Dignity and equality

Human Rights Law Review

Volumn 7, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 299-329

  Grant, Evadné ^a  

^a OXFORD BROOKES UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 34447522042     PISSN: 14617781     EISSN: 17441021     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/hrlr/ngm002     Document Type: Article

References (275)

1. Article 1, UDHR, GA Res. 217 A (III), 10 December 1948, A/810 at 71.
2. See Fredman, Discrimination Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) at 2
3. Barnard and Hepple, 'Substantive Equality', (2000) 59 Cambridge Law Journal 562 at 564.
4. For examples of different approaches see Collins, 'Discrimination, Equality and Social Inclusion', (2003) 66 Modern Law Review 16;
5. Nolan, 'A Right to Meritorious Treatment', in Gearty and Tomkins (eds), Understanding Human Rights (London: Mansell Publishing, 1996) 239;
6. McCrudden, 'Merit Principles', (1998) 18 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 543;
7. and Fredman, 'The Future of Equality in Britain', Equal Opportunities Commission, Working Paper Series, No. 5, 2002 at 10.
8. Loenen, 'Towards a Common Standard of Achievement? Developments in International Equality Law', [2001] Acta Juridica 197.
9. Ibid. at 210.
10. Section 9, Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996.
11. See, for example, Minister of Finance v Van Heerden 2004 (6) SA 121 (CC);
12. 2004 (11) BCLR 1125 (CC).
13. A similar approach is taken by the Supreme Court of Canada in interpreting Section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. See Law v Canada (1999) 1 SCR 497.
14. 1997 (4) SA 1(CC);
15. 1997 (6) BCLR 708 (CC).
16. Ibid. at para. 41.
17. Albertyn and Goldblatt, 'Facing the Challenge of Transformation: Difficulties in the Development of an Indigenous Jurisprudence of Equality', (1998) 14 South African Journal on Human Rights 248 at 257-8.
18. See Grabham, 'Law v Canada: New Directions for Equality under the Canadian Charter?', (2002) 22 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 641 at 653;
19. Bredt and Dodek, 'Breaking the Law's Grip on Equality: A New Paradigm for section 15', (2003) 20 Supreme Court Law Review (2d) 33 at 46;
20. Davis, 'Equality: The Majesty of Legoland Jurisprudence', (1999) 116 South African Law Journal 398 at 413;
21. and Albertyn and Goldblatt, ibid. at 272.
22. Feldman, 'Human Dignity as a Legal Value - Part 1', [1999] Public Law 682 at 697.
23. See also Feldman, Civil Liberties and Human Rights in England and Wales, 2nd edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) at 125;
24. and Beyleveld and Brownsworth, Human Dignity in Bioethics and Biolaw (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) at 63.
25. In National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC);
26. 1998 (12) BCLR 1517 (CC) the Constitutional Court acknowledged the difficulty in describing 'dignity' in precise terms (at para. 28).
27. The influence of the German Constitution in the drafting of the South African Constitution is widely acknowledged. See Sarkin, 'The Effect of Constitutional Borrowings on the Drafting of South Africa's Bill of Rights and Interpretation of Human Rights Provisions', (1998) 1 University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law 176;
28. and De Waal, 'A Comparative Analysis of the Provisions of German Origin in the Interim Bill of Rights', (1995) 11 South African Journal on Human Rights 1.
29. See also Corder, 'Towards a South African Constitution', (1994) 57 Modern Law Review 491.
30. There is growing evidence of a process of 'judicial globalization' in which judges from courts around the world are increasingly influenced by international and comparative law, particularly in human rights cases. See Slaughter, 'A Typology of Transjudicial Communication', (1994) 29 University of Richmond Law Review 99;
31. Slaughter, 'Judicial Globalization', (2000) 40 Virginia Journal of International Law 1103;
32. Slaughter, 'A Global Community of Courts', (2003) 44 Harvard International Law Journal 191;
33. L'Heureux-Dube, 'The Importance of Dialogue: Globalization and the International Impact of the Rehnquist Court', (1998) 34 Tulsa Law Journal 15;
34. Jackson, 'Transnational Discourse, Relational Authority and the US Court: Gender Equality', (2003) 37 Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review 271;
35. and Dupré, Importing the Law in Post-Communist Transitions: The Hungarian Constitutional Court and the Right to Human Dignity (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2003) at 43.
