Uses of respect and uses of the human embryo

Bioethics

Volumn 21, Issue 7, 2007, Pages 370-378

  Gibson, Susanne ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CUMBRIA   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Human embryo; Moral agency; Moral status; Respect; Symbolic worth

Indexed keywords

BIOETHICS; CHROMOSOME DISORDER; CONGENITAL DISORDER; CONTRACEPTION; GENETIC DISORDER; HUMAN; HUMAN EMBRYO; INFERTILITY; LAW; MEDICAL RESEARCH; MORALITY; REVIEW; SOCIOECONOMICS; SPONTANEOUS ABORTION; UNITED KINGDOM;

BIOETHICS; EMBRYO RESEARCH; EMBRYO, MAMMALIAN; EMBRYONIC STEM CELLS; GREAT BRITAIN; HUMAN RIGHTS; HUMANS; MORAL OBLIGATIONS; MORALS; PHILOSOPHY, MEDICAL; UNCERTAINTY;

EID: 34547430497     PISSN: 02699702     EISSN: 14678519     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8519.2007.00565.x     Document Type: Review

References (32)

1. An earlier version of this paper was presented to Northweb 5, Lancaster University, March 2006. I am grateful to participants for their insightful comments.
2. J. Deckers. Why UK Embryo Research is Immoral Bioethics 2005 19:250 271
3. A. Holland. A Fortnight of my life is Missing. J Appl Philos 1990 7 (1 25 38
4. M. Lockwood. Human Identity and the Primitive Streak. Hastings Cent Rep 1995 25 (1 45.
5. M. Warnock. 1985. A Question of Life. The Warnock Report on Human Fertilisation and Embryology. Oxford: Blackwell: Sections 11.5 & 11.20-22.
6. Chief Medical Officer's Expert Group. 2000. Stem Cell Research: Medical Progress with Responsibility. London. Department of Health.
7. Warnock, op. cit. note 4, Sections 11.17-11.18.
8. I use the term 'person' in the Kantian sense of a rational moral agent. I. Kant. 1996. The Metaphysics of Morals. In Practical Philosophy: the Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant. M.J. Gregor, ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 353-604; 579. In order to avoid begging the question, however, I leave open the question of whether the embryo might qualify as a person by virtue of either its membership of a species of persons or its potential for personhood.
9. S. Darwall. Two Kinds of Respect Ethics 1977-78 88:36 49
10. M.J. Meyer L.J. Nelson. Respecting What We Destroy: Reflections on Human Embryo Research Hastings Cent Rep 2001 31 (1 16 23.
11. Meyer and Nelson, op. cit. note 9, 17.
12. Ibid: 21.
13. Ibid: 22.
14. In addition and to a lesser extent, the authors also appeal to Warren's 'transitivity of respect principle'. I will return to this matter below.
15. Ibid: 18.
16. Ibid: 22.
17. B. Steinbock. 2001. Respect for Human Embryos. In Cloning and the Future of Human Embryo Research P. Lauritzen, ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 21-33: 22; 24.
18. J. Robertson. Symbolic Issues in Embryo Research Hastings Cent Rep 1995 25 (1 37 38.
19. J. Robertson. Symbolic Issues in Embryo Research Hastings Cent Rep 1995 25 (1 37 38.
20. Meyer & Nelson, op. cit. note 18.
21. Deckers, op. cit. note 2, p. 259.
22. Meyer & Nelson. Meyer and Nelson Reply. Hastings Cent Rep 2001 31 (4 5.
23. D. Callahan. Human Embryo Research: Respecting What We Destroy? Hastings Cent Rep 2001 31 (4 4.
24. D. Callahan. The Puzzle of Profound Respect Hastings Cent Rep 1995 25 (1 39 40
25. Warren op. cit. note 9, p. 170.
26. Ibid.
27. Meyer & Nelson op. cit. note 9, p. 18.
28. House of Lords. 2002. Stem Cell Research. Report From the Select Committee. London: The Stationery Office Limited: section 4.17.
29. Editorial. What Research? Which Embryos? Hastings Cent Rep 1995 25 (1 36.
30. Warren op. cit. note 4, p. 171.
31. The practice of slavery provides a good example from the history of moral mistakes. Our current treatment of non-human animals might prove a good example for subsequent generations.
32. C.B. Cohen. Human Embryo Research: Respecting What We Destroy? Hastings Cent Rep 2001 31 (4 4 5