Forbearance and prompt corrective action

Journal of Money, Credit and Banking

Volumn 39, Issue 5, 2007, Pages 1107-1129

  Kocherlakota, Narayana R ^a   Shim, Ilhyock ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA   (United States)

^b BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

Banking regulation; Limited enforcement; Optimal social contract; Risky collateral

Indexed keywords

EID: 34547396003     PISSN: 00222879     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1538-4616.2007.00059.x     Document Type: Article

References (9)

1. Dekle, Robert, and Kenneth Kletzer 2003 The Japanese Banking Crisis and Economic Growth: Theoretical and Empirical Implications of Deposit Guarantees and Weak Financial Regulation University of Tokyo, CIRJE Discussion Paper, CIRJE-F-225.
2. Deposit Insurance Corporation of Japan 2003 Treatment of Deposit, etc., When a Financial Institution Fails Accessed March 29, 2005, from http://www.dic.go.jp/english/e_seido/2003/part1_3.pdf.
3. Hall, Maximilian J. B. (1998) Financial Reform in Japan: Causes and Consequences. Northampton, MA : Edgar Elgar Publishing.
4. Holmstrom, Bengt, and Jean Tirole 1998 Private and Public Supply of Liquidity Journal of Political Economy, 106, 1 40.
5. Kocherlakota, Narayana R. (2001 Risky Collateral and Deposit Insurance Advances in Macroeconomics, 1, 1-18.
6. Shim, Ilhyock. (2006 Dynamic Banking Regulation: Is Prompt Corrective Action Optimal Bank for International Settlements, Working Paper No. 206.
7. Sleet, Christopher, and Bruce D. Smith 2000 Deposit Insurance and Lender-of-Last-Resort Functions Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 32, 518 75.
8. Ueda, Kazuo. (1999 The Japanese Banking Crisis in the 1990s In Strengthening the Banking System in China: Issues and Experience, pp. 251 62. BIS Policy Papers No. 7. Basel : Bank for International Settlements.
9. White, Lawrence J. (1991) The S&L Debacle: Public Policy Lessons for Bank and Thrift Regulation. New York : Oxford University Press.