National human rights institutions in Europe

Human Rights Law Review

Volumn 7, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 331-370

  de Beco, Gauthier ^a  

^a UNIVERSITÉ CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN   (Belgium)

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EID: 34447525454     PISSN: 14617781     EISSN: 17441021     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/hrlr/ngm004     Document Type: Article

References (201)

1. ECOSOC Res. 2/9, 21 June 1946.
2. The Commission was first named Commission consultative pour la codification du droit international et la définition des droits et devoirs des Etats et des droits de l'homme ('Consultative Commission for the Codification of International Law and the Definition of the Rights and Duties of States'), and subsequently called Commission consultative des droits de l'homme ('Consultative Commission of Human Rights') in 1984, and finally renamed Commission nationale consultative des droits de l'homme ('French National Advisory Commission for Human Rights') in 1989. Its first President was René Cassin. Initially the role of this institution was to formulate the French position during the drafting of new international human rights instruments. It only acquired competence for national issues in 1986.
3. ECOSOC Res. 772 B (XXX), 25 July 1960;
4. and ECOSOC Res. 888 F (XXXIV), 24 July 1962. Both these resolutions invited governments 'to favour ... the formation ... of ... local human rights committees or national advisory committees'.
5. See Seminar on National and Local Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, ST/HR/SER.A/2 (1978).
6. On this seminar, see Lindsnaes and Lindholt, 'National Human Rights Institutions: Standard-Setting and Achievements', in Lindsnaes, Lindholt and Yigen (eds), National Human Rights Institutions. Articles and Working Papers: Input into the Discussions on the Establishment and Development of the Functions of National Human Rights Institutions (Copenhagen: The Danish Centre of Human Rights, 2000) 1 at 5-6.
7. GA Res. 33/46, 14 December 1978, A/RES/33/46.
8. As far as Europe is concerned, only two institutions were present at the first International Workshop: The CNCDH and the Danish Centre for Human Rights (created in 1987).
9. Comm. Res. 1992/54, 3 March 1992, E/CN.4/RES/1992/54;
10. and GA Res. 48/134, 20 December 1993, A/RES/48/134. ('Paris Principles').
11. Principle 2, Competence and responsibilities, Paris Principles.
12. Para. 11, GA Res. 48/134, supra n. 7.
13. See Decaux, 'Le dixième anniversaire des principes directeurs des institutions nationales des droits de l'homme dits "Principes de Paris"', (2003) 3 Droits fondamentaux 11 at 21;
14. and Schokkenbroek, 'Nationale mensenrechteninstellingen in Europa: Een inleidend overzicht', in van Emmerik and Smals-van Dijk (eds), Een nationale mensenrechtencommissie in Nederland? (Leiden: NJCM-Boekerij, 2000) 5 at 8.
15. The Human Rights Committee and the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights regularly remind states parties to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966, 999 UNTS 171, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966, 993 UNTS 3, to establish national institutions in accordance with the Paris Principles.
16. See, for example, Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee: Italy, 24 April 2006, CCPR/C/ITA/CO/5 at para. 7:
17. and Concluding observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Belgium, 1 December 2000, E/C.12/1/Add.54 at para. 8.
18. Para. 12, GA Res. 48/134, supra n. 7.
19. Section 5, Rules of Procedure for the Sub-committee on Accreditation, 14 September 2004. The NHRIs may also be accredited with reserve and receive 'A(R)-Status', which means that although they comply with the Paris Principles, insufficient documentation has been submitted to confer them 'A-Status'.
20. A full list of accredited NHRIs is available at: www.nhri.net.
21. Para. 36, Part I, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, 25 June 1993 A/Conf.157/23; 1-1 IHRR 240 (1994).
22. See, in particular, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 10: The role of national human rights institutions in the protection of economic, social and cultural rights, 10 December 1998, HRI/GEN/Rev.7 at 59;
23. 6 IHRR 899 (1999);
24. and Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 2: The role of independent national human rights institutions in the promotion and protection of the rights of the child, 15 November 2002, HRI/GEN/1/ Rev. 7 at 301;
25. 10 IHRR 317 (2003).
26. Cardenas, 'Emerging Global Actors: The United Nations and National Human Rights Institutions', (2003) 9 Global Governance 23 at 27-34.
