A two-person game of information transmission

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 135, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 90-104

  Green, Jerry R ^a   Stokey, Nancy L ^b  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO   (United States)

Author keywords

Cheap talk; Communication games; Game theory; Information

Indexed keywords

EID: 34250678600     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: 10957235     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2003.08.007     Document Type: Article

References (7)

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