McDowell, demonstrative concepts, and nonconceptual representational content

Disputatio

Volumn , Issue 14, 2003, Pages 39-54

  Wright, Wayne ^a  

^a not available   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 34347337978     PISSN: 0873626X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2478/disp-2003-0003     Document Type: Article

References (15)

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3. Crane, T. 1992b. The Nonconceptual Content of Experience. In Crane 1992a.
4. Cussins, A. 1990. The Connectionist Construction of Concepts. In The Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence, ed. M. A. Boden. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
5. Dretske, F. 1995. Naturalizing the Mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
6. Evans, G. 1982. The Varieties of Reference. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
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9. McDowell. 1998. Replies. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58:403-32.
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11. Peacocke, C. 1992b. Scenarios, Concepts, and Perception. In Crane 1992a.
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13. Tye, M. 1995. Ten Problems of Consciousness. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
14. Tye, M. 2000. Consciousness, Color, and Content. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
15. Vision, G. 1997. Problems of Vision. Oxford: Oxford University Press.