Time and crisis: Framing success and failure in Romania's post-communist transformations

Review of International Studies

Volumn 33, Issue 3, 2007, Pages 395-413

  Pop, Liliana ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 34547353700     PISSN: 02602105     EISSN: 14699044     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0260210507007577     Document Type: Article

References (45)

1. OECD, OECD economic surveys: Romania. Centre for Cooperation with non-Members (Paris: OECD Publications, 1988);
2. Ilie Şerbǎnescu, 'Can the Vicious Circle be Broken?' and Dorel Candor, 'Politics versus Policies: How to Succeed in Blocking Reforms', papers presented at the Conference 'Romania 2000: Ten years of Transition. Past, Present and Future'. World Bank and Center for Economic Policies, Bucharest, 21-22 October 1999.
3. Pierre Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice, trans. Richard Nice (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990),
4. and Language and Symbolic. Power, edited and introduced by John B. Thompson, trans. Gino Raymond and Matthew Adamson (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991).
5. There is a vast literature on this, for instance Geoffrey Garrett and Peter Lange, 'Internationalization, Institutions and Political Change', in Robert O. Keohane and Helen Milner (eds.), Internationalisation of Domestic Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 48-75;
6. Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998);
7. Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, International Organization, 42 (1988), pp.427-60.
8. See, for instance, Robert Cox, Production, Power, and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987);
9. Craig N. Murphy, International Organization and Industrial Change: Global Governance since 1850 (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994);
10. Kees van der Piji, Transnational Classes and International Relations (London: Routledge, 1998);
11. Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World System. Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century (New York: Academic Press, 1974).
12. See. for example, Emanuel Adler, 'Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Polities', European Journal of International Relations, 3 (1997), pp. 319-63;
13. Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
14. Anna Leander, The 'Realpolitik of Reason: Thinking International Relations through Fields, Habitus and Practice', paper presented at the International Studies Association Annual Convention: Sau Diego 22-25 March 2006.
15. See for instance the well-known discussion and summary of positions provided by Susan Strange, States and Markets, 2nd edn. (London: Pinter, 1988).
16. P. Bourdieu, Logic of Practice, p. 53.
17. P. Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power, pp. 107-11.
18. See in particular Max Weber, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, trans., ed. and Introduced by H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, with a new preface by Bryan S. Turner (London: Routledge, 1948), pp. 180-1.
19. P. Bourdieu, The Logic, of Practice, p. 106.
20. John Michael Montias, Economic Development in Communist Romania (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 1967).
21. Avner Ben-Ner and John Michael Montias, 'The Introduction of Markets in a Hypercentralized Economy: the Case of Romania', Journal of Economic Perspectives, 5 (1991), pp. 163-70.
22. Unlike the neighbouring communist countries, Romania, under the leadership of Nicolae Ceauşescu, reacted to the external economic shocks, especially the increase in oil prices in the 1970s and 1980s, by intensifying political control over the economy. In the drive to pay the foreign debt, including outstanding obligations towards the IMF, as quickly as possible and in full, after the 1982 near-default, the government increased exports and compressed imports at the expense even of minimal technological upgrades in the industry. Domestic consumption was severely curtailed, with many basic foodstuffs and energy being rationed. At the same time, all significant foreign debt had been repaid by the end of 1989.
23. Real wages in fact increased during 1990, even as the economy continued to shrink: GDP declined by 5.6 per cent in 1990, after a 5.8 per cent fall in 1989. In general the decline of real wages was much smaller during this decade compared to other countries in transition; this concern with social protection was reflected in the sequencing of the price liberalisation, for instance, prices for energy and certain basic foodstuffs, such as sugar, bread and meat were liberalised last. As will become apparent, hesitant implementation of hard-budget constraints on enterprises was also motivated by concerns for social protection.
