Risk assessment and state failure

Global Society

Volumn 21, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 47-69

  Carment, David ^a   Gazo, John J ^a   Prest, Stewart ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

AID POLICY; GOVERNANCE APPROACH; MACROECONOMICS; POLICY REFORM; RISK ASSESSMENT; STATE ROLE; UNITED NATIONS;

EID: 34347203725     PISSN: 13600826     EISSN: 1469798X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/13600820601116526     Document Type: Article

References (106)

1. The authors would like to thank the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) of the Government of Canada for its support in this research. Information regarding the work of CIFP can be found at: .
2. Michael Ignatieff, "Intervention and State Failure", Dissent, Vol. 49, No. 1 (2002), p. 115.
3. James Wolfensohn, "Making the World a Better and Safer Place: The Time for Action is Now", Politics, Vol. 22, No. 2 (2002), p. 118.
4. JessicaWest, "Concept Paper: Fragile States and Poverty", Unpublished research paper for CIDA (February 2005).
5. See, for example, the policy of the US government: The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: White House, 2002), available: .
6. Some recent research suggests that aid decisions have become even more politicised since 11 September 2001. See, for instance, Mark McGillivray, Aid Allocation and Fragile States, Background Paper for the Senior Level Forum on Development Effectiveness in Fragile States, 13-14 January 2005, available: .
7. OECD, Poor Performers: Basic Approaches for Supporting Development in Difficult Partnerships - Note by the Secretariat, OECD DAC (November 2001), available: .
8. Magüi Moreno Torres and Michael Anderson, Fragile States: Defining Difficult Environments for Poverty Reduction, PRDE Working Paper No. 1 (August 2004), available: .
9. Jack Goldstone et al., State Failure Task Force Report: Phase III Findings (McLean, VA: Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC), 2000), available: .
10. World Bank, World Bank Group Work in Low-income Countries under Stress: A Task Force Report, World Bank LICUS Task Force (Washington, DC: World Bank, September 2002), available: .
11. AUSAid, Australian Aid: Investing in Growth, Stability and Prosperity AUSAid (September 2002), available: .
12. Asian Development Bank, ADB's Approach to Weakly-performing Developing Member Countries, Discussion Paper for the Asian Development Fund (ADF) IX Donors' Meeting (March 2004), available: .
13. Robert Rotberg (ed.), When States Fail: Causes and Consequences (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004).
14. Prime Minister's Strategy Unit, Investing in Prevention: An International Strategy to Manage Risks of Instability and Improve Crisis Response, Prime Minister's Strategy Unit Report to the Government of the UK (February 2005), available: .
15. The State Failure Task Force is perhaps the world's most famous survey of the problem, and information about it is available at: .
16. Robert Rotberg, "The Failure and Collapse of Nation-states: Breakdown, Prevention, and Repair", in Rotberg (ed.), op. cit., pp. 5-10.
17. Jean-Germain Gros, "Towards a Taxonomy of Failed States in the New World Order: Decaying Somalia, Liberia, Rwanda and Haiti", Third World Quarterly, Vol. 17, No. 3 (1996), pp. 461-548.
18. Karim Morcos, "Chair's Summary", Senior Level Forum on Development Effectiveness in Fragile States, London, 13-14 January 2005 (January 2005), available: .
19. DfID, Why We Need to Work More Effectively in Fragile States", DfID (January 2005), available: .
20. German Federal Government, Action Plan: "Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution and Post-conflict Peace-building" (2004), available: .
21. USAID, Fragile States Strategy, USAID (January 2005), available: .
22. US government, National Security Strategy, op. cit., p. 6.
23. Some writers also identify a third formulation, driven primarily by current inadequacies in the provision of aid in fragile-state environments. See, for instance, Torres and Anderson, op. cit. However, the latter two streams have become closely linked in both theory and policy.
24. United Nations General Assembly, "United Nations Millennium Declaration", Resolution A/55/L.2, 18 September 2000, available: .
25. OECD DAC, Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States, DAC Learning and Advisory Process on Difficult Partnerships (LAP) High Level Meeting, 3 March 2005, available:
26. DfID, Why We Need to Work More Effectively in Fragile States, DfID (January 2005), available: .
27. To cite just one example, efforts to suppress terrorism and crime in Afghanistan included campaigns to eradicate poppies, thereby removing a source of income for transnational criminals and terrorists alike. Unfortunately, the poppies also provided much of the income for Afghanis in the poorest parts of the country. The UN's "Afghanistan Opium Survey 2004" estimates that the opium economy is worth 60% of the country's total licit GDP, making opium production the dominant engine of growth. Clearly, this is a complicated issue in which efforts to combat drug production will inevitably have drastic consequences for economic development over a significant area of the country. See UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Afghanistan Opium Survey 2004, UNODC (November 2004), available: .
