Why neural synchrony fails to explain the unity of visual consciousness

Behavior and Philosophy

Volumn 34, Issue , 2006, Pages 39-58

  Larock, Eric ^a  

^a OAKLAND UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Attention; Binding; Consciousness; Feature ambiguity; Neural synchrony; Unity

Indexed keywords

EID: 34547596535     PISSN: 10538348     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

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