The US-Saudi relationship and the Iraq war: The dialectics of a dependent alliance

Journal of Third World Studies

Volumn 24, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 109-135

  Dris Aït Hamadouche, Louisa ^a   Zoubir, Yahia H ^b  

^a University of Algiers 3   (Algeria)

^b KEDGE BUSINESS SCHOOL   (France)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ELECTION; GOVERNMENT; INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS; MILITARY INTERVENTION; POLITICAL CONFLICT; SECURITY THREAT; WAR;

AR RIYAD [SAUDI ARABIA]; ASIA; EURASIA; MIDDLE EAST; NORTH AMERICA; RIYADH; SAUDI ARABIA; UNITED STATES;

EID: 34250342287     PISSN: 87553449     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (67)

1. Frontline's Interviews with Brent Scowcroft, former U.S. National Security Adviser; Vali Nasr; James Baker; and Prince Bandar bin Sultan. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/saudi/analyses/ussaudi.html
2. Series of Congressional Staff Briefings on "US Challenges and Choices in the Gulf," Middle East Institute Policy Brief: Saudi Arabia. 14 December 2001.
3. Kate Seelye, "Current State of U.S.-Saudi Relations," 2 November 2002, http://www.npr.org/programs/wesat/transcripts/2002/nov/ 021102.seelye.html
4. Charles W. Freeman, former US ambassador and frequent visitor to Riyadh, quoted by Jim Lobe, "Saudi Arabia, US: When the Relationship Sours," 'Asia Time Online', 26 January 2002.
5. Hermann Frederick Eilts, "US Saudi Relations after the September 11 Debacle," http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/archives_roll/ 2001_10-12/eilts_saudi/eilts_saudi.html
6. Michael Scott Doran, "The Saudi Paradox," 'Foreign Affairs', 83, 1 (January-February 2004): p. 36.
7. A good discussion can be found in Doran, "The Saudi Paradox," pp. 38 ff.
8. Abdullah al-Ghathami, quoted in Alain Gresh, "After the Winning of the War, Saudi Arabia: Radical Islam or Reform?" 'Le Monde Diplomatique', June 2003.
9. Hermann Frederick Eilts, "US Saudi Relations after the September 11 Debacle," in http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/archives_roll/ 2001_10-12/eilts_saudi/eilts_saudi.html.
10. Chas. W. Freeman Jr., "Saudi Arabia: Enemy or Friend?", Conference organized by The Middle East Policy Council. http://www.campus-watch.org/article/id/989.
11. In October 2002, the Saudi defence minister prince Sultan Bin Abdul Aziz said that Saudi Arabia has not severed its relations with Iraq. He indicated that "they [Iraqis] were the ones who severed relations with us since 1991 following their invasion of Kuwait. If they drop the weapon and do not attack us we will be brothers."
12. This Saudi position was conveyed by King Abdullah during his meeting with President Bush in April 2002. It was reiterated again by king Abdullah in an interview with the London-based Saudi-owned daily, 'Al-Sharq Al-Awsat', May 11, 2002, and reprinted in 'Okaz' (Saudi Arabia), May 12, 2002, which quotes the Prince as saying: "We are against an attack on Iraq and we hope the situation will not come to that."
13. Rather very surprising was the Iraqi daily 'Babil', (owned by the late Saddam Hussein's son) characterization of the GCC meeting as positive for Iraq.
14. Nimrod Raphaeli, "Saudi-Iraqi Rapprochement," 'MEMRI: Inquiry and Analysis - Economic Report', No. 98, June 16, 2002.
15. 'Politics', 9/6/2002.
16. 'Special Dispatch Series', No. 470, February 14, 2003.
17. 'Politics', 13 September 2002.
18. 'Politics', 13 September 2002.
19. 'Politics', 16 September 2002.
20. 'Al-Hayat', 1 February 2003, in 'Special Dispatch Series' - No. 470, February 14, 2003.
21. 'Al-Gomhorriya', January 9, 2003 in 'Special Dispatch Series' - No. 470, February 14, 2003.
22. "The Iraq Crisis (3): Saudi Newspapers Call on Saddam to Abdicate or Commit Suicide," 'Special Dispatch Series' - No. 470 February 14, 2003 No.470.
23. 'CSIS Report' quoted in Washington conferences focus on deteriorating US-Saudi relations, The Campus Watch website, at http://www.campus-watch.org/article/id/989.
24. George S. Hishmeh, Washington conferences focus on deteriorating US-Saudi relations, February 5, 2004 http://www.dailystar.com.lb/ 05_02_04/art24.asp.