27. OHCHR Professional Training Series No. 4, National Human Rights Institutions. A Handbook on the Establishment and Strengthening of National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights (Geneva: UN, 1995).
28. The European Coordinating Group is composed of four NHRIs: The Irish Human Rights Commission (presiding the Group), the Danish Institute for Human Rights (which replaced the Danish Centre for Human Rights in 2002), the German Institute for Human Rights and the National Human Rights Commission of Greece. The functioning rules of the European Coordinating Committee are described in the Rules of Procedure of the European Group of National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, November 2002, available at: www.nhri.net.
29. Council of Europe Rec. No. R(97) 14, 30 September 1997.
30. Council of Europe Res. (97) 11, 30 September 1997.
31. Until 1997, the Steering Committee for Human Rights of the Council of Europe had focussed solely on the institution of the ombudsman, see Council of Europe Rec. No. R(85) 13 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on the Institution of the Ombudsman, 23 September 1985;
32. and on cooperation between the ombudsmen of Member States and between them and the Council of Europe, see Council of Europe Res. (85) 8 of the Committee of Ministers on Cooperation Between the Ombudsmen of Member States and Between Them and the Council of Europe, 23 September 1985.
33. In the 1980s, the Steering Committee for Human Rights, however, intended to examine the role of NHRIs but this project was subsequently abandoned. See Explanatory memorandum to Recommendation No. R(97) 14 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on the establishment of independent national institutions for the promotion and protection of human rights, in Directorate of Human Rights, Non-judicial means for the protection of human rights at the national level, May 1998, H/INF(98) 3, at 18-20.
34. Recommendation (a), Council of Europe Rec. No. R(97) 14, supra. n. 19.
35. Recommendation (b), ibid.
36. There are also references to GA Res. 48/134 and the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action as well as the resolutions adopted during the two first European Meetings of NHRIs in the Preamble of Council of Europe Rec. No. R(97) 14, supra n. 19.
37. Para. 3, GA Res. 48/134, supra n. 7.
38. Para. 36, Part 3, Vienna Declaration, supra n. 14.
39. Section (a), Council of Europe Res. 97 (11), supra n. 20.
40. Ombudsmen institutions are excluded from this list, even if they have been granted A-Status by the International Coordinating Committee. The ombudsmen institutions that were granted A-Status in Europe are: The Commissioner for Civil Rights Protection in Poland (created in 1999), the Provedor de Justiça in Portugal (created in 1999), the Ombudsman Against Ethnic Discrimination in Sweden (created in 1999), the Defensor del Pueblo in Spain (created in 2000), the Human Rights Ombudsman in Bosnia and Herzegovina (created in 2001), the People's Advocate in Albania (created in 2003), the Human Rights Defender in Armenia (created in 2006) and the Human Rights Ombudsman in Azerbaijan (created in 2006).
41. The EU Network of Independent Experts on Fundamental Rights, created by the Commission of the European Communities on request by the European Parliament in 2002, has drawn up a table of the existing NHRIs in the European Union. See Opinion of the EU Network of Independent Experts in Fundamental Rights Regarding the Role of National Institutions for the Protection of Human Rights in the Member States of the European Union, March 2004, CFR-CDE Opinion1.2004. Several changes have been made, however, since the list was drawn up.
42. The NCHR and the NIHRC are the European NHRIs that have been accredited as members of the International Coordinating Committee most recently. They were granted A-Status by the International Coordinating Committee in April and October 2006, respectively.
43. The Scottish Executive has launched a proposal for a Scottish Human Rights Commission, see 'The Scottish Human Rights Commission, Consultation Paper', available at: www.scotland.gov.uk/consultations/ justice/shrs.pdf.
44. Three public institutions concerned with the protection and promotion of human rights as well as the Netherlands Institute for Human Rights issued a public document in November 2005 for the attention of the Dutch government, advocating the creation of a national institution, which is available at: www.cbpweb.nl/downloads.overig/advies_NIRM.pdf.
45. Several NGOs proposed the creation of a Belgian Commission for Fundamental Rights by issuing a public document in April 2006 for the attention of the Belgian Government. This document was prepared by Olivier De Schutter and the current author and is available at: www.justicepaix.be/documents/CommissBelgeDroitsFondam.pdf.
