Optimal share contracts with moral hazard on effort and in output reporting: Managing the double Laffer curve effect

Oxford Economic Papers

Volumn 59, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 253-274

  de Janvry, Alain ^a   Sadoulet, Elisabeth ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

HAZARD; MODEL; TAX SYSTEM;

EID: 34447640317     PISSN: 00307653     EISSN: 14643812     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/oep/gpl034     Document Type: Article

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