Economic and security consequences of supreme values

Public Choice

Volumn 131, Issue 3-4, 2007, Pages 259-280

  Hillman, Arye L ^a,b,c  

^a BAR ILAN UNIVERSITY   (Israel)

^b CEPR   (United Kingdom)

^c CESIFO   (Germany)

Author keywords

Cultural relativism; Demographic contestability; Economic growth; Gender relations; Institutions; Oil wealth; Personal security; Radical Islam; Rent protection; Rent seeking; Supreme values

Indexed keywords

EID: 34250875014     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-007-9167-8     Document Type: Article

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