36. There are significant similarities in the approach of the Supreme Court of Canada in Law v Canada, supra n. 7, and the South African Constitutional Court's approach to the right to equality. However, while the South African jurisprudence owes much to the Canadian example, there are significant differences in the way in which dignity has been defined and applied in these two jurisdictions.
37. See Small and Grant, 'Dignity, Discrimination and Context: New Directions in South African and Canadian Human Rights Law', (2005) 6 Human Rights Review 25.
38. Frowein, 'Human Dignity in International Law', in Kretzmer and Klein (eds), The Concept of Human Dignity in Human Rights Discourse (The Hague: Kluwer, 2002) 121;
39. Starck, 'The Religious and Philosophical Background of Human Dignity and its Place in Modern Constitutions', in Kretzmer and Klein (eds), ibid., 179;
40. and Eckert, 'Legal Roots of Human Dignity in German Law', in Kretzmer and Klein (eds), ibid., 41.
41. See Arieli, 'On the Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for the Emergence of the Doctrine of the Dignity of Man and His Rights', in Kretzmer and Klein (eds), ibid., 1;
42. and Morsink, 'World War Two and the Universal Declaration', (1993) 15 Human Rights Quarterly 357.
43. Preamble, Charter of the United Nations 1945, 1 UNTS xvi.
44. The European Convention on Human Rights 1950, 213 UNTS 221; ETS No. 5, concluded shortly after the UDHR, does not expressly refer to human dignity. However, it does refer to the UDHR and, in its preamble, states as its aim 'the recognition and observance of the rights therein declared'. The case law of the European Court of Human Rights has established human dignity as an important element in the interpretation of the Convention. See Frowein, supra n. 16 at 124.
45. 999 UNTS 171.
46. 993 UNTS 3.
47. Article 1-2, Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe 2004, [2004] OJ C 300/01, signed by Heads of State or Government on 29 October 2004 but subject to ratification at the time of writing. Human dignity is also identified as a foundational value and as the first right in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 2000, [2000] OJ C 364/01, which has been incorporated as Part II of the Treaty.
48. Human dignity has also been invoked in a number of the post-communist Constitutions of countries in the former communist bloc, many of which have either already become members of the European Union or are on the list of candidate countries. See Dupré, supra n. 14 at 24.
49. See Dicke,'The Founding Function of Human Dignity in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights', in Kretzmer and Klein (eds), supra n. 16, 111;
50. Starck, supra n. 16;
51. and Eckert, supra n. 16.
52. See Cancik, '"Dignity of Man" and "Persona"' in Stoic Anthropology: Some Remarks on Cicero, De Officiis I 105-107',
53. in Kretzmer and Klein (eds), supra n. 16,19 at 21.
54. Ibid. at 19.
55. Thomas, Textbook of Roman Law (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1976) at 369;
56. and Burchell, Principles of Delict (Cape Town: Juta, 1993) at 198.
57. Genesis 1, 27; and Ephesians 4, 24.
58. See Arieli, supra n. 17 at 9. Reflecting this, Jefferson's Declaration of Independence provides that '[w]e hold these truths to be self-evident, that all man are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights...
59. Cancik, supra n. 25 at 33.
60. Cancik, ibid. at 35;
61. and Arieli, supra n. 17 at 7.
62. Barrett,'Dignatio and the Human Body', (2005) 21 South African Journal on Human Rights 525 at 530-2.
63. Dicke, supra n. 24 at 114-5.
64. Dicke, ibid. 118.
65. See Paust,'Human Dignity as a Constitutional Right: A Jurisprudentially Based Inquiry into Criteria and Content, (1984) 27 Howard Law Journal 145 at 186.