28. OECD DAC, Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States, DAC Learning and Advisory Process on Difficult Partnerships (LAP) High Level Meeting, 3 March 2005, available: .
29. USAID, Fragile States Strategy.
30. Tellingly, the first footnote in the USAID Fragile State Strategy refers to the US National Security Strategy.
31. The document also draws on another USAID report, entitled Aid in the National Interest: Promoting Freedom, Security, and Opportunity, which stresses the need for aid to align with American national strategic priorities.
32. See Aid in the National Interest: Promoting Freedom, Security, and Opportunity, USAID Task Force Report (2002), available: .
33. High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, UN (2004), 2, 14-16, available: .
34. USAID, Fragile State Strategy, op. cit.
35. The literature on the democratic peace is extensive, beginning with Doyle's seminal articles in 1983. More recently, writers have explored the linkages between economic factors and inter-state peace
36. see, for instance, M. Mousseau, H. Hegre and J.R. Oneal, "How the Wealth of Nations Conditions the Liberal Peace", European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 9, No. 2 (June 2003), pp. 277-314. The State Failure Task Force exhaustively documents data exploring the linkages between, among other things, regime type, economic performance, and state failure.
37. See Michael Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs", Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 12, No. 3 (1983), pp. 205-235
38. Goldstone et al., op. cit.
39. For articles regarding democratisation and civil violence, see Helen Fein, "More Murder in the Middle: Life-integrity Violations and Democracy in the World, 1987", Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 17, No. 1 (February 1995), pp. 170-191
40. Scott Gartner and Patrick Regan, "Threat and Repression: The Nonlinear Relationship between Government and Opposition Violence", Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 33, No. 3 (1996), pp. 273-287.
41. For more on the role of accelerators and triggers in the onset of crises and state failure, see Barbara Harff, "Early Warning of Humanitarian Crises: Sequential Models and the Role of Accelerators", in John L. Davies and Ted Robert Gurr (eds.), Preventive Measures: Building Risk Assessment and Crisis Early Warning Systems (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998), pp. 70-94.
42. Although the idea had been around for some time, the concept of aid effectiveness being dependent on a sound policy framework became truly entrenched in the literature through David Dollar and Lant Pritchett, Assessing Aid: What Works, What Doesn't, and Why, World Bank Policy Research Report (New York: Oxford University Press for the World Bank, 1998).
43. Other significant contributions include J. Isham and D. Kaufmann, "The Forgotten Rationale for Policy Reform: The Impact on Projects", Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 114, No. 1 (1999), pp. 149-184
44. Craig Burnside and David Dollar, "Aid, Policies, and Growth", American Economic Review, Vol. 90, No. 4 (2000), pp. 847-868
45. Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "Aid, Policy and Growth in Post-conflict Societies", European Economic Review, Vol. 48, No. 5 (2004), pp. 1125-1145.
46. Dollar and Pritchett, op. cit.
47. Paul Collier and David Dollar, "Aid Allocation and Poverty Reduction", European Economic Review, Vol. 46, No. 8 (2002), pp. 1475-1500. David Dollar and Victoria Levin provide evidence that countries have been practising increasing selectivity over the last 20 years.
48. See The Increasing Selectivity of Foreign Aid, 1984-2002, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 3299 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2004).
49. Current policy examples include CIDA, Policy Statement on Strengthening Aid Effectiveness, CIDA (September 2002), available:
50. and USAID, Millennium Challenge Account, USAID (January 2004), available: .
51. See UN, Report of the International Conference on Financing for Development, UN (March 2002), available: .
52. Victoria Levin and David Dollar, The Forgotten States: Aid Volumes and Volatility in Difficult Partnership Countries, Summary Paper Prepared for the DAC Learning and Advisory Process (LAP) (January 2005), available: .
53. Mark McGillivray, Aid Allocation and Fragile States, Background Paper for the Senior Level Forum on Development Effectiveness in Fragile States, 13-14 January 2005, Lancaster House, London (January 2005), available: .
54. Ibid.
55. Levin and Dollar, op. cit.