46. A working group of nine NGOs, supported by more than 100 other NGOs as well as trade unions, religious institutions and individuals made an official demand for the establishment of an NHRI in Switzerland in July 2001. A proposal to create such an institution was subsequently launched in the Swiss Parliament. However, it has not been successful so far. Another position paper from the working group was made public in August 2005 and is available at: www.humanrights.ch/cms/upload/pdf/ 050920.agmri.lang.f.pdf.
47. Equality Act 2006, 2006 Ch 3. For the background to this initiative see DTI, Fairness For All: A New Commission for Equality and Human Rights, White Paper, May 2004, Cm 6185.
48. See International Council on Human Rights Policy, Performance and Legitimacy: National Human Rights Institutions, 2nd edn (Versoix: International Council on Human Rights Policy, 2004) at 64-7.
49. See White Paper, supra n. 35. Although the joint Committee on Human Rights is not an independent and pluralistic national institution in the sense of the Paris Principles, it seems to enjoy adequate independence thanks to its broad mandate, its bi-cameral structure and the judicious choice of its members. Another important aspect is that it interacts with organisations of civil society as well as experts.
50. See Hiebert, 'Parliament and the Human Rights Act: Can the JCHR Help Facilitate a Culture of Rights?', (2006) 4 International Journal of Constitutional Law 1 at 16 and 20.
51. Section 11(2)(d), Equality Act 2006, supra n. 35, however, rather confusingly provides that the Commission for Equality and Human Rights may advise central or devolved government about the likely effect of a proposed change of law'.
52. Para. 12, GA Res. 48/134, supra n. 7:
53. and para. 36, part I, Vienna Declaration, supra n. 14.
54. See also Council of Europe Rec. No. R(97) 14, supra n. 19, which recommends that member states of the Council of Europe consider the possibility of establishing national institutions while 'taking account of the specific requirements of each member state'. The formulation of this recommendation sounds more like a requirement than a right for a state to take into consideration its particular needs when creating an NHRI.
55. Goldschmidt, 'De leemte in de mensenrechtenhandhaving', in van Emmerik and Smals-van Dijk (eds), supra n. 9, 61 at 73.
56. See IHRC, Annual Report 2004, available at: www.ihrc.ie; and DIHR, Annual Reports 2004 and 2005, available at: www.humanrights.dk.
57. This is the case in Belgium and Switzerland, where NGO coalitions issued public documents relating to the creation of a national institution in their country for the attention of the government. See supra n. 33 and 34.
58. Gallagher, 'Making Human Rights Treaty Obligations a Reality: Working With New Actors and Partners', in Alston and Crawford (eds), The Future of United Nations Human Rights Treaty Monitoring (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) 201 at 203.
59. This is one of the successful activities of the GIHR. See Seidensticker, Examination of State Reporting by Human Rights Treaty Bodies. An Example of Follow-Up at the National Level by National Human Rights Institutions (Berlin: German Institute for Human Rights, 2005).
60. Principles 1-3, Composition and guarantees of independence and pluralism, Paris Principles.
61. OHCHR Professional Training Series No. 4, supra n. 17 at 12.
62. Lindsnaes and Lindholt, supra n. 5 at 20.
63. The IHRC, however, previously included a representative (and strong defender) of the travelling community of Ireland, but this seems to have been an exception.
64. See supra n. 11 and accompanying text.
65. International Council on Human Rights Policy, supra n. 36 at 4.
66. Principle 1, Composition and guarantees of independence and pluralism, Paris Principles [emphasis added].
67. The purpose of the analysis of the different models of NHRI composition is not to classify all the existing institutions, but only to examine the options open to states and the consequences of choosing one particular model.
68. The CNCDH is also the national institution with the largest number of members in the world. However, it may be that smaller NHRIs are assisted by a very large staff, as is the case with the DIHR, so that the number of members does not accurately reflect the size of a particular institution.
69. More information on the CNCDH is available at: www.commission-droits-homme.fr.
70. The CNCDHs strict compliance with the Paris Principles is probably due to the fact that this was the Commission that organised the first International Workshop on National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights during which the Principles were drafted.
71. OHCHR Professional Training Series No. 4, supra. n. 17 at 12.
72. More information on the Greek NHRC is available at: www.nchr.gr.
73. See also Papadimitriou, 'The Greek National Commission for the Protection of Human Rights', in Sicilianos (ed.), The Prevention of Human Rights Violations. Contribution on the occasion of the Twentieth Anniversary of the Marangopoulos Foundation of Human Rights (MFHR) (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2001) 249.