66. Schwartländer, quoted in Dicke, supra n. 24 at 119.
67. Dicke, ibid.
68. Paust, supra n. 33 at 147.
69. For example, Article 1, German Basic Law 1949; and Article 54(1), Hungarian Constitution 1989.
70. See Eberle, Dignity and Liberty: Constitutional Visions in Germany and the United States (Westport: Praeger, 2002) at 42;
71. and Kommers, The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany, 2nd edn (London: Duke University Press, 1997) at 300.
72. Chaskalson, 'Human Dignity as a Constitutional Value', in Kretzmer and Klein (eds), supra n. 16, 133.
73. This is not to deny its role in other constitutions, many of which contain references to human dignity. For examples, see Starke, supra n. 16 at 179.
74. and Dupré, supra n. 14.
75. Translated by Kommers, supra n. 40 at 298.
76. See also Benda, 'The Protection of Human Dignity (Article 1 of the Basic Law), (2000) 53 Southern Methodist University Law Review 443.
77. Klein, 'Human Dignity in German Law', in Kretzmer and Klein (eds), supra n. 16, 145 at 147;
78. and Benda, ibid.
79. Klein, ibid.
80. Microcensus Case 27 BVerfGE 1 (1969). See also Life Imprisonment Case 45 BVerfGE 187 (1977).
81. Eckert, supra n. 16 at 51, describes dignity as having 'utmost priority within the legal system'.
82. Eberle, supra n. 40 at 42;
83. and Klein, supra n. 43 at 146.
84. 39 BVerfGE 1 (1975).
85. Cited in Benda, supra n. 42 at 446-7.
86. Quoted in Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC) at para. 54. This view has, however, been subject to criticism. See Kommers, supra n. 40 at 31.
87. The wording of Article 1 was highly controversial. See Kommers, supra n. 40 at 300-1;
88. Eckert, supra n. 16 at 53;
89. and Eberle, supra n. 40 at 42.
90. See Fletcher, 'Human Dignity as a Constitutional Value', (1984) 22 Western Ontario Law Review 171;
91. Eberle, ibid. at 43;
92. Klein, supra n. 43 at 26;
93. and Kommers, ibid. at 305.
94. See Kommers, ibid. at 304;
95. and Arieli, supra n. 17 at 7.
96. Supra n. 45 (translated in Kommers, ibid. at 299).
97. See also Life Imprisonment Case, supra n. 45.
98. See Jones, '"Common Constitutional Traditions". Can the Meaning of Human Dignity under German Law Guide the European Court of Justice', [2004] Public Law 167.
99. Elves 6 BVerfGE 32 (1957);
100. and Census Act Case 65 BVerfGE 1 (1984).
101. See Eberle, supra n. 40 at Chapters 3 and 4.
102. See Fletcher, supra n. 51 at 175.
103. Supra n. 45.
104. See Kommers, supra n. 40 at 306:
105. and Eberle, supra n. 40 at 43.
106. Translated in Kommers, ibid. at 307-8.
107. The Court did not invalidate life imprisonment for murder, but said that the state must consider each case on its own merits in determining whether to permit the release of the prisoner. Shortly after the decision, the Criminal Code was amended. See Kommers, ibid. at 311.
108. In the Mephisto Case 30 BVerfGE 173 (1971), the Federal Constitutional Court held that that the duty to respect human dignity did not end with death. Why is this so? It cannot surely be argued that the dead have a right to dignity? But there is an important sense in which the whole of society has an interest in respect for the dead, manifested in a variety of ways such as the prohibition on the desecration of tombstones and regulation of use of body parts, etc.
109. See Kommers, ibid. at 301;
110. and Eberle, supra n. 40 at 98-9.
111. See Eberle, ibid. at 50-3.
112. See, for example, the Census Act Case 65 BVerfGE 1 (1983) where the Federal Constitutional Court said that '[t]he Basic Law has resolved the tension between the individual and society by postulating a community-related and community-bound individual' (translated in Kommers, supra n. 40 at 323).
113. The corollary of this is that sometimes human dignity may be used to justify constraining human autonomy. For a discussion, see Beylefeld and Brownsworth, supra n. 12.
