Pathans to the east! The development of the Tablighi Jama'at movement in northern Malaysia and southern Thailand

Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East

Volumn 27, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 7-25

  Noor, Farish A ^a  

^a ZENTRUM MODERNER ORIENT   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CULTURAL GEOGRAPHY; CULTURAL INFLUENCE; CULTURAL RELATIONS; RELIGION; SOCIAL MOVEMENT;

ASIA; EURASIA; MALAYSIA; SOUTHEAST ASIA; THAILAND;

EID: 34250023780     PISSN: 1089201X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1215/1089201x-2006-040     Document Type: Article

References (30)

1. See the subtitle of Muhammad Khalid Masud, ed., Travellers in Faith: Studies of the Tablighi Jama'at as a Transnational Islamic Movement for Faith Renewal (Leiden: Brill, 2000).
2. See Farish A. Noor, "Salafiyya Purists in the Land of Shadow Puppets and Hindu Temples: The Tablighi Jama'at in Indonesia" (paper presented at the Wissenschaftliche Konferenz zur gegenwartsbezogenen Forchung im Vorderen Orient [DAVO Congress], Hamburg, 20-22 November 2003).
3. For further readings on the early studies of the movement in Malaysia, see Chandra Muzaffar, "Islamic Resurgence: A Global View," in Islam and Society in Southeast Asia, ed. Taufik Abdullah and Sharon Siddique (Singapore: Institute for Southeast Asian Studies, 1986), 5-39;
4. Muzaffar, Islamic Resurgence in Malaysia (Petaling Jaya: Fajar Bakti, 1987);
5. and Judith Nagata, The Reflowering of Malaysian Islam (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1984). The authors were writing in the 1980s, and at that time the Tabligh was still regarded as an urban-based movement.
6. In Southeast Asia the Tablighi Jama'at has been and is still seen as a moderate, quietist faith renewal movement that is nonpolitical and nonpartisan. Indonesian Islamist intellectuals and activists whom I spoke to during my fieldwork in Java between August and September 2003 were shocked when the country's antiterror agency and security forces rounded up and arrested a number of Tablighis on the island of Bali in the wake ofthe October Bali bombings of 2002. They insisted that the Tablighi Jama'at had always maintained a low profile and claimed that the movement did not endorse any form of violent or revolutionary politics in Indonesia. Though many Indonesian Islamist intellectuals and activists who were interviewed described the Tablighi Jama'at as a "foreign, Indian" movement that was alien to Indonesian Islam, they nonetheless maintained that it was pacifist in nature and not a threat to Indonesian society or national security. Author interviews with Hidayat Nurwahid, president of the Parti Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS), Jakarta, 17 September 2003; Shafi' Anwar, International Center for Islam and Pluralism (ICIP), Jakarta, 14 and 16 September 2003; Shafiq Hasyim, ICIP, Jakarta, 14 and 16 September 2003; Ulil Abshar Abdallah, Jaringan Islam Liberal, Jakarta, 17 and 21 September 2003.
7. For further readings on the close historical links between Kelantan and Patani, see Ibrahim Syukri, Sejarah Kerajaan Melayu Patani (History of the Malay Kingdom of Patani) (Bangi: University Kebangsaan Malaysia University Press, 2002);
8. Hajl Abdul Halim Bashah, Raja Champa dan Dinasti Jembal dalam Patani Besar (The King of Champa and the Jembal Dynasty in Greater Patani) (Kubang Krian: Pustaka Reka, 1994);
9. and Abdul Razak Mahmud, Ikhtisar Sejarah Kelantan (The History of Kelantan) (Kota Bharu: Pustaka Aman, 2002).
10. Wan Nik bin Wan Yusoff, "PAS Mula Ditubuh di Kelantan" ("How PAS Was Established in Kelantan"), 3. From the home page of Dewan Ulema of PAS (Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party), PAS Kelantan Strategic Center (Pusat Kajian Strategik Kelantan), 26 November 1997, kelantan.parti-pas.org/ulamakseja.htm.
11. For further reading on the subject of Kelantan's historical and cultural links to Patani and the fabled kingdom of Langkasuka, see Farish A. Noor and Eddin Khoo, Spirit of Wood: The Art of Malay Woodcarving; Works of Master Craftsmen from Kelantan, Trengganu, and Patani (Singapore: Periplus, 2003).
