Power indices taking into account the agents' preferences to coalesce

Doklady Mathematics

Volumn 75, Issue 3, 2007, Pages 463-466

  Aleskerov, F T ^a,b  

^a NATIONAL RESEARCH UNIVERSITY HIGHER SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (Russian Federation)

^b TRAPEZNIKOV INSTITUTE OF CONTROL SCIENCES   (Russian Federation)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

FUNCTION EVALUATION; GAME THEORY;

INTENSITY FUNCTION; POWER ESTIMATION; POWER INDICES;

PARAMETER ESTIMATION;

EID: 34547251731     PISSN: 10645624     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1134/S1064562407030350     Document Type: Article

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