74. More information on the Luxembourg CNCDH is available at: www.gouvernement.lu/dossiers/justice/droitshom.
75. Lindsnaes and Lindholt, supra n. 4 at 51.
76. Decaux, 'Utile Cassandre, le rôle de la Commission nationale consultative des droits de l'homme', in Pauvoir et Liberté. Etudes Offertes à Jaques Mourgeon (Bruxelles: Bruylant, 1998) 589 at 593.
77. More information on the IHRC is available at: www.ihrc.ie.
78. Small NHRIs should also ensure that senior staff members are representative of civil society. See Commonwealth Secretariat, National Human Rights Institutions. Best Practice (London: Commonwealth Secretariat, 2001) at 14.
79. See Mohamedou, 'The Effectiveness of National Human Rights Institutions', in Lindsnaes, Lindholt and Yigen (eds), supra n. 4, 49 at 65.
80. Klerk, 'Blauwdruk voor een Nederlands mensenrechtencommissie', in van Emmerik and Smals-van Dijk (eds), supra n. 9, 89 at 109.
81. However, see also, Commonwealth Secretariat, supra n. 61 at 14.
82. More information on the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission is available at: www.nihrc.org. Both the IHRC and the NIHRC are based on a commitment made by the British and the Irish Governments in the Agreement Reached in the Multiparty Negotiations 1998 ('Good Friday Agreement') which provides for the establishment of these two institutions.
83. See supra n. 31.
84. Principle 1, Composition and guarantees of independence and pluralism, Paris Principles.
85. Section 5(12), Human Right Commission Act, 2000 No. 9.
86. More information on the DIHR is available at: www.humanrights.dk. See also Kjaerum, National Human Rights Institutions Implementing Human Rights (Copenhagen: Danish Institute for Human Rights, 2003) at 34 [reproduced in Bergsmo (ed), Human Rights and Criminal Justice for the Downtrodden. Essays in Honour of Asbjørn Eide (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2003) 631].
87. The GIHR has, however, one additional organ. In addition to the Board (Vorstand) comprising a director and a deputy director, which runs the institution, and the Board of Trustees (Kuratorium) of 16 members, which adopts the thematic guidelines and nominates the directors, this institution has a General Assembly of 12 members that formally accepts the Boards' Annual Report and nominates some of the members of Board of Trustees. The General Assembly is hierarchically above the Board of Trustees, see: www.institut-fuer-menschenrechte.de.
88. This has indeed been the case for the DIHR and the GIHR. See Decaux, 'Les principes directeurs des institutions nationales des droits de l'homme dits "Principes de Paris"', in Organisation internationale de la Francophonie, Structures gouvernementales et institutions nationales des droits de l'Homme. Expériences et perspective. Colloque international, Cairo, 10-11 May 2003, at 69.
89. Principle 1, Composition and guarantees of independence and pluralism, Paris Principles.
90. Ibid.
91. Principle 3, ibid.
92. OHCHR Professional Training Series No. 4, supra n. 17 at 11;
93. and International Council on Human Rights Policy, Assessing the Effectiveness of National Human Rights Institutions, (Versoix: International Council on Human Rights Policy, 2005) at 14-5.
94. OHCHR Professional Training Series No. 4, supra n. 17 at 11;
95. and International Council on Human Rights Policy, supra n. 36 at 112.
96. This is the case with the DIHR. See Yigen, 'Guarantees of Independence of National Human Rights Institutions: Appointment and Dismissal Procedures of Leading Members', in Lindsnaes, Lindholt and Yigen (eds), supra n. 4, 59 at 69.
97. Article 3(1), Décret constitutif de la Commission Nationale Consultative des Droits de l'Homme 1984.
98. Section 5(3), Human Rights Commission Act, supra n. 67.
99. The conditions mentioned are those that must be fulfilled in order to become a member of the IHRC, according to Section 4(4), Human Rights Commission Act, ibid.
100. Article 2, Décret constitutif, supra n. 77.
101. Principle 3, Composition and guarantees of independence and pluralism, Paris Principles.
102. Commonwealth Secretariat, supra n. 61 at 16.
103. Ibid.
104. Members of the IHRC are eligible for a term of at least five years; renewable for a further term of at least five years; members of the CNCDH are eligible for a term of three years; and members of the DIHR are eligible for a term of four years, renewable once.
