Organising for nation building

Survival

Volumn 49, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 43-76

  Bensahel, Nora ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 34250699059     PISSN: 00396338     EISSN: 14682699     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/00396330701437827     Document Type: Article

References (120)

1. For example, recent RAND work on US and UN nation building includes five cases before the Cold War (Congo, El Salvador, Germany, Japan and Namibia) and 11 cases after the Cold War (Afghanistan, Bosnia, Cambodia, Eastern Slavonia, East Timor, Haiti, Iraq, Kosovo, Mozambique, Sierra Leone and Somalia). James Dobbins, America's Role in Nation-building: From Germany to Iraq (Santa Monica, CA: RAND,2003);
2. James Dobbins, 'America's Role in Nation-building: From Germany to Iraq', Survival, vol. 45, no. 4, Winter 2003, pp. 87-110;
3. James Dobbins et al., The UN's Role in Nation-Building: From the Congo to Iraq (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2005);
4. James Dobbins, 'The UN's Role in Nation-building: From the Belgian Congo to Iraq', Congo, Survival, vol. 46, no. 4, Winter 2004, pp. 81-102.
5. For more on these problems, see Nora Bensahel, 'Mission Not Accomplished: What Went Wrong With Iraqi Reconstruction', Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 29, no. 3, June 2006, pp. 453-73.
6. Nina M. Serafino and Martin A. Weiss, 'Peacekeeping and Conflict Transitions: Background and Congressional Action on Civilian Capabilities', CRS Report for Congress, RL32862, updated 18 September 2006, p. CRS-10.
7. Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization mission statement, available at http://www.crs.state.gov/.
8. The four directorates are Early Warning and Prevention; Planning; Best Practices and Sectoral Coordination; and Response Strategy and Resource Management.
9. This matrix drew heavily on the framework published in Robert C. Orr (ed.), Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction (Washington DC: The Center for Strategic and International Studies Press, 2004).
10. For more on these various initiatives, see http://www.crs.state.gov/; Serafino and Weiss, 'Peacekeeping and Conflict Transitions';
11. and 'An Interview with Carlos Pascual', Joint Forces Quarterly, no. 42, 2006, pp. 80-85.
12. See 'S/CRS Country Engagements', available through http://www.crs.state.gov.
13. The full roster, with affiliations noted, is available through http://www.crs.state.gov/.
14. For the Fiscal Year (FY) 2005 supplemental, the administration requested a total of $17.2 million - $9.4m for start-up costs and $7.8m for a rapidresponse cadre. The final version of the supplemental contained only $7.7m for start-up costs and nothing for the cadre. Since the office was established in mid-2004, after the administration's FY05 budget request had already been submitted, all funding for the office during that fiscal year was appropriated through the supplemental. Serafino and Weiss, 'Peacekeeping and Conflict Transitions', p. CRS-15.
15. In FY06, the administration requested $24.1m for operations and $100m for a flexible Conflict Response Fund that would include the rapid-response cadre and other field-deployment capabilities. Congress once again reduced the budget, allocating only $16.6m for operations and no money for the Conflict Response Fund. In the FY2006 Defense Authorization bill - which was passed after the State Department's budget was finalised and the resources for the fund rejected - Congress did provide transfer authority for the secretary of defense to provide the State Department with up to $100m per year in FY06 and FY07 for reconstruction and stabilisation activities. This measure could certainly help the office develop rapid-response capabilities, but these funds would only be transferred if contingency operations arise. It is also unclear whether this transfer authority will be extended beyond FY07, which means that the office cannot base long-term plans on the assumption that these funds will be available. For FY07, the administration requested $9.4m for operations and $75m for the fund. Though final appropriations have not been made, previous experience suggests that they may well be less than the amount requested, and that the Conflict Response Fund will once again be short-changed. Serafino and Weiss, 'Peacekeeping and Conflict Transitions', pp. CRS-15-22.
16. Gordon Adams, 'Post-Combat Stabilization and Reconstruction: The Lessons for US Government Organization and National Security Resource Planning', in Ellen Laipson and Maureen S. Steinbruner (eds), Iraq and America: Choices and Consequences (Washington, DC: Henry L. Stimson Center, 2006), p. 148.
17. Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization Fact Sheet, http://www.crs.state.gov/index.cfm?fuseaction=public. display&shortcut=J754.
18. Defense Science Board, Transition to and from Hostilities, December 2004, http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2004-12- DSB_SS_Report_Final.pdf, p. vi.
19. Department of Defense Directive 3000.05, 'Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations', 28 November 2005, section 4.1, http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/ corres/html/300005.htm.
20. Ibid., section 4.3.
21. US Army doctrine has been based on this principle as far back as the 1920s. It is reflected in the current version of the army field manual on operations, which states: 'The doctrine holds warfighting as the Army's primary focus and recognizes that the ability of Army forces to dominate land warfare also provides the ability to dominate any situation in military operations other than war'. See David E. Johnson, Learning Large Lessons, MG-405-AF (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2006), p. 10.
22. On this point, parallels with the army's experience in Vietnam may be instructive. The army had great difficulty developing an effective counter-insurgency campaign during that war. In its aftermath, instead of resolving to improve its counter-insurgency capabilities so that it would do better next time, the army instead rejected counter- insurgency as a core mission and turned its attention back to preparing for major combat operations against the Warsaw Pact on the Central Front. The parallel is inexact, since there is obviously no comparable conventional threat today, but it does demonstrate that militaries do not always react to failures by resolving to do better next time. On counter-insurgency in Vietnam and the lessons learned by the army, see John A. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2005).
23. Presidential Decision Directive 56 (PDD-56). Unclassified portions of PDD-56 are available at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd56.htm.
24. Michèle Flournoy, 'Interagency Strategy and Planning for Post-Conflict Reconstruction', in Orr, Winning the Peace, pp. 106-108.
25. Http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-44.html.
26. The United Kingdom provided approximately a third of the 5,000 troops initially deployed in Kabul. See Geoffrey Hoon, British Secretary of State for Defence, testimony before the House of Commons, 10 January 2002, available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200102/ cmhansrd/vo020110/debtext/20110-09.htm#20110-09_min0.
27. North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, 'ISAF Key Figures', 14 March 2007, http://www.nato.int/ISAF/media/pdf/placemat∩af.pdf.
28. At the end of major combat operations in May 2003, the United Kingdom had 18,000 personnel deployed in Iraq. In May 2004, that number was 8,600; in May 2005, 8,500; and in November 2006, 7,100. 'Defence Fact Sheet: Operations in Iraq: Key Facts and Figures', http://www.mod.uk/ DefenceInternet/FactSheets/OperationsFactsheets/OperationsIn IraqKeyFactsFigures.htm.
29. Both pools were created before the new subcommittee. The Africa Conflict Prevention Pool (ACCP) is led by the Department for International Development, and receives Ł60m per year. The Global Conflict Prevention Pool is led by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and receives Ł74m per year. See Department for International Development, The Africa Conflict Prevention Pool, September 2004, http://www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs files/acppinfodoc.pdf#search='Africa %20Conflict%20 Prevention%20Pool
30. Foreign and Commonwealth Office, The Global Conflict Prevention Pool August 2003, http://www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/global-conflict- prevention-pool.pdf#search='Global%20Conflict%20Prevention%20Pool.
31. Hilary Benn, Secretary of State for International Development, House of Commons Hansard Written Ministerial Statements for 16 September 2004, available through http://www.post conflict.gov.uk/links.html.
32. 'PCRU and Stabilisation', available at http://www.postconflict.gov.uk/.
33. Ibid.
34. 'Achievements', available at http://www.postconflict.gov.uk/ achievements.html.
35. For more on the defence reforms implemented from the late 1990s through 2001, see Mary Elise Sarotte, German Military Reform and European Security, Adelphi Paper 340 (Oxford: Oxford University Press for the International Institute of Strategic Studies, 2001)
36. and Redefining German Security: Prospects for Bundeswehr Reform, German Issues 25 (Baltimore: The American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, Johns Hopkins University, 2001).
