The impact of RAMSI on the 2006 elections in the Solomon Islands

Political Science

Volumn 58, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 63-85

  Fraenkel, Jon ^a  

^a AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY   (Australia)

Author keywords

Elections; Prime ministerial elections; Riots; Solomon Islands

Indexed keywords

EID: 34250765708     PISSN: 00323187     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/003231870605800205     Document Type: Article

References (104)

1. Solomon Mamaloni had survived a full term as Prime Minister from 1989-1993, but his government did not. In 1990, Mamaloni abandoned his People's Alliance Party, and forged a new coalition with former opposition members. The 1984 United Party government also survived a full term, but its initial Prime Minister, Sir Peter Kenilorea, was forced to resign in 1986.
2. Rini in fact resigned, but did so only minutes before the vote on the no confidence motion. One of the MPs who crossed the floor, Peter Shanel, criss-crossed straight back after Rini's resignation.
3. th July 2006; 'the fact that elements of the proopposition crowd were already armed with petrol spray and fire bombs, and quickly set to incinerating RAMSI vehicles after the initial skirmishes, supports the contention that key members of the opposition group instrumentalised violence for political gain' (Morgan, M. and McLeod, A., 'Have we Failed our Neighbour?', Australian Journal of International Affairs, 60, (3), 2006, pp. 421-2).
4. th 2006;
5. th May 2006;
6. th May 2006;
7. th 2006.
8. th, 2006.
9. 'There shall be a general election at such time within four months of every dissolution of Parliament...' (Solomon Constitution 1978, The Solomon Islands Independence Order 1978, S. 74).
10. I am indebted to Alistair Legge, of the AEC, who managed the Civic Education Project, for details about these arrangements.
11. th March 2006.
12. th February 2006.
13. The Moral Rearmament Group grew out of the 1930s Oxford Group, and is known as 'Initiatives of Change' in Australia, see http://www.au.iofc.org.
14. Solomon Star, 21" March 2006.
15. Bennett, J., Pacific Forest; A History of Resource Control and Contest in Solomon Islands, c. 1800-1997, The White Horse Press, Cambridge, pp. 346-7.
16. Fraenkel, The Manipulation of Custom; From Uprising to Intervention in the Solomon Islands, Victoria University Press and Pandanus Books, 2004, p. 95.
17. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in_depth/uk/2001/birthday_honours_2001/ 1390944.stm, accessed 14th August 2006.
18. Fraenkel, The Manipulation of Custom, pp. 141-2.
19. th August 2003.
20. 'Bishop challenged to prove allegations', Solomon Star, 8th February 2006;
21. th July 2003;
22. th August 2003;
23. th September 2003;
24. th October 2003,
25. th October 2003.
26. Shahar Hameiri 'What Really Went Wrong in Solomons', The Age, 24th April 2006. Similarly, Morgan and McLeod reject the view that the Prime ministerial election contest as 'a contest between the new guard who support political reform and the old guard characterised by money polities' on the grounds that many of the opposition politicians were also 'old' and because 'charges of money politics and maladministration may evenly be directed against members of Tausinga's camp' (Morgan and McLeod, 'Have we Failed our Neighbour?', pp. 420-421 my emphasis).
27. For an alternative view, see Tarcisius Kabutaulaka, 'Seeking Answers in the Ashes of Honiara', Pacific Islands Report, 20th April 2006.
28. Bennett, Pacific Forest, p. 345.
29. Alasia, S., 'Party Politics and Government in Solomon Islands', State, Society & Governance in Melanesia, Discussion paper, 97/7,1997, p. 13.
30. Bennett, Pacific Forest, p. 345.
31. Bennett, Pacific Forest, pp. 341 -2;
32. Fraenkel, The Manipulation of Custom, pp. 40-41.
33. Hughes, T., 'Lessons from a False Dawn: Outcomes of the Solomon Islands Police and Structural Reform Programme, 1997-2000', Unpublished Paper, 6 October 2001, p. 12.
34. Kabutaulaka, T 'Solomon Islands', in 'Political Reviews: Melanesia', The Contemporary Pacific, 11, (2), 1999, pp. 443-449.
35. Office of the Prime Minister, 'Beneath Guadalcanal: The Underlying Cause of the Ethnic Tension', 24 February 2000, p. 7.
36. th December 2001.
37. th December 2001.
38. th December 2001
39. th February 2005;
40. th July 2005;
41. Terry Brown, email circular to Anthropology in Oceania network, 22nd April 2006.
42. th September, 2004.
43. 'Solomons Parliament Indicates Support for Intervention', ABC, 9 July 2003; 'We'll Be Puppets: Pacific Leader', The Australian, 10 July 2003.
44. th 2005;
45. th February 2005.
46. th May 2005;
47. 'Solomon Lawmaker calls for Kemakeza probe', Solomon Star, 13th May 2005.