114. See, for example, S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at para. 262.
115. Chaskalson, supra n. 41 at 139.
116. Supra n. 64 at para. 329.
117. Echoing its German counterpart, the South African Constitutional Court declared in Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security, supra n. 49 at para. 54, that '[o]ur constitution is not merely a formal document regulating public power. It also embodies, like the German Constitution, an objective normative value system'.
118. See Daniels v Campbell NO and Others 2004 (7) BCLR 735 (CC) at para. 56;
119. and Bhe and Others v Magistrate Khayelitsha and Others 2005 (1) BCLR 1 (CC) at para. 212.
120. See also Roederer, 'Post-Matrix Legal Reasoning: Horizontality and the Rule of Values in South African Law', (2003) 19 South African Journal on Human Rights 57.
121. Roederer, ibid. at 61.
122. Makwanyane, supra n. 64;
123. and S v Williams 1995 (7) BCLR 861 (CC).
124. Bernstein v Bester 1996 (4) BCLR 449 (CC);
125. and National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice, supra n. 12.
126. Khumalo v Holomisa 2002 (5) SA 401 (CC).
127. Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) at paras 38 and 41.
128. See Liebenberg, 'The Value of Human Dignity in Interpreting Socio-Economic Rights', (2005) 21 South African Journal on Human Rights 1.
129. Discussed infra.
130. 2003 (2) SA 198 (CC).
131. Act 74 of 1983.
132. Du Toit, supra n. 75 at para. 29.
133. See also Moseneke v Master of the High Court 2001 (2) SA 18 (CC);
134. 2001 (2) BCLR 103 (CC).
135. However, in Volks NO v Robinson and Others 2005 (5) BCLR 446 (CC), the majority of the Constitutional Court held that the dignity of the applicant had not been infringed by legislation which excluded heterosexual partners in providing for continued maintenance for spouses after the death of one spouse (at para. 62).
136. Articles 22 and 23, UDHR.
137. Supra n. 73.
138. Ibid. at para 23.
139. See also Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal 1997 (12) BCLR 1696 (CC) at para. 8.
140. The connection between dignity and socio-economic rights is discussed in Liebenberg, supra n. 73;
141. and De Vos, 'Substantive Equality after Grootboom: The Emergence of Social and Economic context as a Guiding Value in Equality Jurisprudence', [2001] Acta Juridica 52.
142. See, for example, S v Williams, supra. n. 70. This usually also has a psychological dimension.
143. Supra n. 45
144. Supra n. 12 at para. 117.
145. Ibid. at paras 118-9.
146. 2000 (4) SA 757.
147. Section 31 provides for the right of religious communities to practise their religion.
148. Christian Education South Africa, supra n. 85 at para. 36.
149. Ibid. at para. 50.
150. Supra n. 73.
151. Ibid. at para. 44.
152. Preamble, Interim Constitution, Act 200 of 1993.
153. See, for example, Makwanyane, supra n. 64 at para. 262;
154. Brink v Kitshoff 1996 (4) SA 197 (CC);
155. 1996 (6) BCLR 752 (CC) at para. 33;
156. Ngcobo J in Bato Star Fishing v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism and Others 2004 (7) BCLR 687 (CC) at para. 73;
157. Minister of Finance v Van Heerden, supra n. 6 at para. 22;
158. Fraser v Children's Court Pretoria North 1997 (2) SA 261 (CC);
159. 1997 (2) BCLR 153 (CC) at para. 20;
160. and Bhe, supra n. 68 at para. 71.
161. See also Klare, 'Legal Culture and Transformative Constitutionalism', (1998) 14 South African Journal on Human Rights 146;
162. Cowan 'Can "Dignity" Guide South Africa's Equality Jurisprudence?', (2001) 17 South African Journal on Human Rights 34 at 35;
163. and Chaskalson, "The Third Bram Fischer Lecture - Human Dignity as a Foundational Value of our Constitutional Order', (2000) 16 South African Journal on Human Rights 193 at 199.
