Restrictions on representationalism

Philosophical Studies

Volumn 134, Issue 3, 2007, Pages 405-427

  Kind, Amy ^a  

^a CLAREMONT MCKENNA COLLEGE   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 34347260298     PISSN: 00318116     EISSN: 15730883     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11098-007-9079-y     Document Type: Article

References (21)

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