Building the palace of peace: The Hague conference of 1907 and arms control before the World War

Journal of the History of International Law

Volumn 9, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 35-81

  Keefer, Scott Andrew ^a  

^a Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law ^*  (Germany)

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EID: 34547626764     PISSN: 1388199X     EISSN: 15718050     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1163/138819907X187297     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (281)

1. Address of Henry M. Leipziger, as quoted in Report of the Eleventh Annual Meeting of the Mohonk Lake Conference on International Arbitration 1905, 121, 122 (1905).
2. J.H. Rose, "Canning and Denmark in 1807", II English Historical Review 82, at 86 (1896).
3. R. Ernest Dupuy and Trevor N. Dupuy, The Encyclopedia of Military History: From 3500 B.C. to the Present 766 (2nd ed. 1986).
4. It should also be pointed out that circumstances in 1807 and 1907 were gready different, in that at the earlier date, Great Britain had been at war intermittently for fifteen years, while in 1907 the empire had been at peace, at least in Europe, for fifty one years. Nonetheless, the value of dusty old documents from a century past should not be underestimated when contemplating security debates of the present.
5. For an excellent discussion of this phenomena and its cultural roots, see generally, Jonathan Steinberg, "The Copenhagen Complex", 1 J. Contemporary History 23 (1966).
6. In a speech during a low point in Anglo-German relations in the Russo-Japanese War, Arthur Lee, civil lord of the Admiralty, stated that "[i]f war should unhappily be declared, under existing conditions, the British Navy would get its blow in first, before the other side had time even to read in the papers that war had been declared." Quoted in Jonathan Steinberg, "Germany and the Russo-Japanese War", 75 American Historical Review 1965, at 1984 (1970).
7. Churchill to Grey, 24 October 1913, in G.P. Gooch and H.W Temperley, eds., British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914, [hereinafter BD], Vol. X, No. 487, at 721.
8. Calvin DeArmond Davis, The United States and the Second Hague Peace Conference 142 (1976). Russian Professor Feodor de Martens, sent on a tour of the European capitals by his government to establish a consensus on topics to be discussed at The Hague, pointed out that the subject of " disarmament" was left off the agenda after failure to reach results on the subject in 1899.
9. Grey to Nicolson, 15 February 1907, BD, supra note 7, Vol. VIII, No. 178, at 208.
10. Russian Minister Izvolsky also noted that he was "much embarrassed and perplexed with the conflicting opinions which existed in regard to certain points in the programme of the Conference, and especially in respect to the question of the limitation of expenditure of armaments." Nicolson to Grey, 11 March 1907, BD, Vol. VIII, No. 183, at 214.
11. Bertie to Grey, 1 June 1906, BD, supra note 7, Vol. VIII, No. 160, at 190.
12. Grey to Bertie, 24 July 1906, BD, supra note 7, Vol. VIII, No. 161, at 191.
13. Jonathan Steinberg, supra, note 5, at 29.
14. See, Scott A. Keefer, "Building the Palace of Peace: The Hague Conference of 1899 and Arms Control in the Progressive Era", 8 J. History Int'l. L. 1 (2006).
15. David Dimbleby & David Reynolds, An Ocean Apart: The Relationship between Britain and America in the Twentieth Century, 38-39 (1988). The successful resolution of Alaskan boundary issue and renegotiation of Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of 1850 through the Hay-Pauncefaute Treaty of 1901 cemented the understanding of American predominance in the Western Hemisphere. For a good description of the issues involved in the renegotiation of the treaty,
16. see David McCullough, The Path between the Seas: The Creation of the Panama Canal, 1870-1914, 256-259 (1977).
17. Scott A. Keefer, "American Naval Strategy during the Age of the "New Navy" and its Effect on Foreign Policy during the Venezuelan Crisis of 1902-1903", (1999) (unpublished M. thesis, University of Tulsa) (on file with the University of Tulsa Library).
18. Convention between Chile and the Argentine Republic respecting the Limitation of Naval Armaments, May 28 1902, 1 Am. J. Int'l. L. 294 (Supp. 1907) [hereinafter Chilean-Argentine Convention of 1902].
19. Andrew D. Farrand, "Chile and Argentina: Entente and Naval Limitation, 1902", in Richard Dean Burns, ed., Encyclopedia of Arms Control and Disarmament, Vol. II, 595, at 597 (1993).
20. Id. at 597.
21. Id. at 599.
22. Id. at 599-600.
23. Chilean-Argentine Convention of 1902, supra note 15, at Art. I.
24. Id. at Art. II.
25. Señor Donoso to Sen̈or Terry, 28 May 1902, in 1 Am. J. Int'l. L. 295 (Supp. 1907);
26. Señor Terry to Señor Donoso, 28 May 1902, in 1 Am. J. Int'l. L. 296 (Supp. 1907).
27. Andrew D. Farrand, supra note 16, at 602.
28. Explanatory Protocol, July 10, 1902, 1 Am. J. Int'l. L. 296 (Supp. 1907).
29. Id. at para. 1.
30. Ultimately, the two parties signed an agreement in early 1903 specifying the sale of warships under construction for both states, and mandating the terms of the "just balance" by the disarming of several battleships. Agreement Concluded and Signed between the Argentine Republic and Chile on the 9th January, 1903, giving effect to the terms of the Convention of May 28, 1902, for the Limitation of Naval Armaments, January 9, 1903, 1 Am. J. Int'l. L. 297 (Supp. 1907).
31. Chilean-Argentine Convention of 1902, supra note 15, at Art. I. The Explanatory Protocol also noted that the parties had a need for the "natural defense" of both Chile in the Pacific and the Argentine Republic in the Atlantic, tacitly acknowledging the interests at stake in the border claims.
