Critical realism and causal analysis in International Relations

Millennium: Journal of International Studies

Volumn 35, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 361-378

  Kurki, Milja ^a  

^a ABERYSTWYTH UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 34249815245     PISSN: 03058298     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/03058298070350021501     Document Type: Article

References (71)

1. This paper focuses on 'critical realism' associated with Bhaskar's 'critical naturalist' philosophy of science. Roy Bhaskar, A Realist Theory of Science (Hassocks: Harvester Press, 1978);
2. Roy Bhaskar, The Possibility of Naturalism: A Philosophical Critique of the Contemporary Human Sciences (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1979). While the term 'scientific realism' is used by many other IR theorists, such as Alexander Wendt, the term 'critical realism' is preferred here because of its close association with Bhaskar's thought, the focus adopted here. There are many different strands of philosophical realism and some strands of scientific realism do not adopt a strongly non-positivist stance as critical realists do. For example, while Wendt's work has been ground-breaking in IR, it does not follow Bhaskar's philosophy of science in certain important respects.
3. Heikki Patomäki and Colin Wight, 'After Post-Positivism? The Promises of Critical Realism', International Studies Quarterly 44, no. 2 (2002): 213-37;
4. Heikki Patomäki, After International Relations: Critical Realism and the (Re)Construction of World Politics (London: Routledge, 2002);
5. Colin Wight, Agents, Structures and International Relations: Politics as Ontology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). Some critical realist themes are also developed in American 'scientific realist' scholarship. See, for example, David Dessler, 'Beyond Correlations: Towards a Causal Theory of War', International Studies Quarterly 35, no. 3 (1991): 337-55;
6. Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
7. Some influential critiques include: Friedrich Kratochwil, 'Constructing a New Orthodoxy? Wendt's 'Social Theory of International Politics' and the Constructivist Challenge', Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 29, no.1 (2000): 73-101;
8. Fred Chernoff, 'Scientific Realism as a Meta-theory of International Politics', International Studies Quarterly, 46 n.2 (2002): 189-207;
9. Maja Zehfuss, Constructivism in International Relations: The Politics of Reality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
10. However, for an interesting history of causation see Wallace, Causality and Scientific Explanation I & II (University of Michigan: Ann Arbor, 1972).
11. Although some positivists would even question the validity of causal language and see relations of patterns simply in terms of correlations. Indeed, the very status of causal language is in question for some logical positivists. See, for example, R. Carnap, Philosophical Foundations of Physics: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science (London: Basic Books, 1966), 204.
12. Positivism is of course a contested term. Here I will take it to refer to a philosophy of science that is informed by empiricist theory of knowledge and that emphasises systematic gathering of empirical facts, empirical testing of hypothesis, value of instrumental knowledge and fact-value distinction.
13. John A. Vasquez and Marie T. Henehan (eds), The Scientific Study of Peace and War: A Text Reader, xx-xxii;
14. D.J. Singer, Human Behaviour and International Politics; Contributions ftom the Social-Psychological Sciences (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965);
15. Michael Nicholson, Causes and Consequences in International Relations: A Conceptual Study (London: Pinter, 1996);
16. Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry, Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).
17. Although some classical scholars in IR were sceptical of the scientific approach to causal analysis of the positivists. See Hans Morgenthau, Scientific Man and Power Politics (London: Latimer Press, 1947);
18. Hedley Bull, 'Intemational Theory: Case for Classical Approach' in Contending Approaches to International Politics, ed. K. Knorr and J. Rosenau (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1969).
19. See, for example, K.M. Fierke, Diplomatic Interventions: Conflict and Change in a Globalizing World (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 1-19;
