The scope of thought in parmenides

Classical Quarterly

Volumn 52, Issue 1, 2002, Pages 207-219

  Crystal, I ^a  

^a LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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EID: 34347302577     PISSN: 00098388     EISSN: 14716844     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/cq/52.1.207     Document Type: Article

References (62)

1. To cite just a few recent examples on this subject matter, see A. A. Long, 'Parmenides on thinking being', in J. Cleary (ed. ), Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy 12, (New York, 1996), 125-51;
2. D. Sedley, 'Parmenides and Melissus', in A. A. Long (ed. ), The Cambridge Companion to Early Greek Philosophy, (Cambridge, 1999), 113-33;
3. P. Curd, The Legacy of Parmenides (Princeton, 1998), chs. 1 and 2. I would like to thank Raphael Woolf, M. M. McCabe, Richard Sorabji, Christopher Gill, Gerard O'Daly, Stuart Leggatt, the anonymous referee, and the editor Professor Collard for their invaluable comments on earlier versions of this paper.
4. Long (n. 1), 140-6.
5. See n. 38 below.
6. Curd (n. 1), 89-90.
7. See n. 34 below.
8. See nn. 15-17 below.
9. Although the disjuncts do not need to be taken as contradictories (i. e. ∼∼ and ∼ are not contradictories, and ∼ are), Parmenides, judging from B8. 16-18, certainly took them in that manner. Kirk, Raven, and Schofield state the matter well, remarking that Parmenides' characterization of the disjuncts in the B2 is meant to bring out their mutual incompatibility which is characteristic of contradictories. See G. S. Kirk, J. E. Raven, and M. Schofield, The Presocratic Philosophers (Cambridge, 1983), 246, n. 1.
10. Also cf. D. Gallop, Parmenides of Elea (Toronto, 1984), 8;
11. A. Finkelberg, 'Parmenides' foundation of the way of truth', Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy VI (Oxford, 1988), 43-4.
12. Cf. J. Barnes, The Presocratic Philosophers (London, 1982), 163-5 on the issue of whether Parmenides is confusing necessitas consequentis with necessitas consequentiae.
13. As for the debate about what the subject of is, following G. E. L. Owen, 'Eleatic questions', in M. C. Nussbaum (ed. ), Logic. Science and Dialectic (London, 1986), 9-16, I take it to be the task of the subsequent fragments, culminating with B8, to spell this point out. For example, by the time we get to B6, it is clear that is the subject.
14. For further comments on the difficulty surrounding the question of what the subject of is, also see M. M. Mackenzie, 'Parmenides' dilemma', Phronesis 27 (1982), 2 and relevant note and Sedley (n. 1), 114. Until the full nature of the subject is disclosed, to speak of 'it' as attending upon is not to say too much, save that it enjoys some sort of relation to. For a different line on what the subject of is, cf. Finkelberg (n. 5), 44-7. As for the other well-debated issue, namely the status of and whether it is best understood as predicative, existential, veridical, or a fusion thereof, this is of secondary importance to the present task. It is clear that the scope of the verb 'to be' should not be limited to either the existential use (the complete use) or the predicative use (the incomplete use) if one is to appreciate fully both Parmenides' account of being as outlined in Fragment 8 and the path upon which misguided mortals who confuse and conflate being and not being are said to tread.
15. For some recent discussions of how best to interpret the verb 'to be' in Parmenides, see Sedley (n. 1), 114-15;
16. Curd (n. 1), chs. 1 and 2;
17. and L. Brown, 'The verb "to be" in Greek philosophy: some remarks', in S. Everson (ed. ), The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Thought 3 (Cambridge, 1994), 216-20, 236.
18. Also cf. M. Furth, 'Elements of eleatic ontology', in A. P. D. Mourelatos (ed. ), The Pre-Socratics: A Collection of Critical Essays (New York, 1974), 242-8;
19. Kirk, Raven, and Schofield (n. 5), 245ff. ;
20. G. Owen (n. 7), 104-8;
21. D. Furley, 'Notes on Parmenides', Phronesis Suppl. Vol. 1 (1973), 13-14
22. and C. Kahn, 'The thesis of Parmenides', Phronesis Suppl. Vol. 1 (1973), 723-4.
23. It must be noted, however, that before Parmenides examines the nature of that which is, he posits the possibility of a third option in Fragments 6 and 7. This option is the avenue that mortals follow, an avenue to which he alludes in the Proem. Parmenides presumably takes this step in order to rule out any other possible alternative, prior to examining that which 'is'. It is clear that by the time we come to Fragment 8, he supposes that every option, save that which 'is', has been exhausted (8. 1-2). This third option, according to Parmenides, consists in the equating and confusing of the contradictories, being and not being. In virtue of this sort of conflation of contradictories, the epistemology of mortals, that is their knowledge of the phenomenal world, is untenable. Given this option's unintelligibility, Parmenides is left with only one alternative (by a process of elimination), that which 'is'.