32. Explanatory Protocol, supra note 24, para. 2.
33. General Treaty of Arbitration concluded between Chile and the Argentine Republic, May 28, 1902, 1 Am. J. Int'l. L. 292 (Supp. 1907).
34. It is also worth noting that Chile and Argentina conducted both official and private negotiations in order to prevent inflaming public opinion already on edge. Andrew D. Farrand, supra note 16, at 602. This is in contrast to stated goal at the First Hague Conference of having formal sessions as accessible to the public as possible.
35. See generally, Robert N. Burr, "The Balance of Power in Nineteenth Century South America: An Exploratory Essay", 35 Hispanic American Historical Review 37, 53 (1955).
36. Chilean-Argentine Convention of 1902, supra note 15, at Art. III.
37. See generally, Hugh Lyon, "Argentina", in Robert Gardiner, ed., Conway's All the World's Fighting Ships, 1860-1905, at 401 et. seq. (1979);
38. Hugh Lyon, "Chile", id. at 410, et. seq. Neither country built any of their major sea going warships during this period, importing from European shipbuilding firms.
39. See also Varun Sahni, "Not Quite British: A Study of External Influences on the Argentine Navy", 25 J. Latin American Studies 489 (1993).
40. See generally, Hugh Lyon, "Argentina", in Conway's All the World's Fighting Ships, 1860-1905, supra note 32, at 401 et. seq.;
41. Hugh Lyon, "Chile", id. at 410, et. seq.;
42. each state did resume purchases of major warships after the five year period, buying expensive dreadnought battleships abroad; Robert L. Scheina, "Argentina", in Robert Gardiner, ed., Conway's All the World's Fighting Ships, 1906-1921, 400, et. seq. (1997),
43. Roben L. Scheina, "Chile", id. at 407, et. seq.
44. For an extensive history of these negotiations, see James L. Garrett, "The Beagle Channel Dispute: Confrontation and Negotiation in the Southern Cone", 27 J. Interamerican Studies &WorldAffairs 81(1985).
45. John Roberts, "Great Britain", in Conway's All the World's Fighting Ships, 1860-1905, supra note 32, at 39. The Italians had successfully exported the Garibaldi class of ship, sending one to Spain, sailing and sinking under the name of Cristóbal Colón, and two to Japan, serving under the names Kasuga and Nisshin, aside from selling three to Argentina.
46. Aldo Fraccaroli, "Italy", id. at 351.
47. So satisfied were the Italians with this design that they commissioned three of these ships for their own navy. Id.
48. John Roberts, "Great Britain", in Conway s All the World's Fighting Ships, 1860-1905, supra note 32, at 39.
49. Id.
50. "Germany and Venezuela: The Bombardment of San Carlos," Times (London) : 26 January 1903, p. 5;
51. "Germany Seeks Warships," New York Times, 1 February 1903, p. 2.
52. Seward W. Livermore, "Battleship Diplomacy in South America: 1905-1925", 16 J. Modern History 31, at 37 (1944). The German Imperial Navy Office later estimated that between 1906 and 1914 Great Britain earned 432.2 million marks in battleship exports, while Germany only made 39 million marks.
53. Michael Epkanhans, "Krupp and the Imperial German Navy, 1898-1914: A Reassessment", 64 J. Military History 335, at 344 (2000).
54. Seward W Livermore, supra note 39, at 35, 36-37. The international competition for the sale of two battleships to Argentina described by Livermore clearly reflected the "no holds barred" approach to weapons exports. Bidders handed sensitive technology over to the Argentine Navy in an attempt to secure the contract, despite objections by the United States Navy. Before deciding on purchasing an American built warship, the Argentine government evaluated battleship designs submitted by companies in Great Britain, Germany and the United States, decided on the best features, and then circulated the features among all the competitors asking that they be incorporated in revised designs. This caused an uproar by sharing battleship design characteristics among the rivals.
55. Robert L. Scheina, "Argentina", in Conway's All the World's Fighting Ships, 1906-1921, supra note 33, at 401.
56. David Stevenson, Armaments and the Coming of War: Europe, 1904-1914, 18 (1996). Stevenson graphically listed some of the necessary equipment, noting "[s]teel armor needed 8,000 ton presses and planing machines with a stroke of 38 feet; heavy guns were prepared on 90-foot lathes, and their mountings with 30-foot circular saws."
57. Id.
58. Michael Epkanhans, supra note 39, at 351.
59. The challenges of financing and building the infrastructure necessary to construct major warships meant lower initial efficiency and loss of profits. Michael Epkanhans, supra note 39, at 342-343. Krupp initially lost money building battleships for the German Navy, but in the early 1900s started seeing revenue, earning 18.6% profit on a ship built between 1902 and 1905.
60. Id. at 343. However, British firms in this same period earned up to 30% on contracts.
61. Id. at 343-344.
62. Id. at 344-345.
63. Gary E. Weir, Building the Kaiser's Navy: The Imperial Naval Office and German Industry in the von Tirpitz Era, 1890-1919, 33 (1992) ;
64. Alfred Thayer Mahan, Armaments and Arbitration, 19 (1912).
65. According to Weir, Great Britain could complete a battleship in twenty four months, while it took Germany thirty six months and France up to sixty months. Gary E. Weir, supra note 45, at 89.
66. The United States, for instance, used the Venezuelan Crisis to increase naval appropriations in the spring of 1903. Alfred Vagts, "Hopes and Fears of an American-German War, 1870-1915, I", 54 Political Science Q. 514, at 534 (1939).
67. Denis E. Showalter, "Army and Society in Imperial Germany: The Pains of Modernization", 18 J. Contemporary Hist. 583, at 601 (1983).
