"Make-or-buy" in movies: Integration and ex-post renegotiation

International Journal of Industrial Organization

Volumn 25, Issue 4, 2007, Pages 643-655

  Gil, Ricard ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Contracts; Ex post renegotiation; Movies; Vertical integration

Indexed keywords

CONTRACTS; COST ACCOUNTING; ECONOMIC ANALYSIS; MOTION PICTURES;

EX-POST RENEGOTIATION; VERTICAL INTEGRATION;

INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS;

EID: 34249740694     PISSN: 01677187     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2006.07.006     Document Type: Article

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