Design of secure operating systems with high security levels

Science in China, Series F: Information Sciences

Volumn 50, Issue 3, 2007, Pages 399-418

  Qing, SiHan ^a,b   Shen, ChangXiang ^c  

^a INSTITUTE OF SOFTWARE   (China)

^b PEKING UNIVERSITY   (China)

^c INSTITUTE OF COMPUTING TECHNOLOGY   (China)

Author keywords

Architecture; Covert channel analysis; Secure operating systems with high security levels; Security model

Indexed keywords

EID: 34547337821     PISSN: 10092757     EISSN: 18622836     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11432-007-0028-3     Document Type: Article

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