68. Alfred Vagts, "Land and Sea Power in the Second German Reich", 3 J. Am. Military Inst. 210, at 217 (1939).
69. Id. at 217. The German conscription system should also be contrasted with the volunteer navy of Great Britain, as the latter faced difficulty hiring, competitively paying, and retaining the services of qualified officers.
70. Jon Sumida, "British Naval Administration and Policy in the Age of Fisher", 54 J. Military History 1, at 8-10 (1990).
71. Michael Epkanhans, supra note 39, at 339. Additionally, as has been noted by Vagts, naval war had a bourgeois aspect, in that conflict occurred out on the open sea, far from cities and populations, making the risk of war more palatable -a strategy of limited liability in an era of increasing risk of total war.
72. Alfred Vagts, "Hopes and Fears of an American-German War, 1870-1915, II", 55 Political Science Q. 53, at 54-55 (1940).
73. Geof Eley, "Reshaping the Right: Radical Nationalism and the German Navy League, 1898-1908", 21 Historical J. 327, at 334-335, 345 (1978). It should be noted that this loose alliance was not always found palatable to conservatives. Rural agrarian interests, for example, feared competition from overseas colonies and opposed imperial expansion.
74. Id. at 329.
75. Paul M. Kennedy, "German World Policy and Alliance Negotiations with England, 1897-1900", 45 J. Modern History 603, at 607-608 (1973).
76. Alfred Vagts, supra note 47, at 522-524.
77. See Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783, (Dover 1987) (1890).
78. Lawrence Sondhaus, "Strategy, Tactics, and the Politics of Penury: The Austro-Hungarian Navy and the Jeune Ecole", 56 J. Military History 587, at 600-601 (1992).
79. Such considerations influenced Liberal British, as well as German, policy makers who sought to move naval funds into other types of warships, such as submarines. Nicholas A. Lambert, "British Naval Policy, 1913-1914: Financial Limitation and Strategic Revolution", 67 J. Modern History 595, at 620-621 (1995);
80. Gary E. Weir, supra note 45, at 78, 97. German Admiral Tirpitz went so far as to label advocates of submarines and alternate naval strategies as "enemies of the navy" and have them removed from service.
81. Id. at 78, 84.
82. See for example, P. M. Kennedy, "The Development of German Naval Operations Plans Against England, 1896-1914", 89 English Historical. Review 48, at 57-59 (1974). For the German Army, France remained the enemy, while the German Navy focused on England.
83. See Alfred Vagts, supra note 49, at 218-219.
84. For the British Army, the enemy was Russia, at least until a more effective mission could be found against Germany. J. McDermott, "The Revolution in British Military Thinking from the Boer War to the Moroccan Crisis", in Paul M. Kennedy, ed., War Plans of the Great Powers, 1880-1914, 99, at 108 (1979).
85. Alfred Vagts, supra note 49, at 219-220.
86. Even without venturing into the war guilt arguments of Fischer and others, or pondering what Betthman-Holweg knew in July 1914, the lack of communication appears genuine and yet astonishing to modern eyes. For instance, the British Army's strategic investigation of Germany as an enemy lagged behind Foreign Office concerns of a German threat, demonstrating lack of communication. J. McDermott, in War Plans of the Great Powers, 1880-1914, supra note 58, at 107-108. In 1906, on the heels of the First Moroccan Crisis, even Sir Edward Grey lacked full knowledge of political-military connections between his nation and its Entente partner France, and mistakenly believed that the British and French navies had begun talks on naval cooperation.
87. See P. Haggie, "The Royal Navy and War Planning in the Fisher Era", in id. at 118, 125.
88. In 1908, while the War Office coordinated military strategy with the French Army, the British Navy devised plans to deal with the contingency of war against a Franco-German alliance. Id. Evidence indicates that while the Foreign Office focused on Germany as a rival, the British Navy followed an "isolationist" outlook towards security, arming against all states.
89. See A. J. A. Morris, "The English Radicals' Campaign for Disarmament and the Hague Conference of 1907", 43 J. Modern History 367, at 380, fn. 37 (1970).
90. Nicholas A. Lambert, "Admiral Sir John Fisher and the Concept of Flotilla Defence, 1904-1909", 59 J. Military History 639, at 642 (1995). According to this theory as ably expounded by Lambert and Jon Sumida, the battlecruiser, a new hybrid warship type that immediately followed the Dreadnought and carried the armament of a battleship, but possessed the speed and thin armor of an armored cruiser, would replace both the fleets of battleships and armored cruisers, taking on both roles.
91. Id at 642-643;
92. Jon Tetsuro Sumida, "Sir John Fisher and the Dreadnought: The Sources of Naval Mythology", 59 J. Military History 619, at 620 (1995).
93. Kenneth L. Moll, "Politics, Power, and Panic: Britain's 1909 Dreadnought 'Gap'", 29 Military Affairs 133, at 135 (1965).
94. Calvin DeArmond Davis, supra note 8, at 148. It should be noted that the British only cut this battleship after concluding it would cause no material injury to their naval superiority.
95. Andre T. Sidorowicz, "The British Government, the Hague Peace Conference of 1907, and the Armaments Question", in B. J. C. McKercher, ed., Arms Limitation and Disarmament, Restraint on War, 1899-1939, 1, at 5 (1992).
96. Kenneth L. Moll, supra note 62, at 134.
97. Id. at 135.
98. Id. at 142.
99. See A. J. A. Morris, supra note 60, at 372.
100. Frederick C. Leiner, "The Unknown Effort: Theodore Roosevelt's Battleship Plan and International Arms Limitation Talks, 1906-1907", 48 Military Affairs 174, at 175 (1984).
101. Data compiled from N. J. M. Campbell, "United States of America", in Conway's All the World's Fighting Ships, 1860-1905, supra note 32, at 114, 139-144.
102. See Calvin DeArmond Davis, supra note 8, at 141-142.
103. Annual Message of President Theodore Roosevelt to Congress, 6 December 1904, in U.S Dep't of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States 1904, at XLI (1905).
