. ECrtHR, Bosphorusv. Ireland, 30 June 2005, No. 45036/98, paras. 115 (applicant) and 144 (Court), 〈cmiskp.echr.coe.int////tkp197/ viewhbkm.asp?action=open&table=F69A27FD8FB86l42BF01C116 6DEA398649&key= 10594&sessionId=9789273&:skin=hudoc-en&attachment = true〉, last visited on 20 December 2006.
180. Ibid, para. 157.
181. 1241 ECrtHR, Cantoni v. France, 15 November 1996, No. 17862/91, Reports 1996-V, para. 26.
182. European Commission for Human Rights, Ilse Hess v. the United Kingdom, 28 May 1975, No. 6231/73, 2 DR (1975) p. 73.
183. See Maastricht Guidelines, supra note 119, para. 19;
184. Craven, supra note 73, p. 148.
185. The third state obligation to protect has been understood by the ICESCR Committee as to require from states diat they prevent third parties from violating economic, social and cultural rights in other countries, if they are able to influence these third parties by way of legal or political means, in accordance with die Charter of the UN and applicable international law (see General Comment No. 14 (2000), supra note 73, para. 39;
186. General Comment No. 15 (2002), supra note 73, para. 33).
187. General Comment No. 15 (2002), supra note 73, para. 33.
188. On the possibility of future EU accession to die ECHR, see A. Verstichel, 'European Union Accession to the European Convention on Human Rights', in P. Lemmens and W Vandenhole (eds.), Protocol No. 14 and the Reform of lhe European Court of Human Rights (Intersentia, Antwerp, 2005) pp. 123-144.
189. See Matthews v. United Kingdom, supra note 120, para. 32.
190. ECJ, Accession by the European Community to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 28 March 1996,
191. Advisory Opinion 2/94, ECR (1996), p. 1-1789: international human rights treaties of which the member states are signatories are said to supply the European Court of Justice merely with 'guidelines'.
192. See D. Bradlow and C. Grossman, 'Limited Mandates and Intertwined Problems: A New Challenge for the World Bank and rhe IMF", 17 Human Rights Quarterly (1995) p. 428;
193. K. De Feyter, The International. Financial Institutions and Human Rights-Law and Practice, IDPM-UA Discussion Paper (2002), p. 9, 〈www.ua.ac.be/main.aspx?c=.IOBE&n 537383〉, visited on 20 December 2006;
194. 'Tilburg, Guiding Principles on World Bank, IMF and Human Rights', in W. van Genugten, P. Hunt and S. Mathews (eds.), World Bank, IMF and Human Rights (Wolf Legal Publishers, Nijmegen, 2003) pp. 247-255.
195. See ECJ, Mannesmannröhren-Werke AG v. Commission, 20 February 2001, No. T-112/98, ECR (2001-11), p. 754.
196. ECJ, Yusuf and Al Barakaat v. Council and Commission, 21 September 2005, No. T-306/01, Rec. (2005-11), p. 3533, paras. 235-257 (appeal pending).
197. Ziegler, supra note 66, para. 51.
198. Cf. Coomans, supra note 66, p. 193.
199. See also Watkins, supra note 9, p. 6, "to ensure that its policies do not undermine the efforts of poor people to improve their lives."
200. Contra Sepúlveda 2006, supra note 72, pp. 296-298.
201. On the reporting procedure and shadow reports, see W Vandenhole, The Procedures before the UN Treaty Bodies: Divergence or Convergence? (Intersentia, Antwerp, 2004) pp. 125-139.
202. Inter alia, Germany and Norway.
203. Sff 〈www.11.be〉, click 'themes' and 'human rights', visited on 20 December 2006.
204. Cf. the absence of references to third state obligations in the concluding observations on Germany and Norway, two states with respect to which a parallel report on third state obligations had been submitted (Concluding Observations Germany, UN Doc. E/C. 12/1/Add. 68; Concluding Observations Norway, UN Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.109).
205. See 〈www.ohchr.org/english/issues/food/complaints.htm〉, visited on 20 December 2006.
206. In the interim injunction proceedings, the Dutch judge had forbidden the Dutch minister to vote in favour of a particular decision at the European Council, as long as the European Court of Justice had not given a preliminary ruling on the issue, for he had his doubts on the substance of the regulation. The Supreme Court of the Netherlands (Hoge Road), however, found that the judge in the interim injunction proceedings lacked the competence for imposing such a prohibition (Hoge Road, 10 September 1999, No. C98/013HR, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie (2003) p. 94). The question is whether the outcome would have been different had a violation of human rights been the reason for the judge to intervene.
207. Watkins, supra note 9, p. 6.
208. Fowler, supra note 17, p. 6.
209. Ibid., pp. 21 and 37.
210. Cf. Watkins, supra note 9, p. 6.