20. David Campbell. Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and Politics of Identity, 2nd edn (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998), 4.
21. While some call this debate 'third debate', I follow Ole Wæver's characterisation of the contestation between the positivist and post-positivists as a 'fourth debate'. Ole Waever, 'The Rise and Fall of the Interparadigm. Debate', in International Theory; Positivism and Beyond, ed. Steve Smith, Ken Booth and Marysia Zalewski (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
22. Even though within the positivist tradition some, on the basis of empiricist logic, also reject the very notion of causality in favour of speaking of correlations of observed facts. See footnote 5 above.
23. See, for example, Andrew Collier, Critical Realism: An Introduction to Roy Bhaskar's Philosophy (London: Verso, 1994);
24. Margaret Archer, Roy Bhaskar, Andrew Collier, Tony Lawson and Alan Norrie (eds), Critical Realism: Essential Readings (London: Routledge, 1998); Bhaskar, A Realist Theory of Science; Bhaskar, The Possibility of Naturalism; Patomäki and Wight, 'After Post-Positivism?'.
25. See, for example, Christopher Norris, On the Limits of Antirealism (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997). See also Colin Wight's article in this forum.
26. Bhaskar, Realist Theory of Science, 21.
27. Bhaskar, Possibility of Naturalism, 16.
28. Deep ontology as a term highlights the difference between empiricists' observable ontology where observable events are what form the basis of 'existence'. Deep ontology emphasises that causal forces exist on deeper levels of reality and hence can be, while unobservable, nevertheless real.
29. An assumption Bhaskar has termed 'regularity-determinism'. Bhaskar, Realist Theory of Science, 70-1.
30. While some critical realists use the notion of causal mechanisms, these are not understood in a classically mechanistic manner. Many critical realists, including this author, prefer to avoid the use of the metaphor mechanism precisely because of its mechanistic connotations.
31. For a summary of various causal words see Andrew Sayer, Method in Social Science: A Realist Approach, 2nd edn (London: Routledge, 1992), 104.
32. See also Heikki Patomaki, 'How to Tell Better Stories about World Politics', European Journal of International Relations, 2, no.1 (1996): 105-33;
33. Paul Lewis, 'Realism, Causality and the Problem of Social Structure', Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, 30, no. 3 (2000): 249-68;
34. Paul Lewis, 'Agency, Structure and Causality in Political Science: A Comment on Sibeon', Politics, 22, no. 1 (2002): 17-23;
35. Milja Kurki, 'Causes of a Divided Discipline: Rethinking the Concept of Cause in International Relations Theory', Review of International Studies, 32, no. 2, (2006): 189-216.
36. This concept is developed by Heikki Patomäki; Patomäki, 'How to tell Better Stories', 105-33.
37. Qualitative research is seen as 'intensive' causal research, while quantitative is seen as an 'extensive' taxonomical. model. See Sayer, Method in Social Science, 243.
38. Huth and Allee characterise the empiricist treatment of causal complexity in a telling way. They call for use models and tests that allow us to capture a variety of 'variables' in study of democratic peace. However, in the face of complexity, Huth and Allee cannot but recognise the difficulty of finding any adequately holistic statistical models that would account for the complexity of the causation involved. They do not, however, try to resolve the complexity ontologically through use of conceptual models that indicate the interactions of various causal forces. RK Huth and T.L. Allee, 'Questions of Research Design in the Testing of Democratic Peace', International Interactions, 28, no. 1 (2002): 51.
39. See David Dessler, 'Beyond Correlations: Towards a Causal Theory of War', International Studies Quarterly, 35, no. 3 (1991): 337-55.
40. See, for example, R.I. Rummel, 'Democracies Are Less Warlike than Other Regimes', European Journal of International Relations, 1, no. 4 (1995): 457-79;
41. Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace; Principles of Post-Cold War World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993). See also criticisms posed in Tarak Barkawi and Mark Laffey (eds), Rethinking Democratic Peace: Democracy, Liberalism and War (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2001).