104. Root to Ambassador Tower, 15 January 1907, in U.S Dep't of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States 1907, Part II, at 1099 (1910).
105. Bertie to Grey, 17 May 1906, BD, supra note 7, Vol. VIII, No. 159, at 189;
106. Bertie to Grey, 1 June 1906, id., Vol. VIII, No. 160, at 189-190.
107. Grey to Durand, 25 July 1906, BD, supra note 7, Vol. VIII, No. 162, at 191.
108. Calvin DeArmond Davis, supra note 8, at 150-152. This degree of informality surprised professional British diplomats, and caused a minor stir when Carnegie returned to the United States and circulated stories of German hostility and aggressive intent toward America.
109. Id. at 154-155.
110. Gleichen to Durand, 2 September 1906, enclosure in Durand to Grey, 7 September 1906, BD, supra note 7, Vol. VIII, No. 165, at 195. This would preserve the utility of the fleet of American pre-Dreadnought battleships, and as British Admiralty observers noted, would favor the Americans and Germans, who possessed shallow coastlines and lacked deep harbors necessary for the bigger dreadnoughts.
111. Keith Neilson, "'The British Empire Floats on the British Navy': British Naval Policy, Belligerent Rights, and Disarmament, 1902-1909", in Arms Limitation and Disarmament: Restraints on War, 1899-1939, supra note 63, at 21, 32.
112. Pourtalès to Sternburg, 16 October 1906, Die Grosse Politik der europdischen Kabinette, 1871-1914, [hereinafter Die Grosse Politik] vol. XXIII, No. 7821, at 91.
113. In response to the proposal, the Kaiser interjected "[a]blehnen! Jeder Staat baut das was ihm paßt! Geht keinen Andern was an!" Marginal note of 15 October 1906, Pourtalès to Wilhelm II, 13 October 1906, Die Grosse Politik Vol. XXIII, No. 7820, at 90.
114. Grey to Durand, 6 November 1906, BD, supra note 7, Vol. VIII, No. 167, at 197. The British also sought political capital out of the conference, regardless of its outcome. As the House of Commons and the British public would want to know why their Navy continued to require heavy funding, Sir Edward Grey hoped to place the blame for the expense at Germany's doorstep, on account of German refusal to negotiate.
115. Grey to Knollys, 12 November 1906, BD, supra note 7, Vol. VIII, No. 168, at 198.
116. Lascelles to Grey, 16 August 1906, BD, supra note 7, Vol. VIII, No. 163, at 192.
117. Captain Dumas to Sir F. Lascelles, 9 January 1907, enclosure in Lascelles to Grey, 10 January 1907, BD, supra note 7, Vol. VI, No. 1, at 2.
118. Grey to Bertie, 5 December 1906, BD, supra note 7, Vol. VIII, No. 170, at 199.
119. White to Root, 12 January 1907, in U.S Dep't of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States 1907, supra note 72, Part II, at 1100.
120. White to Root, 1 March 1907, in U.S Dep't of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States 1907, supra note 72, Part II, at 1102.
121. Cartwright to Grey, 29 January 1907, BD, supra note 7, Vol. VIII, No. 174, at 202.
122. Sir Edward Grey noted that if the conference adopted proportional limits, the population of British India would greatly outweigh that of Germany. Marginal Note of Grey, Cartwright to Grey, id., at 203.
123. See Calvin DeArmond Davis, supra note 8, at 160.
124. See Nicolson to Grey, 11 March 1907, BD, supra note 7, Vol. VIII, No. 183, at 213, 214.
125. Rosen to Root, 22 March/4 April 1907, in U.S Dep't of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States 1907, supra note 72, Part II, at 1108. Throughout the entire year leading up to the conference, the British sought to engage the United States to take the lead in discussions.
126. Id.
127. Nicolson to Grey, 14 March 1907, BD, supra note 7, Vol. VIII, No. 185, at 215. Sir Edward Grey previously told Professor de Martens that "the matter should [not] simply be raised and buried in half-an-hour... the discussion must be a serious one."
128. Grey to Nicolson, 15 February 1907, BD, supra note 7, Vol. VIII, No. 179, at 209, 210.
129. M. de Nelidov, as quoted in Calvin DeArmond Davis, supra note 8, at 186.
130. Instructions to the American Delegates to the Hague Conference, 1907, in U.S Dep't of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States 1907, supra note 72, Part II, at 1128, 1129.
131. See James Brown Scott, The Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907 Vol. 1, 95 et. seq. (1909) [hereinafter The Hague Peace Conferences by Scott]. Another practical result of Latin American participation, as well as a direct consequence of the Venezuelan Crisis of 1902-1903, the Drago Doctrine made its way on to the agenda, seeking limitations on the use of force in the collection of debts. This resulted in the Convention [No. II] Respecting the Limitation of the Employment of Force for the Recovery of Contract Debts, October 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2241, 2 Am. J. Int'l. L. 81 (Jan. - Apr. Supp. 1908).
132. Grey to Bryce, 15 March 1907, BD, supra note 7, Vol. VIII, No. 186, at 216. Grey additionally sought a more limited role for military experts at the conference, in contrast to the 1899 Conference, which major naval figures, including Alfred Thayer Mahan and John Fisher, dominated.
133. Grey to Nicolson, 21 March 1907, BD, supra note 7, Vol. VIII, No. 188, at 217.
134. Hague Declaration Prohibiting the Discharge of Projectiles and Explosives from Balloons, October 18, 1907, 2 Am. J. Int'l. L. 216 (Jan. - Apr. Supp. 1908).
