Unrealistic assumptions in rational choice theory

Philosophy of the Social Sciences

Volumn 37, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 115-138

  Lehtinen, Aki ^a   Kuorikoski, Jaakko ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF HELSINKI   (Finland)

Author keywords

As if; Economics imperialism; Rational choice; Robustness; Unrealistic assumptions

Indexed keywords

EID: 34249717772     PISSN: 00483931     EISSN: 15527441     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0048393107299684     Document Type: Article

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