24. In this vein, Burnyeat remarks: 'Thought requires an object, distinct from itself, and that object, Parmenides argues, must actually exist' (M. Burnyeat, 'Idealism and Greek philosophy: what Descartes saw and Berkeley missed', Philosophical Review 91 [1982], 15-16). According to Burnyeat, the ancients, Parmenides included, never got beyond the realist position. He takes it to be a post-Cartesian phenomenon to think of the categories of thought as constituting or determining the nature of the world. For the ancients it is the other way around.
25. Also cf. Bumyeat, 22-3 and 33.
26. Verdenius takes a similar view about what is intended to connote. He takes the line that is to be understood as the true nature of things and not some mental category or property. See W J. Verdenius, 'Parmenides B2. 3', Mnemosyne 15 (1962), 237.
27. Vlastos correctly emphasizes the religious aspect of all this imagery. To paraphrase, Parmenides is presenting the reader with a mystical revelation in which he is attempting to bridge the gulf between mortal and divine. See G. Vlastos, 'Parmenides' theory of knowledge', TAPhA 77 (1946), 74-5.
28. See A. P. D. Mourelatos, The Route of Parmenides (New Haven, 1970), 67. Mourelatos cites the example of the Homeric voyage motif as a place in which the imagery is employed. In Heraclitus we find the phrase (fr. 101) which does not conflict with the realist account, since the existence of that which is consulted or sought after, that is oneself, is not in question.
29. By 'modified form' I understand that the notion of multiple sense is left out. There is a one-on-one mapping. Cf. Furth (n. 7), 252.
30. All translations, unless stated otherwise, are taken from Barnes (n. 6). This translation, which does not posit the strict identity of thinking and being and treats in a modal manner, has been widely embraced in the Anglo-American tradition. See, for example, Kirk, Raven, and Schofield (n. 5);
31. Mourelatos (n. 12), 75;
32. and Owen (n. 7), 15.
33. Vlastos (n. 11), 68.
34. Sedley (n. 1), 120.
35. On the place of B3, cf. Finkelberg (n. 5), 55. Now, of course, if one does not accept the place of Fragment 3, then the arguments of Vlastos and Sedley carry much more force. See Sedley (n. 1), 120.
36. On speaking as an extension of thinking, see Barnes (n. 6), 158-9.
37. Curd reads this fragment as saying that there are no internal divisions within being but that it does not entail 'no external numerical divisions' (P. Curd, 'Parmenidean monism', Phronesis 36 [1991], 253).
38. The problem I have with this view is that if there were a numerical plurality, say, of F and G, then there would be a sense in which being was 'cut off from itself at least at a generic level. That is to say, F and G would not be cut qua F and G but qua being they would be cut off from one another. However, I do agree with Curd's remark (n. 1), 254 that this obscure fragment does come before B8 and that it is offering us a preliminary hint about the unity that is to come there.
39. In this vein Kahn (n. 7), 724 remarks: 'This general asymmetry reflects the extent to which such monism remains "realistic": knowing is founded in being; science and logic rest upon ontology; the mind does not impose its forms but receives them from the object it knows. '
40. This is the view expressed by von Fritz about the nature of the intellect and its act of intellection: 'It is still the primary function of noos to be in direct touch with ultimate reality': Kurt von Fritz, 'Nous, noein and their derivatives in pre-Socratic philosophy', in A. P. D. Mourelatos (ed. ), The Pre-Socratics: A Collection of Critical Essays (New York, 1974), 52.
41. For a different view cf. Barnes (n. 6), 611. Barnes argues contra von Fritz that this is wrong and vovs is from time to time erroneous.
42. Also cf. J. Lesher, 'Parmenides' critique of thinking: the poludêreis elenchos of Fragment 7', Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 2 (Oxford, 1984), 1-30;
43. and Curd (n. 19), 247-8 and id. (n. 1), 49.
44. Kahn (n. 7), 723 makes the following point which sits very well with the realist interpretation: 'It is worth noting, however, that in both Parmenides and in Aristotle the identity is characterised by a curious asymmetry: it is always or which is identified with - or reduced to - its object, never conversely. '
45. Mackenzie (n. 7), 2 takes this line of interpretation. She holds that Parmenides does not assume 'real objects' of thought en route to explaining. The basis for such a claim is as follows: 'We think thought must have content otherwise it would be vacuous, and could not be said to occur at all. We think about something, and not about nothing, . . . So if the choice between and can be reinterpreted as a choice between something and nothing, we must take. What can be thought is, and nihilism is false. For whatever its status, something is happening, even if the event only occurs in my brain. Moreover anything other than something must be impossible. So differentiation is impossible and strong monism may be thought to follow. '
