A model of the synchronic self

Consciousness and Cognition

Volumn 16, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 533-550

  Carruthers, Glenn ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ADELAIDE   (Australia)

Author keywords

Agency; Body integrity identity disorder; Boundedness; Delusions; Integrated body map; Motor control; Ownership; Phenomenology of self; Self

Indexed keywords

ARTICLE; BODY IMAGE; COGNITION; FEEDBACK SYSTEM; HUMAN; KINESTHESIA; MOTOR CONTROL; PHENOMENOLOGY; PROPRIOCEPTION; SELF CONCEPT; SOMATIC DELUSION; THINKING;

BODY IMAGE; COGNITION; DELUSIONS; EGO; HUMANS; INTERNAL-EXTERNAL CONTROL; MODELS, PSYCHOLOGICAL; PROPRIOCEPTION; PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY; VOLITION;

EID: 34249867403     PISSN: 10538100     EISSN: 10902376     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2006.06.002     Document Type: Article

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