Rational expectations and pro sports leagues

Scottish Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 54, Issue 3, 2007, Pages 374-387

  Fort, Rodney ^a   Quirk, James ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN   (United States)

^b CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMPETITIVENESS; COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS; STATISTICAL ANALYSIS;

EID: 34250185379     PISSN: 00369292     EISSN: 14679485     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9485.2007.00420.x     Document Type: Article

References (16)

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