25. Adel Al-Jubeir, foreign affairs advisor to King Abdullah, explained on 11 August 2003 that his country was ready to increase its production by an additional 1.3 million barrels even if it really has not seen a clients increase demand. The fact that there are high prices is due to factors having nothing do with supply and demand. People are concerned about the situation in Iraq, the situation with Yukos [oil company] in Russia, the possible instability in Venezuela. As a consequence, there is massive speculation by hedge funds, which are driving prices high. Nevertheless, demand in the US jumped 3.4 percent in 2004, because of the stockpiles of crude oil, which fell by 1.3 million barrels in August 2004. Excluding the Strategic Petroleum Preserve, crude inventories fell by 0.4 percent to 293 million barrels. China's refineries have processed 17.2 percent more crude so far this year than in 2003. India expects the nation's crude oil imports to rise by 11 percent between 2004 and 2005 with demand rising by nearly 4 percent.
26. Ali Al-Naimi, Saudi Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources, in a statement released to the Saudi Press Agency, 19/08/2004. http://www.saudi-us-relations.org/newsletter2004/ saudi-relations-NID-08-19.htm.
27. Sadad Al-Husseini, former executive vice-president of Saudi Aramco, predicted in May 2004 that "the Kingdom can certainly increase its production to 15 million barrels per day based on its existing reserves base."
28. Frontline's Interviews with Brent Scowcroft, former U.S. national security adviser; Vali Nasr, an authority on Islamic fundamentalism; James Baker, former U.S. secretary of state; and Prince Bandar bin Sultan, Saudi ambassador to the U.S. See: "Analysis: US-Saudi Relations." http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/saudi/ analyses/ussaudi.html.
29. Bob Woodward's best-selling book quoted by the 'Washington Post'.
30. An E-mail Debate between Craig Unger and Rachel Bronson, "How does the Saudi relationship with the Bush family affect US foreign policy?" July 19, 2004. This exchange originally appeared in Slate: http://www.slate.com/id/2103239/.
31. David Walsh, "The US War in Afghanistan," 'The New York Times', 29 October 2001;
32. "The dirty secret of US-Saudi relations," 'World Socialist Web Site' www.wsws.org.
33. 'Politics', "Saudi Arabia-Iraq," 10/15/2002.
34. Eric Schmitt, "Saudi Arabia Said to Assure U.S. on Use of Bases,", December 29, 2002.
35. Scott Peterson, "Relation with Saudis gets trickier," 'Christian Science Monitor', May 31, 2002 http://www.csmonitor.com/ 2002/0531/p06s02-wome.html.
36. General John P. Jumper, Air Force Chief of Staff, cited in, Eric Schmitt, "Saudi Arabia Said to Assure U.S. on Use of Bases" 'New York Times', 29 December 2002..
37. Alain Gresh, "After the winning of the war Saudi Arabia: radical Islam or reform?" 'Le Monde Diplomatique', June 2003.
38. Some analysts explain the official critics to the French opposition to second resolution on Iraq by linking it this discreet support.
39. These countries officially rejected this kind of intervention.
40. Alfred B. Prados, "Saudi Arabia: Current Issues and U.S. Relations," 'Congressional Research Service', January 25, 2002
41. 'Ibid'
42. Riyadh has bought more than $50 billion in US arms and construction contracts over the past 20 years with the hundreds of billions of dollars that it has earned as the world's biggest oil exporter.
43. Almost 7000 members who receive as much as 40 percent of the country's oil revenues.
44. Anthony H. Cordesman and Arleigh A. Burke, "Ten Reasons for Reforging US and Saudi Relations," Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 30, 2004.
45. Alain Gresh, "Saudi Arabia: breaking the silence," 'Le Monde Diplomatique', English language edition, May 2002.
46. CSIS report quoted in Washington conferences focus on deteriorating US-Saudi relations, The Campus Watch website, at http://www.campus-watch.org/article/id/989.
47. King Abd al-Aziz (commonly known as Ibn Sa'ud) founded the Third Saudi State after recapturing the ancestral home of Riyadh in 1902.
48. Daniel Pipes, "Arabia's Civil War," 'Wall Street Journal' (European Edition), May 14, 2003.
49. The Saudi family was allied to the lkhwan who served it, bringing it the essential military victories.
50. After his death in 1953, Abdul Aziz was succeeded by King Saud, who abdicated in 1964 in favor of his half-brother, King Faisal, who was assassinated in 1975. He was succeeded by his half-brother Khalid. After the death of King Khalid in 1982, King Fahd became the ruler of Saudi Arabia.