12. The Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS) was formed in 1951 under the leadership of Haji Fuad Hassan. The Islamist activist Burhanuddin al-Helmy was invited to take over as president of PAS in December 1956. In 1969 Burhanuddin died after being put into detention without trial by the Malaysian government. PAS then came under the leadership of Mohamad Asri Muda, who was a staunch defender of Malay rights and privileges. The period of Asri Muda's leadership was highly controversial. After a leadership crisis that went out of control, the federal government declared a state of emergency in Kelantan in 1978. In 1982, Asri Muda was forced to step down by a new generation of activist ulema who had infiltrated the party. The 1980s and 1990s witnessed the radicalization of PAS as its new leaders began to confront the nationalistled coalition government and the state apparatus on the grounds that they were secular, un-Islamic, and working in league with Western and Zionist interests. In 1990 PAS regained control of the state of Kelantan, and in 1999 it won control of Trengganu as well. But PAS lost control of Trengganu and nearly lost control of Kelantan - its home base - in the elections of February 2004.
13. UMNO's and PAS's Malay centrism was born out of a desire to protect the existence of the Malay-Muslim constituency itself. After the boom and bust cycles of the 1950s and 1960s, the Malaysian economy seemed in danger of failing into a major slump, with unemployment levels rising alarmingly among the Malays in particular. Apart from the structural problems within the economy itself, the Malays were forced to contend with increased competition from the other communities. From 1957 to 1970, income inequality among all the major ethnic groups had grown, but the Malay community was particularly badly hit. While class, rather than race, was the real reason for these discrepancies, it was nonetheless believed that the economic lot of the Malays was made worse because of the encroachment ofthe non-Malays.
14. The BRN was formed in March 1963 as a result of a split within the BNPP. The BRN was formed by Ustaz Abdul Karim Hassan, and his group aimed to create an independent Republic of Patani. The group actively courted the support of other Muslim states such as Algeria, Syria, and Libya. In this respect the BRN was more akin to other secular Muslim liberation movements such as the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). The BRN opted for political mobilization and networking and rejected the use of terrorism and guerrilla warfare for which the BNPP had become famous. Between 1963 and 1968, the BRN concentrated mainly on penetrating the local pondok and madrassa networks in order to recruit more members to its cause. But the constant infighting and counterterrorist activities of the Thai government in the region forced the BRN leadership to go underground in 1968.
15. PULO was the only Patani liberation movement founded outside Patani itself. Its founder, Tengku Bira, was himself a graduate of Aligarh Muslim University in India. Soon after launching PULO, Tengku Bira transferred himself and the group's main headquarters to Mecca, where he hoped to attract more support from Patani Muslims who were studying there. PULO's ideological orientation was largely secular from the start: it aimed at national liberation in the broadest sense, like the PLO and MNLF. PULO rejected the neofeudal and traditionalist ideology of the BNPP and the Islamic Socialism of the BRN. Its main recruitment targets were the Arab states and Malaysia. PULO collected most of its funds from Patani Malays working overseas, particularly in countries such as Saudi Arabia. In 1979 PULO tried to work with the BNPP in order to coordinate their military operations in the Patani region. This agreement was reached at the Muslim World Summit of the same year. But this experiment with cooperation ended in 1981 because of internal rifts within PULO and the BNPP.
16. For further readings on the complex political debates on Indian migration to British Malaya during the colonial period, see Kernial Singh Sandhu, Indians in Malaya: Some Aspects of Their Immigration and Settlement, 1786-7957 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969);
17. and C. Kondapi, Indians Overseas, 1938-1949 (New Delhi: Indian Council of World Affairs, 1963).