56. Levin and Dollar, op. cit., pp. 14-22.
57. Lisa Chauvet and Paul Collier, Development Effectiveness in Fragile States: Spillovers and Turnarounds (Oxford: Centre for the Study of African Economies, Department of Economics, University of Oxford, January 2004), available: .
58. For a clear argument on the dangers of disengagement from an American national security perspective, see Jeremy M.Weinstein, John Edward Porter and Stuart E. Eizenstat, On the Brink: Weak States and US National Security, Report of the Commission onWeak States and US National Security, Center for Global Development (CGD) (June 2004), available: .
59. High Level Forum, Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness: Ownership, Harmonisation, Alignment, Results and Mutual Accountability, High Level Forum, Paris, 28 February-2 March 2005, available: .
60. Robert Picciotto, Charles Alao, Eka Ikpe, Martin Kimani and Roger Slade, Striking a New Balance: Donor Policy Coherence and Development Cooperation in Difficult Environments, Background Paper for the Senior Level Forum on Development Effectiveness in Fragile States, 13-14 January 2005,
61. Lancaster House, London (January 2005), available: .
62. German Federal Government, op. cit.
63. Ibid., p. 2.
64. The main new organisational additions are an inter-departmental steering mechanism and a process for joint priority-setting for each conflict. Once established, the CPPs brought together budgets for programme spending and peacekeeping costs. Although still in development, this coordinated effort is an example of a commitment to cooperation between departments to ensure an effort that includes all aspects of reconstruction, from security to economics, participation and social development.
65. USAID, Fragile States Strategy, op. cit., pp. 1-3.
66. Over the last decade various research programmes have documented both the decline of organised political violence and the reasons for it. As early as seven years ago, reports from the Centre for International Development and Conflict Management, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, and the Peace Research Institute of Oslo, showed that large-scale violence was in decline. However, the majority of sub-Saharan African states still have only limited capacity and authority effectively to address threats to individuals. In addition to organised violence, these efforts are consistently undermined by a host of domestic political and governance factors, weak international linkages, demographic instability, poor economic growth, environmental degradation and low human development. Failing the identification of a fundamental set of causal factors that generate human insecurity, donor countries and international organisations will remain divided on how to address fragile and failing states such as those in sub-Saharan Africa.
67. Ibid.
68. DfID, Why We Need to Work More Effectively in Fragile States, op. cit.
69. German Federal Government, op. cit.
70. Picciotto et al., op. cit.
71. OECD DAC, "Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States", op. cit., p. 3.
72. According to the OECD DAC, the whole-of-government approach is intended to promote "policy coherence within the administration of each international actor". 3D - Defence, Development, Diplomacy - is the term applied to the approach of pursuing coherence among the international efforts of the Canadian government.
73. DfID, Why We Need to Work More Effectively in Fragile States, op. cit., p. 14.
74. USAID, Fragile States Strategy, op. cit., pp. 3-5. At the 8th Annual Peacebuilding and Human Security Consultations, Ambassador Carlos Pascual, the coordinator of the US State Department's newly created Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization, issued a call for improved analysis to support his organisation's efforts to respond to failing states.
75. See Bruce Jentleson, "The Realism of Preventive Statecraft", in David Carment and Albrecht Schnabel, Conflict Prevention: Path to Peace or Grand Illusion? (Tokyo: UNU Press, 2003).
76. Long-term conflict prevention is associated with structural transformations and developmental aid and faces a time lag of approximately 20-30 years before results are easily visible. Positive change can be achieved through partnerships and linkages that emphasise clear, comprehensive strategic plans for high-risk regions and priority areas of concern within them.
77. For applications of the Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) template see: : Conflict Risk Assessment Report: Cambodia, Indonesia, Philippines (1 January 2002)
78. CoAflict RiskAssessment Report:WEstAfrica:Mano RiverUnion and Senegambia (1April 2002)
79. Conflict Risk Assessment Report Sub-Sahara Africa (4 November 2002)
80. Conflict Risk Assessment Report African Great Lakes (6 September 2003)
81. Conflict Risk Assessment Report: Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, and Ukraine (8 November 2002).