42. King, Keohane and Verba's influential approach to advocating qualitative research, for example, still utilises positivist meta-theoretical framework that prioritises parsimony, observation and regularities. King Keohane and Verba, Designing Social Inquiry. See Kurki, 'Causes of a Divided Discipline', 195-7.
43. See Kurki, 'Causes of a Divided Discipline', 206-9.
44. Robert Cox, Production, Power and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987);
45. Cynthia Enloe, Bananas, Beaches and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990).
46. Jonathan Joseph discusses the link to Marxism in his contribution to this forum.
47. For a critical realist treatment of discourse see Jonathan Joseph, Realism Discourse and Deconstruction (London: Routledge, 2004).
48. For example, non-realist accounts such as Suganami's also open similar avenues. Hidemi Suganami, Causes of War (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996).
49. Indeed, critical realist philosophy has many convergences with the Aristotelian and medieval conceptions of causation.
50. Both Kratochwil's and Chernoff's influential critiques are focused on Wendt. Kratochwil, 'Constructing a New Orthodoxy?'; Chernoff, 'Scientific Realism'.
51. See, for example, Robert Cox, 'Realism, Positivism and Historicism', in Approaches to World Order, ed. R. Cox and T. Sinclair (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995);
52. Jill Steans, Gender and International Relations: An Introduction (Oxford: Polity, 1998), 13; Kratochwil, 'Constructing a New Orthodoxy?'
53. David Campbell, National Deconstruction: Violence, Identity and Justice in Bosnia (London: University of Minnesota Press, 1998).
54. For a persuasive and reflective exposition of this argument see Suganami, Causes of War.
55. K.M. Fierke, 'Constructivism' in International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity, ed. Tim Dunne, Mi1ja Kurki and Steve Smith (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006), 177.
56. Andrew Sayer, Realism and Social Science, (London: Sage, 2000), 45.
57. Interestingly, a point made by Chernoff in his article that seems to advance predictive empirical tests as the key criterion for scientific theories. Chernoff, 'Scientific Realism', 195. He also prioritises simplicity much more heavily than critical realists would. See later discussion of causal complexity.
58. See Colin Wight's discussion of this issue in his contribution to this forum.
59. See Barkawi and Laffey, Rethinking Democratic Peace.
60. Although individual critical realists can of course come to formulate theories of world politics. See, for example, Heikki Patomäki, After International Relations.
61. See Colin Wight's contribution to this forum.
62. In terms of democratic peace research, critical realists would prefer the general lines of research suggested by, for example, Barkawi and Laffey. Tarak Barkawi and Mark Laffey, 'Introduction' in Democracy, Liberalism and War, 16. See also Barkawi and Laffey, 'Retrieving the Imperial: Empire and International Relations', Millennium Journal of International Studies, 31, no. 1 (2002): 112.
63. This connection has been pointed to by a variety of authors, but is especially well indicated in Mark Rupert, 'Democracy: What's not to Love?', in Rethinking Democratic Peace, ed. Barkawi and Laffey.
64. For example, Kratochwil's critique of Wendt reveals strange conflation of realism with empiricism. See J. Morgan, 'Philosophical Realism in International Relations Theory: Kratochwil's Constructivist Challenge to Wendt', Journal of Critical Realism, 1 no. 1 (2002): 96-7.
65. A point paradoxically made by Kratochwil in 'Constructing a New Orthodoxy?', 90.
66. However, instead of rejecting science because of its potential political biases, critical realism advocates challenging socially destructive science by seeking to bring out its biases, as well as, in the cases of racist stereotyping or patriarchal biology, the ontologically implausible and evidentially poorly supported bases of these scientific theories. See, for example, Sayer, Realism and Social Science, 44.
67. David Campbell, 'Poststructuralism' in International Relations Theories, ed. Dunne, Kurki and Smith, 225.
68. See Kurki, 'Causes of a Divided Discipline', 198-9.
69. Reasons must be causal in that the agent's reasons are'a necessary condition for the bodily movements that occurred, in the straightforward sense that had the agent not possessed them they would not have occurred'. See Bhaskar, Possibility of Naturalism, 113-4.
70. Sayer, Method in Social Science, 111.
71. Jonathan Lear, Aristotle, the Desire to Understand (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).