Stochastic evolution of rules for playing finite normal form games

Theory and Decision

Volumn 62, Issue 4, 2007, Pages 311-333

  Germano, Fabrizio ^a  

^a DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS   (Spain)

Author keywords

Bounded rationality; Evolutionary dynamics; Learning; Normal form games; Rules; Stochastic dynamics

Indexed keywords

EVOLUTIONARY ALGORITHMS; FINITE ELEMENT METHOD; LEARNING SYSTEMS; PROBLEM SOLVING; RANDOM PROCESSES;

BOUNDED RATIONALITY; EVOLUTIONARY DYNAMICS; NORMAL FORM GAMES; STOCHASTIC DYNAMICS;

GAME THEORY;

EID: 34249914745     PISSN: 00405833     EISSN: 15737187     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11238-007-9032-8     Document Type: Article

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