24. For instance, Romania was owed oil up to the value of 1.7 bn US$ by Iraq. See for instance, Eugen Dijmǎrescu, 'Optiunile economice íntre politicǎ si pragmatism', Oeconomica, 5, pp. 77-86;
25. Per Ronnas, 'The economic legacy of Ceauşescu', in Economic Change in the Balkan States: Albania, Bulgaria, Romania and Yugoslavia, eds. Orjan Sjoberg and Michael L. Wyzan (London: Pinter Publishers, 1991), pp. 45-68.
26. Romania has been a member of the IMF since 1972; no borrowing took place during the 1980s, as Ceausescu embarked on his policy of financial autarky.
27. Elements of institutional reform lagged behind and contributed to distortions in money flows and the decapitalisation of enterprises. For example, the socialist accounting system, which remained in place until 1994, calculated costs only for products sold and cashed, and not for stocks; depreciation costs were calculated historically, ignoring the high levels of cumulated inflation during the early 1990s. Thus, the relative balance of the state budget masked other negative phenomena such as the decapitalisation of enterprises and the accumulation of arrears in the economy, which remained a much used form of lending of last resort in spite of state efforts to cancel debts and put financial relations with enterprises on a sounder footing. By the end of 1991, arrears had reached 80 per cent of GDP and the BNR was instructed to facilitate credits worth 1.8 trillion lei to enable enterprises to pay their debts. After an initial reduction, at the end of 1992 arrears again reached 30 per cent of GDP.
28. For general economic data used in this article see Appendix II in Liliana Pop, Democratising Capitalism? The Political Economy of Post-Communist Transformations in Romania, 1989-2001 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006), pp. 161-2.
29. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Transition Report 1999 (London: EBRD, 1999), p. 256.
30. Kevin Done, 'Survey: Romania '97: Economy: Shock therapy is prescribed', Financial Times, 25 June 1997.
31. See for instance the Public Information Notice no. 98/79, issued by the IMF on 6 October 1998.
32. According to BNR figures, Romania attracted only $4.9 bn between 1995-99, compared to $18.2 and 12.6 bn invested in Poland and the Czech Republic respectively, during the same period. See: Banca Nationale a Romaniei (BNR), Raport anual, 1998 (Bucharest: BNR), p. 29.
33. Guvernul României, Letter of Intent and Memorandum of Policies, 26 July 1999 (http://www.imf.org/ external/up/loi/1999/072699. 1itml), annex A.
34. Jon Elster, Claus Offe, and Ulrick K. Preuss, Institutional Design in Post-Communist Societies: Rebuilding the Ship at Sea, with Frank Boenker, Ulrike Goetting, and Friedbert W. Rueb (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998);
35. Gil Eyal, Ivan Szélenyi, and Eleanor Towusley, Making Capitalism without Capitalists: Class Formation and Elite Struggles in Post-Communist Central Europe (London: Verso, 1998).
36. There were almost daily street demonstrations in the capital during this period; other examples include nationalist confrontations in Tirgu Mures in March 1990 and the 'invasion' of Bucharest in June that year by the miners of Valea Jiului to defend, as they saw it, the newly elected government from continued street demonstrations.
37. Dan Ionescu, 'Romania Signs Association Accord with the EC, RFEIRL Research Report, 5 March 1993, pp. 33-7,
38. 'Romania Admitted to the Council of Europe', RFEIRL Research Report, 5 November 1993, pp. 40-5,
39. 'Romania Adjusting to NATO's Partnership for Peace Program', RFEIRL Research Report, 9 March 1994, pp. 43-7,
40. 'Romania's Standby Agreement with the IMF', RFEIRL Research Report, 6 May 1994, pp. 21-6.
41. See, for instance, Ion Iliescu, Dialoguri Româno-Americane (Bucharest: Nemira, 1996).
42. Michael Shafir, 'Romania's Tortuous Road to Reform', RFEIRL Research Report, 3 January 1992, pp. 96-9.
43. Vladimir Pasti, Politica împotriva economiei: De la guvernarea ostilǎ la restructurarea politicii românéşti (Fundaba 'Un Viitor pentru România), 1998, pp. 3-4.
44. Vasile Secǎreş, 'Romǎnia riscǎ sǎ iasǎ pentru multǎ vreme de pe agenda SUA!' Intervi- de Irina Bàrlǎ, National, 15 April 1998.
45. Dan Pavel and Iulia Huiu, 'Nu putem reuşi decît împreunǎ: O istorie analiticǎ a Convenţiei Democratice, 1989-2000 (Iaşi: Polirom, 2003).