48. th December, 2005.
49. th February 2006.
50. th August 2003, http://www.aph.gov.au/hansard/reps/dailys/drl20803.pdf.
51. Wainwright, E., 'How is RAMSI Faring? Progress, Challenges and Lessons Learned', ASPI Strategic Insights, April 2005, p. 5.
52. Pacific Islands Forum, Eminent Persons Group, 'A Review of the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands', May 2005; Solomon Islands Government 'Report of the Foreign Relations Committee on "The Report of the Forum Eminent Persons Group'", National Parliamentary Paper, No. 3 of 2005, May 2005; Solomon Islands Government, Parliamentary Foreign Relations Committee, 'Report on the Receipt, Administration and Management of the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands', National Parliamentary Paper, no. 17 of 2004, December 2004.
53. th August 2006).
54. Solomon Star, 23rd March 2006;
55. th March 2006.
56. th November 2005).
57. th March 2006;
58. th March 2006).
59. th February 2006.
60. th February 2005.
61. In the wake of the 2002 elections, PNG switched from first-past-the-post to a limited preferential voting system. For data on number of candidates per constituency in PNG, see Jon Fraenkel, 'Electoral Engineering in Papua New Guinea; Lessons from Fiji and Elsewhere', Pacific Economic Bulletin, vol. 19, no. 1, 2004.
62. What is said here is also true of Vanuatu, although that country uses a single nontransferable vote system (see Howard Van Trease, 'The Operation of the Single Non-Transferable Vote System', Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, vol. 43, no. 3, 2005, pp. 296-332).
63. th April 2006.
64. For an analysis of the likely impact of quotas aimed at influencing party candidate selection, see Fraenkel, J., 'The Impact of Electoral Systems on Women's Representation in Pacific Parliaments', Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, Research to Advance Women's Political Representation in Forum Island Countries, April 2006.
65. th July 2005.
66. nd March 2005.
67. th March 2006.
68. th May 2006.
69. th 2005.
70. th March 2005.
71. th March 2006.
72. th February 2006;
73. th January 2006.
74. th March 2006;
75. th March 2006.
76. 'Lafari Pledges Stability', Solomon Star, 21" March 2006.
77. 'Liberals Vie for 38 Seats', Solomon Star, 28th February, 2006;
78. 'Former MPs Refute Liberal's Claim', Solomon Star, 28th February 2006.
79. 'Nasnol Pati to Legislate SI Political Party System', Solomon Star, 16th March 2006.
80. 'Parliamentarians Resign from National Party', S1BC, 18th August 2006.
81. th July 2005; 'Party Blames Government for Poor Economy', PacNews, 27th September 2005.
82. th February 2006.
83. th April 2006, Honiara.
84. th April 2006.
85. th March 2006.
86. th April 2006.
87. In some cases, only the constituencies were announced, presumably because when written up the victors were still unknown.
88. th May 2005.
89. th May 2006.
90. Personal communications [anonymous].
91. th April 2006.
92. th April 2006.
93. th April 2006.
94. th April 2006.
95. th September 2006.
96. th April 2006.
97. th April 2006.
98. th April 2006.
99. The issue of what reforms might prove effective in such circumstances, including the scope for strengthening political parties and reform of the process of electing Prime Ministers, is discussed in a separate forthcoming paper.
100. DVD recording of raw Solomon Islands TV footage taken before, during and after the Prime ministerial election result, including coverage of the subsequent disturbances outside parliament.
101. For some anticipation of the potential for hostility to the outcome of the Solomon Islands' two-stage Prime ministerial elections, and a account of the 2001 sequence of events, see Fraenkel, The Manipulation of Custom, p 136-138.
102. nd May 2006; http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2006/May/ 05-24-com.htm. Solomon Islands bom Mike Wheetly, the former Assistant Police Commissioner (National Reconnaissance and Surveillance) during 1992-2000 explained: 'It is a standard procedure for the disciplinary forces of Solomon Islands to be on alert during any national election, stepping up as parliament is convened for the election of the Prime Minister. Forces were usually deployed at Parliament House, on the approaches to Chinatown and for other key locations on a direct route from Parliament House. Such a strategy allows one to block or deflect riotous assembly as opposed to the riskier strategy of following it into Chinatown' ('"RAMSI Tuesday" wasn't due to Intelligence Failure', http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/HL0605/S00401.htm).
103. th May 2006, New Matilda.com.
104. Personal Communication (anonymous).