82. Ruddy Doom and Koen Vlassenroot, "Early Warning and Conflict Prevention: Minerva's Wisdom?", Journal of Humanitarian Assistance (July 1997), available:
83. Alexander L. George and Jane E. Holl, The Warning-Response Problem and Missed Opportunities in Preventive Diplomacy (Washington, DC: Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, 1997), pp. 10-12.
84. There is also the danger that emphasis will be placed on immediate military solutions, while the longer term prevention of emergent threats is a lesser priority. As a consequence, making the domestic military a preferred partner of cooperation may upset civil-military relations in various countries (e.g. Pakistan, Philippines, Colombia). The implications for countries with weak, fragile or emerging democracies are serious. Hard-won civilian control over the military may be compromised, and progress towards democracy and regional integration could be lost.
85. The methodological framework presented below was developed by the Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) project at Carleton University, Ottawa, in part to respond to the specific needs of the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), and those of the Government of Canada as a whole, to meet the challenges posed by failed and fragile states in an analysis-led and policy-coherent manner. However, like any robust methodology, the framework is flexible and can be generalised and adopted by other donor governments interested in implementing a more analytical and integrated approach to fragility.
86. USAID, Fragile States Strategy, op. cit., pp. 3-5.
87. There are a number of references to the intention to draw on multiple and external sources of information, but no specifics on the manner in which the various sources of information and analysis are to be integrated into a coherent, comprehensive assessment. The USAID website is equally unrevealing.
88. USAID, Fragile State Strategy, op. cit., p. 4.
89. DfID, Why We Need to Work More Effectively in Fragile States, op. cit., p. 16.
90. Prime Minister's Strategy Unit, Investing in Prevention: A Prime Minister's Strategy Unit Report to the Government. An International Strategy to Manage Risks of Instability and Improve Crisis Response, available: .
91. Ibid., pp. 16-39.
92. Ibid., pp. 42-46.
93. Clingendael Institute for the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Stability Assessment Framework: Designing Integrated Responses for Security, Governance and Development (January 2005), available: .
94. Ibid., p. 5.
95. Ibid., p. 54.
96. The impact assessment element is an outgrowth of the work on absorptive capacity, the ability of developing countries to absorb and utilise development assistance effectively. However, the focus is shifting to how donors can craft response strategies that are more appropriately attuned to the specific needs and capabilities of developing partners.
97. These errors are derived from unintended consequences and incomplete information. Substantial research has been conducted on unintended consequences and moral hazard problems. Moral hazards can arise from a number of different causes; the first source of moral hazard is the traditional one of incomplete information. There are also moral hazards not only in intervening militarily but also in providing humanitarian assistance to vulnerable populations. Researchers have noted that outside assistance can do more harm than good or can become entangled in the local political economy that fuels the conflict. See Howard Adelman, "Difficulties in Early Warning: Networking and Conflict Management", in Klaas van Walraven (ed.), Early Warning and Conflict Prevention (London: Brill, 1998), pp. 56-57.
98. Country Indicators for Foreign Policy, Risk Assessment Template (August 2001), available: .
99. The issue areas include History of Armed Conflict, Governance and Political Instability,Militarisation, Population Heterogeneity, Demographic Stress, Economic Performance, Human Development, Environmental Stress and International Linkages. For a complete list and description of the basic set of indicators utilised in the CIFP conflict risk assessment methodology, see CIFP, CIFP Risk Assessment Indicator Definitions (2001), available: .
100. While international actors approach these issues through a number of different lenses, these three sectors are the principal focus of efforts to determine instability and the potential for state collapse.
101. See Patrick James and Michael Brecher, Crisis and Change in World Politics (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986).
102. Country Indicators for Foreign Policy, Risk Assessment Template, available: .
103. Country Indicators for Foreign Policy, CIFP Country Risk Assessment: Medium Term "Watch List" (November 2004), available: .
104. Ibid., p. 4.
105. For CIFP Watchlist methodology limitations see ibid., p. 6.
106. This can include an examination of the existence and influence of diasporas and the presence and work of NGOs in failed and failing states.