From short-term to long-term orientation-political economy of the policy reform process

Journal of Evolutionary Economics

Volumn 17, Issue 4, 2007, Pages 433-449

  Freytag, Andreas ^a   Renaud, Simon ^a  

^a FRIEDRICH SCHILLER UNIVERSITY JENA   (Germany)

Author keywords

Active learning; Evolutionary learning process; Long term orientation; Pathological learning; Policy reform; Rules; Time consistency

Indexed keywords

EID: 34547273215     PISSN: 09369937     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00191-006-0049-x     Document Type: Article

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