37. By 2010, the Bundeswehr will include three types of forces: The stabilisation force of 70,000 soldiers; a response force of 35,000 soldiers who will conduct high-intensity peace enforcement operations; and a support force of 147,500 personnel that will provide logistics, command and control, and training for the other two types of forces. German Federal Ministry of Defence, White Paper 2006 on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr, October 2006, pp. 69, 79-81.
38. German Federal Government, Action Plan, 'Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution and Post-Conflict Peace-Building', 12 May 2004, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/12/33983678.pdf.
39. The full text of the Comprehensive Concept is included in an annex of the Action Plan.
40. Ibid., Section V, p. 87.
41. Ibid., Section V.2, initiative 136, p. 90.
42. Ibid., Section V.5, initiatives 158 and 161, pp. 99-100.
43. The office is a part of the Directorate-General for Global Issues, Human Rights and Humanitarian Aid within the Foreign Ministry, which focuses on transnational and interdisciplinary issues as well as the United Nations. More information on this directorate, and a full organisation chart, can be found at http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/en/AAmt/AA/ uebersichtAbteilungen.html.
44. Information provided by the German Foreign Ministry, September 2006.
45. This sub-working group examined whether the German government should follow the British model described above and merge funds for conflict-prevention activities into a single pool rather than having those funds remain under the control of individual ministries. Working Together to Strengthen Security and Stability Through Crisis Prevention, 1st Federal Government Report on the Implementation of the Action Plan 'Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding' (Bonn: Die Bundesregierung, 2006), pp. 67 and 83-4.
46. Ibid., pp. 10 and 67.
47. Ibid., pp. 25-6.
48. The group started by conducting a political analysis of Nigeria, which identified fissures that could develop into future crises. It then developed a political strategy that would defuse the potential for such crises, and is now working with the German government and other actors to implements elements of this strategy. The government has not yet decided whether to create a second group to examine a different country. For more on the lessons learned from this approach, see ibid., pp. 85-6.
49. Ibid., p. 68.
50. Ibid., p. 67.
51. Ibid., p. 100.
52. Privy Council Office, Canada, Securing an Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy (Ottawa: Privy Council Office, 2004), available at http://www.pco-bcp.gc.ca/default.asp?page=publications &Language=E&doc=natsecurnat/natsecurnat_e.htm.
53. A Role of Pride and Influence in the World, Canada's International Policy Statement, Overview, available at http://geo.international.gc.ca/ cip-pic/ips/ips-overview5-en.asp.
54. Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force, Year in Review: Mobilizing Canada's Capacity for International Crisis Response, September 2005-September 2006 (Ottawa: START, 2006), p. 4.
55. Ibid., pp. 6-7.
56. Information provided by the Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force.
57. This initiative seemed to stem from the bitter conflicts that divided the United Nations in the months before the March 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq. Though Annan did not specifically reference those disagreements in his speech, he did note that the UN members disagreed on how to respond to major international threats, and he specifically stated that the Security Council 'needs to consider how it will deal with the possibility that individual States may use force "pre-emptively" against perceived threats'. The Secretary-General's Address to the General Assembly, New York, 23 September 2003, http://www.un.org/webcast/ga/58/statements/sg2eng030923.
58. Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility (New York: United Nations, 2004), section 261, available at http://www.un.org/secureworld/.
59. Ibid., section 264.
60. Ibid., sections 228 and 266-9.
61. 'The Peacebuilding Commission', resolution adopted by the United Nations General Assembly, 20 December 2005, A/Res/60/180, sections 4-6, available at http://www.un.org/peace/peacebuilding/gares60_180.pdf.
62. Ibid., section 7.
63. The Security Council selected China, Denmark, France, Russia, Tanzania and the United States; ECOSOC elected Angola, Belgium, Brazil, Guinea-Bissau, Indonesia, Poland and Sri Lanka; the five UN financial contributors are Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands and Norway; the five UN military and civilian providers are Bangladesh, Ghana, India, Nigeria and Pakistan; and the seven members elected by the General Assembly are Burundi, Chile, Croatia, Egypt, El Salvador, Fiji and Jamaica. See http://www.un.org/peace/peacebuilding/membership.htm.