135. Id.
136. For instance, the preamble to the weak Convention Relative to the Laying of Automatic Submarine Contact Mines expressed a belief in that it would lead to further regulation, "[u]ntil such time as it is found possible to formulate rules on the subject which shall ensure to the interests involved all the guarantees desirable." Hague Convention [No. VIII] Relative to the Laying of Automatic Submarine Contact Mines, October 18, 1907, 2 Am. J. Int'l. L. 138, (Jan. - Apr. Supp. 1908) [hereinafter Hague Convention Relative to Submarine Mines]. To reaffirm this intent, the convention went on to require renegotiation of the regulation at the conclusion of its seven year duration, if a third Peace Conference had not done so already. Id. at art. 11.
137. See The Hague Peace Conferences by Scott, supra note 93, at 576.
138. Id. At 580-581. In the 1904-1905 Russo-Japanese War, Japan lost two of her six battleships to mines, Russia also losing a battleship to mines.
139. A. J. Watts, Japan, in Conway's All the World's Fighting Ships, 1860-1905, supra note 32, at 216, 221-222;
140. N. J. M. Campbell, Russia, in id., at 170, 181. In the entire Great War of 1914-1918, Great Britain lost only one dreadnought battleship to enemy action, and this loss resulted from striking a mine.
141. Anthony Preston, Great Britain, in Conway's All the World's Fighting Ships, 1906-1921, supra note 33, at 1, 30.1
142. Hague Convention Relative to Submarine Mines, supra note 97, at art. I (1) & (2).
143. Id. at art. 2.
144. See The Hague Peace Conferences by Scott, supra note 93, at 582.
145. The Hague Peace Conferences by Scott, supra note 93, at 581. German delegate Marschall von Bieberstein did note that international law possessed limited value in regulating wartime behavior, and cautioned against the creation of norms that countered military necessity, as they would not be observed in wartime and would diminish respect for the rule of law.
146. Id. at 586-587.
147. Final Act and Conventions of the Second Peace Conference, October 18, 1907, 2 Am. J. Int'l. L. 1, (Jan. - Apr. Supp. 1908). Even a suggested slight change in wording of the text, "plus que jamais urgente," caused difficulty. Marschall to the Foreign Office, 24 July 1907, Die Grosse Politik, supra note 77, Vol. XXIII, No. 7971, at 303-304;
148. Tschirschky to Marschall, 26 July 1907, id., Vol. XXIII, No. 7973, at 305.
149. The Hague Peace Conferences by Scott, supra note 93, at 663-665.
150. Id. at 669.
151. "Hic Jacet La Question de la Limitation des Armements, Née à Saint Petersbourg, le 24, Août, Etauffée à la Haye, le 18 Août 1907." Calvin DeArmond Davis, supra note 8, at 219.
152. This stance contrasted with the 1899 Conference, in which Great Britain and the United States both opposed two of the three armaments declarations. Scott A. Keefer, supra note 12, at 13.
153. In his 1907 annual message, he noted the failure of limitation of armaments when asking for four new battleships, and further commented that the Navy offered "by far the best insurance for peace that can by human ingenuity be devised." Annual Message of President Theodore Roosevelt to Congress, 3 December 1907, in U.S Dep't of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States 1907, supra note 82, Part I, at LII, LX.
154. As quoted in Calvin DeArmond Davis, supra note 8, at 301.
155. See e.g. Calvin DeArmond Davis, supra note 8, at 221, et. seq.
156. See also The Hague Peace Conferences by Scott, supra note 93, at Vol. I, at 575-576.
157. See e.g., C. H. Stockton, "The International Naval Conference of London, 1908-1909", 3 Am. J. Int'l. L. 596, at 608, 612 (1909).
158. Calvin DeArmond Davis, supra note 8, at 304.
159. Walther Schücking, "Die Organisation der Welt", 533, 608-609 in Staatsrecthliche Abhandlungen: Festgabe für Paul Laband, (1908);
160. Walther Schücking, "Die Organisation der Welt", as quoted in Hans Wehberg, The Limitation of Armaments: A Collection of the Projects Proposed for the Solution of the Problem, Preceded by an Historical Introduction, 56 (Edwin H. Zeydal, trans. 1921) [hereinafter The Limitation of Armaments];
161. see also The Hague Peace Conferences by Scott, supra note 93, at Vol. I, 670.
162. As quoted in The Limitation of Armaments, supra note 113, at 33. For a good discussion of the interplay of the law of war at sea and British naval armament policy,
163. see Keith Neilson, supra note 76.
164. Kenneth L. Moll, supra note 62, at 140.
165. Id. at 137.
166. Id. at 138;
167. Grey to Goschen, 4 January 1909, BD, supra note 7, Vol. VI, No. 151, at 237, 238.
168. The Berliner Tageblatt perhaps more accurately recognized that the British devised this dilemma for themselves by introducing the dreadnought. Only in 1909 did the British public realize their predominance in older battleships no longer guaranteed security. Goschen to Grey, 20 May 1909, BD, supra note 7, Vol. VI, No. 180, at 272, 273.
169. See, e.g. Dumas to Lascelles, 23 October 1907, enclosure in Lascelles to Grey, 24 October 1907, BD, supra note 7, Vol. VI, No. 39, at 62, 64.
170. As of the end of 1908, Great Britain had one dreadnought completed and six under construction, while Germany had seven under construction, although more of the British ships were near completion. Data drawn from Anthony Preston, "Great Britain", in Conway's All the World's Fighting Ships, 1906-1921, supra note 33, 1 et. seq;
171. N.J.M. Campbell, "Germany", in Conway's All the World's Fighting Ships, 1906-1921, supra note 33, at 134 et. seq. The British relied on their ability to complete ships more rapidly to offset these numbers. The total construction time of a battleship resulted more from the lengthier time it took to complete its heavy guns than from the period necessary to build the hulls.
