Social security incentives, human capital investment and mobility of labor

Journal of Public Economics

Volumn 91, Issue 7-8, 2007, Pages 1299-1325

  Poutvaara, Panu ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF HELSINKI   (Finland)

^b Department of International Economics and Management   (Denmark)

Author keywords

Earnings related and flat rate pensions; Education; Migration; Social security

Indexed keywords

EID: 34249712989     PISSN: 00472727     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2007.03.001     Document Type: Article

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