105. Principle 3, Composition and guarantees of independence and pluralism, Paris Principles. As these principles are the minimum standards for NHRIs the provision of non-renewable long-term mandates is of course permissible.
106. Principle 2, Composition and guarantees of independence and pluralism, Paris Principles.
107. Yigen, supra n. 76 at 77.
108. Ibid.
109. See also Commonwealth Secretariat, supra n. 61 at 14.
110. Principle 1(e), Composition and guarantees of independence and pluralism, Paris Principles.
111. See International Council on Human Rights Policy, supra n. 74 at 14.
112. Ibid. at 15.
113. The mandate of members of the CNCDH, who fail to participate in three consecutive meetings without a valid reason, might be terminated by the Bureau of this Commission, according to Article 3(7), Décret constitutif, supra n. 77.
114. S.7, Human Rights Commissions Act, supra n. 67.
115. OHCHR Professional Training Series No. 4, supra n. 17 at 80.
116. Principle 2, Competence and responsibilities, Paris Principles. The Paris Principles also state that this mandate 'shall be clearly set forth in a constitutional or legislative text, specifying its composition and its sphere of competence'.
117. See OHCHR Professional Training Series No. 12, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Handbook for National Human Rights Institutions (Geneva: UN, 2005) at 35.
118. These national institutions are usually anti-discrimination bodies, especially in developed countries such as those in Europe. Because of their limited mandate, they do not fully comply with the Paris Principles. An example of this is the Belgian Centre for Equal Opportunities and Opposition to Racism and the Dutch Equal Treatment Commission, which only have B-Status in the International Coordinating Committee.
119. See, in general, Kjaerum,'The Experiences of European National Human Rights Institutions', in Lindsnaes, Lindholt and Yigen (eds), supra n. 4, 113.
120. These two functions were already acknowledged in the guidelines of the 'Seminar on National and Local Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, see supra n. 4.
121. Note, however, that the DIHR acquired competence in 2003 to hear complaints of discrimination on the grounds of race or ethnic origin, creating the Complaints Committee for Ethnic Equal Treatment for that purpose. For a description of this Committee and its working methods, see Kjaerum, 'The Protection Role of the Danish Human Rights Commission, in Ramcharan (ed.), The Protection Role of National Human Rights Institutions (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2005) 23 at 33-7.
122. The term 'monitoring' is not referred to in the Paris Principles. This may be because NHRIs are set up primarily to promote human rights rather than to ensure respect for these rights. See Lindsnaes and Lindholt, supra n. 5 at 47.
123. See Ryle, 'Pre-Legislative Scrutiny: A Prophylactic Approach to Protection of Human Rights', [1994] Public Law 192 at 194.
124. However, there are other methods of ensuring legislation is compliant with human rights. In the United Kingdom, for example, all ministers who propose new legislation for Parliament to consider must certify that it is compatible with the rights protected with by the European Convention on Human Rights. See s.19, Human Rights Act 1998, 1998 Ch. 32.
125. OHCHR Professional Training Series No. 4, supra n. 17 at 24.
126. See Kjaerum, supra n. 68 at 22;
127. and Kjaerum, supra n. 97 at 115.
128. See Articles 17-24, Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment 2003, GA Res. 57/199, 18 December 2002, A/RES/57/199; 10 IHRR 595 (2003). Article 18(4) of this Protocol provides that: '[w]hen establishing national preventive mechanisms, States Parties shall give due consideration to the Principles relating to the status of national institutions for the promotion and protection of human rights'. This can be interpreted as encouraging states to use NHRIs as national prevention mechanisms in the sense of this Protocol.
129. See Kjaerum, supra n. 68 at 21;
130. and Kjaerum, supra n. 97 at 28.
131. Principle 3(a), Competence and responsibilities, Paris Principles.
132. Principle a, Methods of operation, Paris Principles.
133. See DIHR, Annual Report 2005, supra n. 40;
134. and Connelly, The Irish Human Rights Commission and the Implementation of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Paper submitted at the International Round Table on National Human Rights Institutions and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, New Delhi, 29 November-2 December 2005.