172. See Dumas to Lascelles, 29 January 1907, enclosure in Lascelles to Grey, 1 February 1907, BD, supra note 7, Vol. VI, App. II, at 769, 771. Thus verification of stockpiled artillery would serve as a more accurate indicator of German capabilities than inspection of ships in dock.
173. Grey to Goschen, 3 February 1909, BD, supra note 7, Vol. VI, No. 152, at 239.
174. Grey to Goschen, 18 March 1909, BD, supra note 7, Vol. VI, No. 156, at 244, 245.
175. Goschen to Grey, 26 March 1909, BD, supra note 7, Vol. VI, No. 161, at 251-252.
176. Grey to Goschen, 23 June 1909, BD, supra note 7, Vol. VI, No. 182, at 275, 277.
177. Lascelles to Grey, 31 July 1908, BD, supra note 7, Vol. VI, No. 99, at 156.
178. See Memorandum by Sir Edward Grey, 31 July 1908, BD, supra note 7, Vol. VI, Appendix III, at 779.
179. Memorandum by Sir Charles Hardinge, 16 August 1908, BD, supra note 7, Vol. VI, No. 117, at 184, 187.
180. Id. at 186.
181. See also marginal notes of Kaiser Wilhelm II in Metternich to von Bülow, 11 August 1908, Die Grosse Politik, supra note 77, Vol. XXIV, No. 8228, at 131-132.
182. See, e.g. Notes of Eyre Crowe, in Lascelles to Grey, 12 February 1908, BD, supra note 7, Vol. VI, No. 81, at 117, 132.
183. Grey, for his part, felt that British concerns directly stemmed from the arms race, as no other issue separated Germany and Great Britain, thus arms control best served as the first step. Memorandum by Sir Edward Grey, 6 August 1908, BD, supra note 7, Vol. VI, No. III, at 173-I74.
184. Walther Schücking, The International Union of the Hague Conferences, (Charles G. Fenwick trans. 1918) 320;
185. The Hague Peace Conferences by Scott, supra note 93, at Vol. I, at 671;
186. Richmond Pearson Hobson, "Disarmament", z Am. J. Int'l L. 743 (1908).
187. See e.g. Goschen to Hardinge, 28 May 1910, BD, supra note 7, Vol. VI, No. 374, at 489-490.
188. Grey to Goschen, 16 December 1910, BD, supra note 7, Vol. VI, No. 425, at 575-576.
189. Grey to Goschen, 27 January 1911, BD, supra note 7, Vol. VI, No. 428, at 579-580. It should be noted that the initial draft of the offer to Germany anticipated that the agreement would be binding, but that Grey omitted this part upon discussions with the Admiralty.
190. Notes to Grey to Goschen, id.
191. Id.
192. Goschen to Grey, 24 March 1911, BD, supra note 7, Vol. VI, No. 454, at 608. The draft text stated that simultaneous exchanges of information would occur with regard to "1. The dimensions of the ships to be laid down. 2. The protection, armament, speed, and horse-power of the ships. 3. The dates of their laying down and completion."
193. Goschen to Grey, 25 March 1911, BD, supra note 7, Vol. VI, No. 455, at 610.
194. Naval attachés from each country would apply to the host country when they sought an inspection visit, drawing British concern that such an undefined process could preclude confidence in verification. Notes of Eyre Crowe in Goschen to Grey, id. at 611.
195. Goschen to Grey, 30 March 1911, BD, supra note 7, Vol. VI, No. 457, at 612.
196. Id. The German representative had previously noted that in the need of a party to alter its construction program due to events in the world, it "would form the subject of a friendly discussion between the two Governments."
197. Id. at 613.
198. See also Aide-Memoire of von Kiderlen, 27 June 1911, Die Grosse Politik, supra note 77, Vol. XXVIII, No. 10452, at 423-424.
199. Admiralty to Foreign Office, 16 May 1911, BD, supra note 7, Vol. VI, No. 465, at 629.
200. De Salis to Grey, 1 July 1911, BD, supra note 7, Vol. VI, No. 472, at 640.
201. Admiralty to Foreign Office, 21 August 1911, BD, supra note 7, Vol. VI, No. 474, at 642.
202. Goschen to Grey, 28 January 1912, BD, supra note 7, Vol. VI, No. 489, at 662.
203. Admiralty to Foreign Office, 12 December 1911, BD, supra note 7, Vol. VI, No. 478, at 647.
204. Proposals for Exchange of Naval Information between England and Germany, Enclosure in Goschen to Grey, 12 January 1912, BD, supra note 7, Vol. VI, No. 485, at 655, 658.
205. Russell to Goschen, Enclosure in Goschen to Grey, 4 March 1911, BD, supra note 7, Vol. VI, No. 442, at 593, 594. These views found their supporters among (mainly German) academic circles.
206. See, for example, Lujo Brentano, "English Naval Supremacy and Germany", Neue Freie Presse, (Vienna): 24 December 1911, as quoted in The Limitation of Armaments, supra note 113, at 49-50,
207. calling for a British renunciation of the two power standard as well as an alliance with Germany; "Proposal of the German Peace Society 1909", as quoted in The Limitation of Armaments, supra note 113, at 79, setting the British naval budget at double the level of their German counterpart combined with either an alliance or a general multilateral naval limitation agreed at the Hague;
208. Walther Schücking, supra note 129, at 187, connecting armament concessions and political issues at the Hague in 1907.
209. Enclosure in Goschen to Grey, 15 October 1909, BD, supra note 7, Vol. VI, No. 200, at 293, 297. Eyre Crowe noted that a naval agreement would last only two or three years, while the territorial settlement would be permanent.