64. 'Budget Committee Informs General Assembly Human Rights Council Will Require Additional Appropriation of $4.3 Million; Also Takes Up Budget Implications of Peacebuilding Support Office', press release, 15 March 2006, GA/AB/3723, available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/ docs/2006/gaab3723.doc.htm.
65. Secretary-General Kofi Annan, 'Remarks on the Launch of the Peacebuilding Fund', 11 October 2006, http://www.un.org/webcast/pdfs/ sgremarks.pdf.
66. Carolyn McAskie, Assistant Secretary-General, Peacebuilding Support Office, Statement to the Security Council, 31 January 2007, http://www.un.org/peace/peacebuilding/pdf/mcaskie31jan07.pdf.
67. The first pillar, European Communities, essentially codifies the economic, social and environmental issues and agreements that existed before the Maastricht Treaty. The second pillar, CFSP, and the third pillar, police and judicial cooperation, were new initiatives for the EU.
68. For more on the development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, see Jolyon Howorth and John T.S. Keeler, Defending Europe (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003).
69. Treaty of Amsterdam, 10 November 1997, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/11997D/htm/11997D.html.
70. 'Presidency Conclusions, Cologne European Council, June 3 and 4, 1999', http://europa.eu.int/council/off/conclu/june99/june99_en.htm.
71. Peter Viggo Jakobsen, 'The ESDP and Civilian Rapid Reaction: Adding Value is Harder than Expected', European Security, vol. 15, no. 3, September 2006, p. 312.
72. 'Structure of the EUMS', Impetus: Bulletin of the EU Military Staff no. 2, Autumn-Winter 2006, p. 9, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/IMPETUS2Final.pdf.
73. International Crisis Group, EU Crisis Response Capability Revisited Europe Report No. 160 (Brussels: ICG, 2005), pp. 19-20.
74. Jakobsen, 'The ESDP and Civilian Rapid Reaction', p. 312;
75. German Federal Ministry of Defence, White Paper 2006, p. 37.
76. European Council, A Secure Europe in a Better World: The European Security Strategy, (Brussels: European Council, 2003), available at http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf.
77. Michèle Flournoy, Julianne Smith, Guy Ben-Ari, Kathlees McInnis and David Scruggs, European Defense Integration: Bridging the Gap Between Strategy and Capabilities (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2005), p. 55.
78. For more on the battlegroups, see German Federal Ministry of Defence, White Paper 2006, p. 38;
79. and Julianne Smith, 'EU Battlegroups Ready (and Willing?)', Transatlantic Security Notes and Comment, vol. 2, no. 1, January 2007, http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/tsnc_0107.pdf, p. 3.
80. Agnieszka Nowak, 'Civilian Crisis Management within ESDP', in Agnieszka Nowak (ed.), Civilian Crisis Management: The EU Way, Chaillot Paper No. 90 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, 2006), p. 23.
81. These priorities were identified at the June 2000 European Council meeting in Feira. For specific EU developments in each of these areas, see ibid., pp. 19-23.
82. Jakobsen, 'The ESDP and Civilian Rapid Reaction', p. 312.
83. Ibid., p. 314. The Civil ian Headline Goal of 2008 builds on the concepts adopted in the Action Plan for Civilian Aspects of ESDP, which was adopted by the European Council in June 2004. The text of the Action Plan is available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/ Action%20Plan%2 0for%20Civilian%20Aspects%20of%20 ESDP.pdf.
84. 'Civilian Headline Goal 2008: General Secretariat Document: Multifunctional Civilian Crisis Management Resources in an Integrated Format - Civilian Response Teams', 10462/05, 23 June 2005, http://www.intermin.fi/intermin/hankkeet/skh/home.nsf/files/ crtheadlinegoal2008/$file/crtheadlinegoal2008.pdf.
85. Jakobsen, 'The ESDP and Civilian Rapid Reaction', p. 304.
86. Ibid., p. 305.
87. For a list of participating countries and more information about the Cotonou Agreement, see http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/r12101.htm.
88. Catriona Gourlay, 'Community Instruments for Civilian Crisis Management', in Nowak, Civilian Crisis Management, pp. 57-8.