164. 1998 (1) SA 1(CC);
165. 1997 (11) BCLR 1489 (CC),
166. subsequently cited in, amongst others, Satchwell v President of the Republic of South Africa 2002 (6) SA 1 (CC) at para. 20;
167. Hoffmann v South African Airways 2001 (1) SA 1 (CC);
168. 2000 (11) BCLR 1211(CC) at para. 16;
169. National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Another v Minister of Justice, supra n. 12 at para. 17;
170. Van Heerden, supra n. 6 at para. 99;
171. Volks, supra n. 77 at para. 77;
172. and Van der Merwe v Road Accident Fund and Others CCT 48/05, 30 March 2006, at para. 42.
173. See Grant and Small, 'Disadvantage and Discrimination: The Emerging Jurisprudence of the South African Constitutional Court', (2000) 51 Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 174.
174. In terms of the justification clause, Section 36, limitation of rights in the Bill of Rights is permitted if such limitation can be justified on the basis that it is 'reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom...'. The role of Section 36 is not considered in this analysis.
175. Harksen, supra n. 93 at para. 42;
176. Prinsloo v Van der Linde 1997 (3) SA 1012 (CC);
177. 1997 (6) BCLR 759 (CC) at para. 25;
178. and Van der Merwe, supra n. 93 at para. 49.
179. The term 'corrective action' is preferred to 'affirmative action' or 'positive discrimination' which are used in other jurisdictions because the explicit aim of the provision is to correct the injustices of the past. See Van Heerden, supra n. 6 at para. 29.
180. See also Gutto, Equality and Non-Discrimination in South Africa: The Political Economy of Law and Law-Making (Claremont: New Africa Books, 2001) at 127.
181. At paras 44-5.
182. Supra n. 6.
183. Ibid. at para. 32.
184. Ibid. at para. 31.
185. See also National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Another v Minister of Justice, supra n. 12 at para. 61.
186. See Sachs J in National Coalition v Minister of Justice, ibid. at paras 122-3.
187. Supra n. 95.
188. Ibid. at para. 31,
189. quoted in Harksen, supra n. 93 at para. 46.
190. Ibid.
191. See section 9(5) cited earlier; and Harksen, supra n. 91 at para. 45.
192. Harksen, ibid. at para. 49.
193. See Van der Merwe, supra n. 93 at para. 25.
194. Harksen, ibid. at para. 46.
195. See also Prinsloo, supra n. 95 at para. 33.
196. See section 9(5).
197. 1998 (1) SA 745 (CC);
198. 1997 (12) BCLR 1655 (CC).
199. Ibid. at para. 19.
200. Harksen, supra n. 93 at para. 50.
201. National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice supra n. 12.
202. Sachs J in National Coalition v Minister of Justice, ibid. at para. 126.
203. Harksen, supra n. 93 at para. 51.
204. See also Hugo, supra n. 8 at para. 43.
205. Davis, supra n. 11 at 413, argues that the concept is so malleable that it can 'be used in whatever form and shape is required by the demands of the judicial designer'.
206. Although, according to the Court in Harksen, the three factors identified are not exhaustive of what may be relevant to the unfairness enquiry. At the time of writing no further factors have been identified.
207. See Fredman, Discrimination Law, supra n. 2 at 14-5.
208. Preamble, South African Constitution.
209. Ngcobo J in Van Heerden, supra n. 6 at para. 116.
210. See, for example, National Coalition v Minister of Justice, supra n. 12;
211. and National Coalition v Minister of Home Affairs, 2000 (2) SA 1.
212. Ibid.
213. Ibid. at para. 44.
214. 1998 (2) SA 363 (CC);
215. 1998 (3) BCLR 257 (CC).
216. Ibid. at para. 48. In spite of this finding, once all the contextual factors had been considered, the decision went against the applicants.
217. See, for example, Van Heerden, supra n. 6 at para. 122.
218. See supra text accompanying n. 117.
219. See Hugo, supra n. 8 at para. 41;
220. and Van Heerden, supra n. 6 at para. 116.