46. Owen (n. 7), 18-21, I think wrongly, argues that lines 26-33 are also part of the temporal argument. He maintains that this passage restates two previous conclusions and argues for temporal invariance with the use of the imagery. I disagree with that reading for two reasons: much of the imagery has become spatial and there is no point in using this passage to establish temporal invariance, since lines 6-21 have established inter alia just that point.
47. Cf. Barnes (n. 6), 179.
48. Also see his 'Parmenides and the eleatic one', Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 61 (1979), 12
49. and Sedley (n. 1), 118-19.
50. Cf. Barnes (n. 7), 189 for the various construals of lines 12-13.
51. Cf. Barnes (n. 26, 1979), 19.
52. Cf. Owen (n. 7), 13 and 18-19.
53. For the view that it does imply qualitative homogeneity, see L. Tarán, Parmenides (Princeton, 1965), 107-8.
54. Cf. Barnes (n. 7), 210-12.
55. To use a well-known phrase, enjoys the state of the timeless present in which it might be tensed grammatically but not logically. See G. E. L. Owen, 'Plato and Parmenides on the timeless present', in M. C. Nussbaum (ed. ), Logic, Science and Dialectic (London, 1986), 27-8.
56. As with most commentators (including Diels-Kranz), I am leaving out the. See Tarán (n. 30), 119 and Gallop (n. 5), 68.
57. At this point I should address Curd's interesting interpretation ([n. 1], 95-6), which takes the view that Parmenides is a predicational monist. What this means in the present context is that whatever 'is', can have only one predicate, say 'F', thereby guaranteeing internal unity and ruling out internal differences. To quote: 'Parmenides is committed to and argues for the internal unity of each thing that is (so there can be no internal differences in each thing that is) but he also allows for a numerical plurality of such things (thus allowing for external differences for the things that are). ' The problem with this view is that it does allow for 'not being' to enter the picture inasmuch as one thing is 'F' and not 'G'. Curd herself admits there may be a problem 'lurking' here (95) for Parmenides but claims that he and his successors did not see it as one. I would argue that with this last argument (lines 26-33) Parmenides did see it as a problem and ruled it out. His principle cannot lack in any way whatsoever. As a result, not only internal difference must be ruled out but external difference as well. For even if 'x' were entirely 'F' and 'y' entirely 'G' and there was not any internal difference within each, there would be a difference between 'x' and 'y', a difference that could not be overlooked, since this would entail they not only both 'are' but in some sense, albeit relationally, 'are not'. Moreover, as I shall argue subsequently, Parmenides goes on to argue for the identity between being and thinking, as that distinction, if allowed to stand, would also constitute an instance of differentiation.
58. Long (n. 1), 140-6, I think, wrongly attributes a weak identity-relation between thinking and being in which, although identical, they are coextensively related. He maintains that thinking and being do not connote the same thing or are different in semantic value, just as the other attributes such as being ungenerated and everlasting are different in semantic value. However, even allowing for these differences in connotation or semantic value, one nonetheless cannot avoid the problem that thinking cannot be treated like the other attributes in that it requires the differentiation outlined above; the sort of differentiation which Parmenides appears to rule out when he offers his complete account of being in Fragment 8. Moreover, as I have argued elsewhere, it would seem that Plato picked up on this point when setting out his account of mental faculties and their objects in Republic 5. That is, in the midst of a backdrop couched in allusions to Parmenides' Proem, Plato sets out an account of thinking and its objects which is based upon the sort of differentiation that Long talks about, namely as coextensive relata. But more to the point, it would seem that Plato is setting out his account in this manner in contrast to the Parmenidean account. See I. Crystal, 'Parmenidean allusions in Republic V', Ancient Philosophy 16 (1996), 351-63.
59. See n. 37.
60. Cf. A. H. Coxon, The Fragments of Parmenides (Assen and Maastrict, 1986), 168
61. and Sedley (n. 1), 120, who translates the passage as 'the unshaken mind of well-rounded truth'. Long (n. 1), 142 in a similar vein states the matter as follows: 'The word is one of Homer's standard terms for naming the seat of life, emotion, and . . . thought or mind [Long's italics]. We have every reason to suppose that Parmenides, who models his language so directly on Homer, is using the word in just that way here. '
62. Cf. Crystal (n. 38), 351-7 on how Plato tackles this problem.