Competing explanations for bureaucratic preferences

Journal of Theoretical Politics

Volumn 19, Issue 3, 2007, Pages 219-247

  Whitford, Andrew B ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Bureaucracy; Model selection; Organization; Political control; Preferences

Indexed keywords

EID: 34250198658     PISSN: 09516298     EISSN: 14603667     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0951629807077568     Document Type: Review

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