Is the compensation model for real estate brokers obsolete?

Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics

Volumn 35, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 7-22

  Miceli, Thomas J ^a   Pancak, Katherine A ^b   Sirmans, C F ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT   (United States)

Author keywords

Agency; Brokerage; Multiple listings; Percentage commission

Indexed keywords

EID: 34250838266     PISSN: 08955638     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11146-007-9026-x     Document Type: Article

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