210. Minutes of E.A.C. in Goschen to Grey, 15 October 1909, id.
211. Great Britain sought to offer only "pacific assurances" of good intentions, which would include formal statements that the French and Russian ententes had no anti-German goal, and that Great Britain would undertake no "unprovoked attack" on Germany, possibly assuaging concerns of a Copenhagen occurring. Goschen to Grey, 15 October 1909, id., 293-294.
212. The British record is littered with memoranda and notes expressing these concerns. As Charles Hardinge eloquently, if hostilely, phrased it, "[i]t must be remembered that the one obstacle to German hegemony in Europe has been the strength and independence of the British Navy ... for England to tie her own hands and to remain neutral while Germany established her supremacy on the Continent would be a derogation from the honourable rôle which Great Britan has played in Europe for more than three hundred years and which has greatly contributed to the peace of the world." Notes of Charles Hardinge in Goschen to Grey, 4 November 1909, BD, supra note 7, Vol. VI, No. 204, at 304, 311. Additionally if negotiations failed to achieve concrete results, then the parties risked engendering even worse relations.
213. Goschen to Nicholson, 28 October 1910, BD, supra note 7, Vol. VI, No. 408, at 539.
214. See Jonathan Steinberg, supra note 5, at 29-30;
215. Extract from the Times of October 24, 1924, Secret papers of Tirpitz, BD, supra note 7, Vol. VI, No. 124, at 197, 198-199.
216. However, many German naval officers anticipated that the British would take a more cautious approach to war with Germany, and not undertake a surprise attack at the start of hostilities. P. M. Kennedy, "The Development of German Naval Operations Plans Against England, 1896-1914", supra note 58, at 64-65. This British strategy could also be inferred from negotiating stances on distant blockade at the Hague in 1907 and London in 1908.
217. Depending on their belief in the efficacy of international law, these individuals naturally came to diametrically opposed conclusions. Compare Walther Schücking, supra note 129, at 327-330,
218. who believed the answer to German diplomatic isolation could be found in greater international organization and a resultant limitation of armaments, with Karl von Stengel's (German international legal expert at the Hague in 1899), Weltstaat und friedensproblem, 134-137 (1909). "Am liebsten würden wohl die Engländer es mit der deutschen Flotte machen, wie im Jahre 1807 mit der dänischen, die sie mitten im Frieden wegnahmen und als beute fortführten, weil die dänische Regeierung sich geweigert hatte, die verlangte Allianz abzuschließen."
219. Id. at 135, fn. 2. Disarmament, even under the watchful guidance of the Hague arbitration system, would be political suicide.
220. Id. at 137.
221. Minutes of Eyre Crowe, in Goschen to Grey, 10 May 1911, BD, supra note 7, Vol. VI, No. 464, at 625, 627-628.
222. Aufzeichnung, 15 October 1909, Die Grosse Politik, supra note 77, Vol. XXVIII, No. 10347, at 239, 242. However, the British naval attaché noted that the German government had sold two older battleships to Turkey without modifying the Navy Law or consulting the Reichstag.
223. Remarks on German Statement, enclosure 2 in Goschen to Grey, 30 November 1910, BD, supra note 7, Vol. VI, No. 416, at 555, 556.
224. Minutes of Charles Hardinge, 24 October 1909, in Goschen to Grey,15 October 1909, BD, supra note 7, Vol. VI, No. 200, at 293, 299-300.
225. Minutes of Charles Hardinge, in Grey to Goschen, 4 November 1909, BD, supra note 7, Vol. VI, No. 204, at 304, 310.
226. James Brown Scott, "Lord Haldane's Diary of Negotiations between Germany and England in 1912", 12 Am. J. Int'l. L. 589, 592 (1918).
227. Diary of Lord Haldane's Visit to Berlin, 10 February 1912, BD, supra note 7, Vol. VI, No. 506, at 676, 677.
228. Id. at 678.
229. Id. at 679.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 680.
232. Minutes of Eyre Crowe, in id. at 685. Bertie informed a German representative that Britain had "no spare Heligolands which the British public would be prepared to present... as gifts" referring to a previous Anglo-German territorial agreement in 1890.
233. Bertie to Grey, 11 February 1912, BD, supra note 7, Vol VI, No. 508, at 686, 687.
234. Goschen to Nicholson, 15 March 1912, BD, supra note 7, Vol. VI, No. 541, at 716-717.
235. See J. C. G. Rohl, "Admiral von Muller and the Approach of War, 1911-1914", 12 Historical J. 651, at 671 (1973).
236. Memorandum, in Bethmann-Hollweg to Metternich, 4 March 1912, Die Grosse Politik, supra note 77, Vol. XXXI, No. 11381, at 148, 151-152.
237. Arthur Lee, 5 March 1907, Hansard Parliamentary Debates, 4th Series, Vol. 170, Col. 668, as quoted in Merze Tate, The Disarmament Illusion: The Movement for a Limitation of Armaments to 1907, 335-336 (1942).
238. Grey to Goschen, 8 Aug. 1912, BD, supra note 7, Vol. X, No. 451, at 655.
239. See, e.g. Lascelles to Grey, 14 August 1908, BD, supra note 7, Vol. VI, No. 115, at 181-182;
240. Goschen to Nicolson, 28 October 1910, BD, id., Vol. VI, No. 408, at 539;
241. Minutes of Eyre Crowe, 18 February 1913, in Goschen to Grey, 10 February 1913, BD, id., Vol. X, No. 457, at 669, 671. Furthermore, it was reasoned that the less the British challenged German naval construction, the less political fuel they would feed to the German naval party.
242. Report by Captain Watson, enclosure no. 2 in Goschen to Grey, 15 October 1913, BD, id., Vol. V, No. 483, at 710, 714.
243. Winston S. Churchill, The World Crisis, 1911-1914, 100 (1923).
244. Emphasis added. Churchill speech in the House of Commons, 18 March 1912, as quoted in The Limitation of Armaments, supra note 113, at 37.