18. Haydar noted that his grandfather had come to trade in Kelantan and, like many of the Indian Muslims then, was inclined to trade in gold and jewelry. However, Kelantan is unique for the simple reason that it is the only Malay state where the trade in gold and jewelry had always been monopolized by the local Kelantan Malays. Because of excessive competition in the field, Baharam Khan chose to trade in cloth and Indian spices instead.
19. The Pakistan Mosque of Kota Bharu is no longer there, having burned down in a freak accident a few years ago.
20. Interview with Haydar Ali at the Markaz Tabligh, Batu Enam Kedai Mulong, Jalan Kuala Kerai, 4 August 2004.
21. Haydar Ali Tajuddin bin Fateh Muhammad, Sepuluh Perkara Yang Biasa Dibangkitkan oleh Mubaligh Kristian untuk Menentang Islam (Madrasatul Quran Batu Enam Kedai Mulong, Jalan Kuala Kerai, Tumpat), Malay translation of Zakir Naik's The Ten Most Common Questions Asked by Christian Missionaries against Islam (Mumbai: Islamic Research Foundation, n.d.).
22. On the first evening there, members of my research group were bitten no fewer than thirty-one times.
23. It should also be emphasized that the use of canes by teachers is not unique to the madrassas of the Tabligh. Rattan canes are widely used in almost all the madrassas in the region, and more often than not they are used as a teaching aid by the teachers, who "tap" the canes on the floor or their knees as they set and maintain the pace as the students orally recite the Koran. In this regard the canes seem to function more like an orchestra conductor's baton than a tool for punishment.
24. Haydar pointed out that "the students in this madrassa are all sent by their families. They often come from poor families, laborers, rubber-tappers, and the like. Some of these kids are really very poor, some are orphans with no one to take care of them. In the more serious cases, we cover the entire cost of the board and tuition by asking for donations from the public. In some cases, we try to cover half the costs." Interview with Haydar Ali at the Markaz Tabligh, Batu Enam Kedai Mulong, Jalan Kuala Kerai, 4 August 2004.
25. In Haydar's words, "These are the most difficult students of all. We run after the second-best students who cannot make it in any of the national schools and madaris, and we try to give them a second chance in life. We work to make sure that they have at least read the Qur'an and know the fundamentals of their religion. This madrasah does not hope to create geniuses - we just want to make sure that these boys do not end up getting lost or end up in crime and other sorts of unwanted activities. Our aim here is to make these children good Muslims, and to protect them from the corrupting effects of society." Ibid.
26. In Haydar's words, "The parents of these children are scared now. Thanks to all this talk of terrorism and militant activities, they are scared to send their kids to madaris like ours. But you can see that there is nothing going on here except Qur'an-reading classes. How can that be a threat to the country?" Ibid.
27. When queried about the matter, the owner of the workshop professed no knowledge whatsoever of the activities in the center. He noted that those who attended the classes tended to be young boys from Kelantan or Patani and that "there were some Indians who come once in a while." There is no reason to assume that the man was not telling the truth, for the Tablighi are known for their low-profile approach and reluctance to draw attention to themselves and their activities. Ibid.
28. Ibid.
29. Recent Thai government attempts to win Patani Malay-Muslim support by investing in mosque projects have met with a hostile response. Prior to the killing of 113 Patani Muslims on 28 April 2004, the local Thai authorities announced a 28-million-baht project to restore the Krue Se Mosque near Patani. The Krue Se Mosque restoration project met with strong local opposition because of its historical significance for the Patani Malays, who see it as a landmark monument marking the arrival of Islam and the Islamization of Patani. The local community leaders argued that the restoration would lead to the destruction of the original mosque and to its replacement with another modern Arab-style mosque along the lines of the Masjid Jame' Patani.
30. See Farish A. Noor, Salafiyya Purists in the Land of Shadow Puppets and Hindu Temples: The Tablighi Jama'at in Indonesia (paper presented at the Annual Congress of the German Middle East Studies Association [DAVO], Hamburg, 2003).