Lies, damned lies, and political campaigns

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 60, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 262-286

  Callander, Steven ^a   Wilkie, Simon ^b  

^a NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Electoral competition; Lying; Signaling games

Indexed keywords

EID: 34447283500     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2006.12.003     Document Type: Article

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