135. Principle 3(d), Competence and responsibilities, Paris Principles.
136. OHCHR Professional Training Series No. 4, supra n. 17 at 27.
137. International Council on Human Rights Policy, supra n. 74 at 19;
138. and Amnesty International, National Human Rights Institutions - Amnesty International's Recommendations for Effective Protection and Promotion of Human Rights, 1 October 2001, IOR 40/007/2001 at 9. Note that the CNCDH does contribute to the preparation of French reports to treaty bodies.
139. See Seidensticker, supra n. 43.
140. Although only one ministry is usually in charge of reporting to a particular treaty body, generally several ministries will be concerned with the implementation of the observations and recommendations of each of the treaty bodies. It is, therefore, advisable that national institutions invite not only the representatives of the ministry principally involved in the implementation of particular treaties, but also the representatives of other ministries who (should) take part, even incidentally, in the implementation of these treaties. See Seidensticker, ibid. at 14.
141. Seidensticker, ibid. at 14-7. According to the GIHR, the media should be excluded from these meetings, as publicising the debates might reduce the value of the dialogue with the ministries' representatives.
142. See OHCHR Professional Training Series No. 4, supra n. 17 at 18-27.
143. Ibid. at 23.
144. Ibid. at 18-9.
145. International Council on Human Rights Policy, supra n. 74 at 20.
146. The emphasis on certain competences will be reflected in a national institution's composition. The NHRIs which place an emphasis on research often have many academics on their boards.
147. See Pohjolainen, The Evolution of National Human Rights Institutions. The Role of the United Nations (Copenhagen: The Danish Institute for Human Rights, 2006) at 19.
148. The GIHR and the NCHR are developing similar promotional activities, see: www.institut-fur-menschenrechte.de; and www.humanrights.uio.no, respectively.
149. For the monitoring activities of the DIHR, see Kjaerum, supra n. 68 at 20-2;
150. and Kjaerum, supra n. 97 at 26-31. The GIHR, however, does not have a mandate to monitor governmental action.
151. See Kjaerum, supra n. 97 at 30.
152. This prize is presented by the Prime Minister on 10 December each year (International Human Rights Day) and rewards five people for their activities and projects on the effective protection and promotion of human rights.
153. This medal is awarded each year by the Minister of Education. It is designed to reward people for their exemplary action, usually as part of a school project, in relation to the promotion and protection of human rights in France or abroad. The competition is open to students, groups of students and entire classes in both private and state-owned French secondary and vocational schools in France and abroad.
154. GA Res. 217 A (III), 10 December 1948, A/810 at 71.
155. Para. 33, Part I, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, supra n. 14.
156. See Article 42, Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989, 1577 UNTS 3: and Article 10, Convention against Torture and other Cruel or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 1984, 1465 UNTS 85.
157. Marie,'Human Rights Education, a Fundamental Resource in the Prevention of Violations', in Sicilianos (ed), The Prevention of Human Rights Violations. Contribution on the Occasion of the Twentieth Anniversary of the Marangopoulos Foundation of Human Rights (MFHR) (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2001) 269 at 275.
158. GA Res. 49/184, 23 December 1994, A/RES/49/184.
159. See paras 12 and 28(a), Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the implementation of the Plan of Action for the United Nations Decade for Human Rights Education, 12 December 1996, A/51/ 506/Add.1.
160. In December 2004, the World Programme for Human Rights Education was proclaimed by the General Assembly. A primary and secondary school education programme was adopted in August 2005, see GA Res. 59/113, 5 August 2005, A/RES/59/113B.
161. OHCHR Professional Training Series No. 4, supra n. 17 at 18;
162. and Commonwealth Secretariat, supra n. 61 at 21.
163. OHCHR Professional Training Series No. 4, supra n. 17 at 18;
164. and Commonwealth Secretariat, supra n. 61 at 22.
165. See DIHR, Annual Report 2004, supra n. 40.
166. See GIHR, Annual Report 2004, available at: www.institut-fur-menschenrechte.de.
167. See DIHR, Annual Reports 2004 and 2005, supra n. 40. The DIHR seems to be more involved in promoting human rights abroad than in Denmark. It could be considered more as a technical cooperation agency than as a national institution.
168. International Council on Human Rights Policy, supra n. 74 at 35-6.
169. Ibid. at 36-7.
170. Cardenas, Adaptive States: The Proliferation of National Human Rights Institutes, Policy Working Paper T-01-04, Harvard University Carr Centre for Human Rights, 2001 at 5.
