The mind-body problem and Quine's repudiation theory

Behavior and Philosophy

Volumn 29, Issue , 2001, Pages 187-202

  Stemmer, Nathan ^a,b  

^a Beth David Institute   (Israel)

^b NONE   (Israel)

Author keywords

Folk psychology; Materialism; Mental terms; Mentalism; Verbal behavior

Indexed keywords

EID: 34547517061     PISSN: 10538348     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

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