89. Ibid., pp. 58-9.
90. These figures stand in stark contrast to the funds available for CFSP operations, which totaled Ł102m in 2006 for all types of operations. Catriona Gourlay, 'Civil-Civil Coordination in EU Crisis Management', in Nowak, Civilian Crisis Management, p. 109.
91. Gourlay, 'Community Instruments for Civilian Crisis Management', p. 60.
92. More information on these activities is available at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/cfsp/cpcm/cp/list.htm.
93. Humanitarian assistance is the sole responsibility of European Community Humanitarian Office.
94. Data available at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/cfsp/cpcm/ rrm/date.htm.
95. See http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/cfsp/cpcm/rrm/index.htm.
96. This proposal apparently was rejected shortly after the French and Dutch referendums defeated ratification of the Constitutional Treaty, when it seemed important to maintain the intergovernmental principles of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Gourlay, 'Community Instruments for Civilian Crisis Management', p. 61.
97. Gourlay, 'Civil-Civil Coordination in EU Crisis Management', pp. 105-107.
98. Ibid., p. 106;
99. Arjen Boin, Magnus Ekengren and Mark Rhinard, 'The Commission and Crisis Management', in David Spence (ed.), The European Commission, 3rd ed. (London: John Harper, 2006), esp. pp. 495-6.
100. Gourlay, 'Civil-Civil Coordination in EU Crisis Management', p. 120;
101. Boin et al., p. 489.
102. Gourlay, 'Civil-Civil Coordination in EU Crisis Management', p. 121.
103. European Constitutional Treaty, Article I-28, available at http://europa.eu/constitution/index_en.htm.
104. The other elements are strengthening institutions and governance; fostering trade, investment, economic growth and sustainable development; implementing debt relief; expanding knowledge; improving health and confronting HIV/AIDS; increasing agricultural productivity; and improving water resource management. The full text of the G8 Africa Action Plan is available at http://www.g8.gc.ca/2002Kananaskis/ afraction-en.pdf.
105. G8 Action Plan for Peace Support, 10 June 2004, http://www.g8.gc.ca/ g8_expansion-en.asp.
106. Michael Dziedzic and Christine Stark, Bridging the Public Security Gap: The Role of the Center of Excellence for Stability Peace Units (CoESPU) in Contemporary Peace Operations, United States Institute for Peace briefing, June 2006, http://www.usip.org/pubs/ usipeace_briefings/2006/0616_coespu.html.
107. Ibid.
108. Ibid.;
109. Office of the Spokesman, US Department of State, 'Stability Police Trainer Class Graduates', 20 October 2006, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ ps/2006/74876.htm.
110. Dziedzic and Stark, Bridging the Public Security Gap.
111. Information provided by CoESPU, available at http://coespu.carabinieri.it/Internet/Coespu/01_nature.htm.
112. Dziedzic and Stark, Bridging the Public Security Gap.
113. G8 Declaration on Cooperation and Future Action in Stabilization and Reconstruction, 16 July2006, http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/summit/ 2006stpetersburg/stabilization.html.
114. In FY06, the budget for the office was $16m, the State Department's total budget was approximately $8.9bn, and the Defense Department's budget was $419bn (excluding supplemental appropriations for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan).
115. For more on the director of foreign assistance, see http://www.state.gov/f/.
116. Serafino and Weiss, 'Peacekeeping and Conflict Transitions', pp. CRS-15-22.
117. United States Department of State Fact Sheet, 'State Department Stands Up Active Response Corps', 23 August 2006;
118. The Partnership for Effective Peacekeeping, 'Funding U.S. Civilian Stabilization & Reconstruction Capabilities and Activities', PEP Briefing Note, May 2006.
119. The 2007 State of the Union address is available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/stateoftheunion/2007/index.html.
120. For more detail on these national and international rosters, see Catriona Gourlay, Lessons Learned Study: Rosters for the Deployment of Civilian Experts in Peace Operations, (New York: United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations Best Practices Unit, 2006), http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbpu/view/viewdocument.aspx?id=2&docid=730.