Real effort versus chosen effort in experiments

Economics Letters

Volumn 96, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 232-236

  Brüggen, Alexander ^a   Strobel, Martin ^b  

^a MAASTRICHT UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

^b MAASTRICHT UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Chosen effort; Experiment; Real effort

Indexed keywords

EID: 34249995681     PISSN: 01651765     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2007.01.008     Document Type: Article

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