171. Dickson, 'The Contribution of Human Rights Commissions to the Protection of Human Rights', [2003] Public Law 272 at 279.
172. Klerk, supra n. 63 at 98.
173. International Council on Human Rights Policy, supra n. 34 at 22.
174. The contact person in parliament should communicate the opinions of the NHRI to all political groups in parliament. In certain cases it might be useful for the national institution to also send these opinions directly to political groups.
175. Kjaerum, supra n. 97 at 28.
176. Principle 3(a), Competence and responsibilities, Paris Principles.
177. See OHCHR Professional Training Series No. 4, supra n. 17 at 10.
178. While this may happen by constitutional amendment, a new law or presidential decree, only the first two ways of establishing NHRIs give the best guarantees of their independence. See Lindsnaes and Lindholt, supra n. 5 at 14-7. According to Principle 2, Competence and responsibilities, Paris Principles, national institutions shall only be established 'by a constitutional or legislative text'.
179. Qafisheh, 'Defining the Role of National Human Rights Institutions with regard to the United Nations, (2004) 36 Legal Reports Series of the Palestinian Independent Commission for Citizens' Rights 1 at 21.
180. The representatives of NGOs that occasionally represent national institutions of which they are member must be aware of their particular position. Without clearly stating in which capacity they speak, these representatives might confuse those they address because the latter might not understand why they sometimes take different positions than their own organisation. They must, therefore, make clear that they express the views of the national institution and not those of the NGO that they represent in this institution.
181. See para. 11(a), Comm. Res. 2005/74, 20 April 2005, E/CN4/RES/2005/74. This resolution provides that only national institutions accredited by the Sub-committee on Accreditation of the International Coordinating Committee have this right. The General Assembly decided that the level of participation of NHRIs in Commission on Human Rights sessions should be maintained in the UN Human Rights Council sessions, albeit without explicitly granting NHRIs full participation in these sessions.
182. See para. 11, GA Res. 60/251, 3 April 2006, A/RES/60/251: 13 IHRR 1195 (2006).
183. Pearson, 'Non-Governmental Organisations and International Law: Mapping New Mechanisms for Governance, (2004) 23 Australian Yearbook of International Law 73 at 100-1.
184. See supra n. 31 and 32.
185. See International Council on Human Rights Policy, supra n. 34 at 98.
186. Principle 1, Composition and guarantees of independence and pluralism, Paris Principles.
187. Small NHRIs are in a way more flexible than large NHRIs, since they can establish as many alliances with NGOs they wish without having to change their statutes. It may also be difficult for large NHRIs to embrace all the NGO community in their membership.
188. See Section (a), Council of Europe Res. (97)11, supra n. 20.
189. Cardenas, supra n. 142 at 5-8.
190. On governmental networks, see Slaughter, 'Governmental Networks: The Heart of the Liberal Democratic Order', in Fox and Roth (eds), Democratic Governance and International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) 199.
191. Council of Europe, First Round Table with the National Human Rights Institutions. 3rd European Meeting of National Institutions. Compilation of reports, statements and recommendations, 16-17 March 2000, NHRI (2002) 012 at 54-6.
192. Kjaerum, supra n. 68 at 7. Morten Kjaerum is the chairman of the International Coordinating Committee and director general of the DIHR.
193. European NHRIs that have only been granted B-Status by the International Coordinating Committee have no voting rights in the European Group of NHRIs. See Section 2(3). Rules of Procedure of the European Group of National Institutions, supra n. 18.
194. Section 6(2)(b), Rules of Procedure of the European Group of National Institutions, ibid.
195. See European Group of National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Newsletter 2, May August 2005, available at: www.nhri.net.
196. The lack political will of the European states with regard to NHRIs is also reflected in the wording of Council of Europe Rec. No. R(97) 14, supra n. 20, as discussed in the Part 2 of this article.
197. It is worth noting that the mandate of JOIN explicitly provides that it is not the purpose of this project to advocate one NHRI model, but only to ensure compliance with the Paris Principles.
198. See Athens Declaration 2006, 20 November 2006, CommDH/NHRI(2006) 10 at 5.
199. Athens Declaration 2006, ibid. at 6.
200. Para. 12, GA Res. 48/134, supra n. 7.
201. Section (a), Council of Europe Rec. No. R(97) 14, supra n. 19.