51. Trained at Sandhurst, Lt. Gen. Mitab is regarded as a highly competent commanding officer with strong professional ties to the US military. He will probably pursue modernization programs aimed at improving and expanding the Guard's capabilities in counter-insurgency, intelligence gathering and tactical operations. The National Guard is configured to deal with threats to internal security.
52. Joseph A. Kechichian, "Succession in Saudi Arabia," Reviewed by Daniel Pipes, 'Middle East Quarterly', Winter 2002.
53. Abel Aziz ruled until his death in 1953 and made king his oldest surviving son, Sa'ud. The ruling family ousted the incompetent Sa'ud in 1964, and Faysal reigned until his assassination in 1975.
54. Te Sudairi Seven are generally regarded as 'progressives', pro-American and driven by the accumulation of wealth. The 'progressives,' led by Fahd and Sultan, are committed to the American alliance, rapid modernization, economic development, and high rates of oil production to moderate pricing. On the contrary, Abdullah is a traditionalist and nationalist. He believes in a less overt relationship with the U.S., preferring resistance to westernization and greater economic diversification.
55. While Abdullah was at a summit of the Gulf Cooperation Council in Oman (December 1995) Sultan summoned members of the Supreme Religious Authority to seek their sanction of his claim to the throne and to dismiss Abdullah as Commander-in-Chief of the National Guard. Recognizing Sultan's attempt to seize power under the guise of religious approbation, the Ulema denied Sultan's petition. In reaction, Abdullah travelled to Al-Qissim, center of the powerful Shammar confederation of tribes to get their support. In Paul Michael Wihbey, "Succession in Saudi Arabia: The not so Silent Struggle," July 1997.
56. See, J. E. Peterson, "Succession in the States of the Gulf Cooperation Council," 'Washington Quarterly', (Autumn 2001): pp. 176-186.
57. Anthony H. Cordesman and Arleigh A. Burke, "Ten Reasons for Re-Forging US and Saudi Relations," Center for Strategic and International Studies, 30 January 2004.
58. "We must recognize that the extremist ideology exists in our midst," wrote a columnist on the governmental daily 'al- Watan'. In November 2003, the Interior Minister, Prince Nayef, initially accused the Muslim Brotherhood.
59. This period witnessed an important growth of the Islamist movement throughout the Muslim world as a whole, as illustrated by the examples of Algeria, Egypt, Sudan, Indonesia, and the Balkans.
60. "Saudi-American Security Relations," An Adaptation of Remarks Presented at the Saudi-US Relations Symposium, Portland State University, 26 January 2004. Original publication on web site, 30 January 2004. http://www.jepeterson.net/id12.htm.
61. Frontline's interviews with Brent Scowcroft, former U.S. national security adviser; Vali Nasr, an authority on Islamic fundamentalism; James Baker, former U.S. secretary of state; and Prince Bandar bin Sultan, Saudi ambassador to the U.S. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/ frontline/shows/saudi/analyses/ussaudi.html.
62. Frontline's interviews with Brent Scowcroft, former U.S. National Security Adviser; Vali Nasr, an authority on Islamic fundamentalism; James Baker, former U.S. secretary of state; and Prince Bandar bin Sultan, Saudi Ambassador to the U.S. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/ frontline/shows/saudi/analyses/ussaudi.html.
63. 'Ibid.'
64. Muqtedar Khan, "The Empire and the Kingdom: Saudi-US Relations in Crisis Again," http://www.glocaleye.org/SaudiArabia.htm.
65. Hermann Frederick Eilts, "US Saudi Relations after the September 11 Debacle," http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/archives_roll/ 2001_10-12/eilts_saudi/eilts_saudi.html.
66. According to Annual Energy Outlook 2004, published by the American Administration, OPEC will provide 60% of the expected augmentation of the US oil importation between 2002 et 2025. Hence, the American importation from the Gulf will increase from 53% to 70%.
67. "How does the Saudi relationship with the Bush family affect U.S. foreign policy?" Item of Interest: An E-mail debate between Craig Unger and Rachel Bronson, July 19, 2004.