221. National Coalition, supra n. 12 at para. 61.
222. See Van Heerden, supra n. 6 at paras 31, 75 and 97.
223. Harksen, supra n. 93 at para. 51.
224. Supra n. 6.
225. The Closed Pension Fund (CPF) was set up to provide pension benefits for those who held office prior to the first democratic elections in 1994 - see the Closed Pension Fund Act 197 of 1993.
226. Per Moseneke J.
227. In separate dissenting judgments by Makgoro and Ngcobo JJ.
228. Per Makgoro J at para. 102;
229. per Ngcobo J at paras 123-8.
230. Sachs J at paras 147 and 149.
231. It should be noted that, in terms of Harksen, the third contextual factor is not confined to an investigation of the impact on dignity. In the alternative, the question for investigation is whether the discrimination 'constitutes an impairment of a comparably serious nature' (supra n. 115).
232. For a discussion, see Small and Grant, supra n. 15 at 32.
233. National Coalition v Minister of Justice, supra n. 12.
234. This was the first of a number of cases in which discrimination on the ground of sexual orientation was alleged. Subsequent cases brought on this ground include National Coalition v Minister of Home Affairs, supra n. 121;
235. Hoffmann, supra n. 93;
236. Satchwell, supra n. 93;
237. DuToit, supra n. 75;
238. J and Another v Director General, Department of Home Affairs 2003 (5) SA 621;
239. and Van der Merwe, supra n. 93.
240. National Coalition v Minister of Justice, supra n. 12 at para. 25.
241. Ibid. at paras 22-7.
242. Ibid. at paras 23-4.
243. Ibid. at para. 23.
244. The second contextual factor clearly played no role here, as the purpose of the provisions at issue was manifestly not aimed at enhancing equality in any sense.
245. National Coalition v Minister of Justice, supra n. 12 at paras 127-8.
246. Ibid. at para. 124.
247. Ibid. at para. 125.
248. Feldman also proposes three levels of operation of the concept. See Feldman, supra n. 12 at 125. However, the first level identified by Feldman, 'the dignity attaching to the whole human species' is not a concern reflected in the South African equality jurisprudence. Instead, the concern in the South African cases is with the transformation of society.
249. As noted earlier, the Canadian Supreme Court has defined dignity in more subjective terms than the South African Court, stating that '...human dignity ...concerns the manner in which a person legitimately feels when confronted with a particular law' (Law v Canada, supra n. 7 at para. 53).
250. Albertyn and Goldblatt, supra n. 10 at 272.
251. See, for example, National Coalition v Minister of Justice, supra n. 12 at para 19.
252. Ibid. at para. 24.
253. See also Van Heerden, supra n. 6 at para. 101.
254. 2002 (5) SA 401 (CC).
255. Ibid. at para. 27.
256. See De Vos, supra n. 80 at 63.
257. See Liebenberg, supra n. 73.
258. See Van Bueren, 'Alleviating Poverty through the Constitutional Court', (1999) 15 South African Journal on Human Rights 52.
259. De Vos, supra n. 80 at 63.
260. Albertyn and Goldblatt supra n. 10 at 261-6;
261. and Grant and Small, supra n. 93 at 188-9.
262. In contrast, note the discussion of women and domestic violence in the recent case of Van der Merwe, supra n. 93 at paras 66-7.
263. See, for example, National Coalition v Minister of Justice, supra n. 12;
264. National Coalition v Minister of Home Affairs, supra n. 121;
265. Hoffmann, supra n. 93;
266. and Du Toit, supra n. 75.
267. See, for example, the emphasis on the need to recognise and protect diversity in Volks, supra n. 77 at para. 210.
268. Although the challenge in Walker was partly successful, this was limited to measures which were not designed to further the greater goal of transformation.
269. See Fredman, Discrimination Law, supra n. 2 at 94-105;
270. and Barnard and Hepple, 'Substantive Equality', (2000) 59 Cambridge Law Journal 562 at 563.
271. Fredman, 'The Future of Equality in Britain', supra n. 2.
272. See also Fredman, ibid. at 16-23.
273. Dawood v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 (3) SA 936 (CC);
274. 2000 (8) BCLR 837 (CC) at para. 35.
275. See also Khumalo v Holomisa, supra n. 154 at para. 26.