245. Great Britain actually continued to maintain the two-power standard, over the next largest navies of Germany and the United States until the 1921 Washington Conference. See George Modelski & William R. Thompson, Seapower in Global Politics, 1494-1993, 78 (1988).
246. Winston S. Churchill, supra note 166, at 108.
247. John H. Maurer, "The Anglo-German Naval Rivalry and Informal Arms Control, 1912-1914", 36 J. Conflict Resolution 284, at 288 (1992).
248. Churchill speech in the House of Commons, 18 March 1912, as quoted in The Limitation of Armaments, supra note 113, at 37.
249. Id.
250. Winston S. Churchill, supra note 166, at 111-112;
251. Maurer, supra note 170, at 296.
252. As John Maurer has ably argued, despite a formal agreement, by July 1912 the existence of long-range planning by both states served as a measure of agreed construction. Maurer, supra note 170, at 290.
253. Id.
254. See Goschen to Nicolson, 5 June 1913, BD, supra note 7, Vol. X, No. 479, at 704-705. Tirpitz complained perhaps more accurately in February of 1914 when he noted that during the previous five years, the British had constructed twenty four battleships, far above the fifteen ships he estimated as necessary to maintain the proportion of sixteen to ten if Germany built three ships per year.
255. Tirpitz speech in the Reichstag, 4 February 1914, as quoted in The Limitation of Armaments, supra note 113, at 38.
256. Winston Churchill speech before the House of Commons, 26 March 1913, as quoted in The Limitation of Armaments, supra note 113, at 38.
257. Brazil provides a good example. This nation actually was among the first states in the world to own dreadnought battleships, purchasing a pair from a private yard in Britain, making it briefly one of four nations possessing these weapons in 1910, along with Great Britain, Germany and the United States. When its neighbors, Argentina and Chile, followed suit with purchases of their own pairs of dreadnoughts, Brazil authorized the construction of a third battleship. However, fiscal restraints, combined with a naval revolt by the mutinous crew on the dreadnought Minas Gerais soured Brazilian enthusiasm for the expensive weapons, and Brazil sold the incomplete third warship to Turkey. See Robert L. Scheina, "Brazil", in Conway's All the World's Fighting Ships, 1906-1921, supra note 33, at 403, et. seq. Similarly, contemplated sales of Argentine dreadnoughts to Greece and Chilean battleships to either Russia or Turkey complicated matters.
258. Nicolson to Grey, 30 September 1912, BD, supra note 7, Vol. IX, No. 806, at 761, 762;
259. Editor's Note, BD, supra note 7, Vol. X, following No. 548, at 801.
260. Editor's Note, BD, supra note 7, Vol. X, following No. 548, at 801. However, on the eve of war, Churchill took steps to assure that the British retain control over two battleships completing in private yards for Turkey.
261. Winston S. Churchill, supra note 166, at 209.
262. See also Agreement between the United Kingdom, France, and Italy, Respecting the Importation of Arms and Ammunition into Abyssinia, December 13, 1906, 1 Am. J. Int'l L. 230 (Supp. 1907), under which the British also regulated the export of weaponry from British territory.
263. In 1910, when Great Britain possessed seven dreadnoughts to four German, the sale of the two Brazilian ships could have had a disproportionate, if very temporary, impact on the naval balance.
264. Churchill to Grey, 24 October 1913, BD, supra note 7, Vol. X, No. 487, at 721.
265. Maurer, supra note 170, at 301.
266. See also Lichnowsky to Bethmann Hollweg, 8 February 1913, Die Grosse Politik, supra note 77, Vol. XXXIX, No. 15,563, at 15-18.
267. Vice-Admiral von Ahlefeld, "A Basis foran Anglo-German Agreement", as quoted in The Limitation of Armaments, supra note 113, at 63-64.
268. Id. at 63. Maurer noted that moderation in the pace of construction was undermined by improved preparedness in both the German and British navies.
269. Maurer, supra note 170, at 299.
270. L. Persius, as quoted in The Limitation of Armaments, supra note 113, at 64-65. Retired Vice-Admiral von Ahlefeld raised this latter point more succinctly by arguing a state could circumvent limitations by building ships just under the size limit of a battleship, or by improving effectiveness and efficiency.
271. Vice-Admiral von Ahlefeld as quoted in The Limitation of Armaments, supra note 113, at 63-64.
272. For every 700 inhabitants in a country, its leaders could choose to build either 50 tons of naval vessels or the eqiupment of 10 soldiers. "Proposal of Anonymous Writer", as quoted in The Limitation of Armaments, supra note 113, at 74. This proposal might also address French fears that a naval arms limit would merely shift funds from the German Navy to the Army.
273. Memorandum by Churchill, 20 May 1914, BD, supra note 7, Vol. X, No. 511, at 746-748.
274. Id. at 547.
275. Id.
276. Memorandum by Grey, 25 May 1914, BD, supra note 7, Vol. X, No. 512, at 748. Additionally, Crowe strongly opposed further negotiations with Germany in the belief that the Germans were untrustworthy.
277. Notes of Eyre Crowe in Goschen to Grey, 10 February 1914, BD, supra note 7, Vol. X, No. 501, at 736-737.
278. The German press, for its part, had already expressed the hope that Churchill might instead take a "Speech Holiday" or "Redefeierjahr." Goschen to Grey, 22 October 1913, BD, supra note 7, No. 485, at 718-719.
279. Treaty of Peace Between British Empire et. al. and Germany, June 28, 1919, 225 C.T.S. 188 (1919) Art. 185.
280. Id. at Art. 190.
281. Thomas H. Buckley, "The Washington Naval Limitation System, 1921-1939", in Encyclopedia of Arms Control and Disarmament, supra note 16, Vol. II, 639, at 644-645.