The Salih regime and the need for a credible opposition

Middle East Journal

Volumn 61, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 263-280

  Burrowes, Robert D ^a   Kasper, Catherine M ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ELECTION; ELECTORAL GEOGRAPHY; PARTY POLITICS; POLITICAL DISCOURSE; POLITICAL REFORM;

ASIA; EURASIA; MIDDLE EAST; YEMEN;

EID: 34249690152     PISSN: 00263141     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.3751/61.2.14     Document Type: Article

References (88)

1. Robert D. Burrowes, "What Is to Be Done - Now?" The Yemen Times, Vol. 14, No. 945, May 11, 2006.
2. Robert D. Burrowes, "Yemen: Political Economy and the Effort against Terrorism," in Robert I. Rotberg, ed., Battling Terropism in the Horn of Africa (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press/World Peace Foundation, 2005), pp. 141-173.
3. United Nations Development Programme, Arab Human Development Report 2004 (New York: United Nations Publications, 2005), especially tables on pp. 234-248.
4. This said, the beginnings of democracy are in place in Yemen; it could evolve into a much more democratic country in the near future, but only under the right conditions and environment. In part, what is at issue is whether it is likely that Yemen has the time or the setting for further democratic transition - i.e., whether democracy will deepen and broaden, and become more legitimate, in the near future.
5. During the 1980s, what could be described as an "affirmative action" program favored businessmen from the north over their then-dominant colleagues from Ta'iz and the rest of the southern uplands. The ruling group at the center began "commanding ... top-down, through an elaborate system of patronage. The state became a family business. Around the family there developed ... a military-commercial complex. ... High-ranking army officers and a few great merchant families all had their hands in each other's pockets ... [and] had the state in their control." Paul Dresch, "The Tribal Factor in the Yemen Crisis," in Jamal al-Suwaidi, ed., The Yemeni War of 1994, Causes and Consequences (Abu Dhabi: The Emirates Center for Stategic Studies and Research, 1996).
6. The unification process (1989) and power sharing with the YSP during the transition period had interrupted and challenged this trend briefly from 1990 until 1994.
7. Neither the relatively impoverished imamate state of the first six decades of the 20th century nor the republic of the 1960s and 1970s had been a source of much wealth and private gain.
8. For use of the term "kleptocracy," see Joshua Charap and Christian Harm, "Institutionalized Corruption and the Kleptocratic State," in George T. Abed and Sanjeev Gupta, eds., Governance, Corruption and Economic Performance (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 2002), pp. 135-158.
9. Dr. 'Abd al-Karim al-Iryani - two-time prime minister, long-time foreign minister, secretary-general of the ruling General People's Congress for a decade until late 2005, and still senior adviser to the President - insisted in a long discussion with the senior author in Sana'a in February 2006 that categorization of the regime as a kleptocracy is unduly "harsh," and he is correct to a degree. Some of those who have gotten rich did not do so entirely or even largely by ill-gotten means. Instead, some were just in the right place at the right time - e.g., having inherited large amounts of land right in the path of Sana'a's explosive growth. Accordingly, Yemen should perhaps be described as a mix between kleptocracy and "plutocracy," the latter being merely government of, by, and for the rich.
10. In recent years, the big exception that proves the rule seems to have been the Social Development Fund, the relatively new government agency that has run social "safety net" projects and seems dedicated to its mission and quite free of corruption. In these regards, one is reminded of the old Central Planning Organization (CPO) during its early days in the mid-1970s.
11. It should be noted that many public servants, some very high and some very low, have chosen not to participate in this system, or at least not to participate in it very much. In addition, many public servants are simply not in offices or posts through which much money flows. Senior author's assessments in footnotes 10-12 are based on observations and many conversations in Sana'a between October 2003 and March 2006.
12. The social structure and political culture of the kleptocratic state is new to Yemen. In centuries past, the tribes and their shaykhs enjoyed freedom on the periphery at the expense of relative wealth at the center, in the towns and cities - i.e., they paid a hefty price in terms of comfort for their freedom. Now they have both affluence and a new kind of freedom - as well as continuing autonomy on the periphery - by virtue of the power and access afforded by positions and connections at the center. In a way unimaginable in 1948, when they literally did sack the city of Sana'a, the shaykhs have been participating in the serial sacking of Sana'a since the late 1970s.
13. Perhaps the word "silently" is not correct since the "succession issue" and the issue of nepotism - from the presidency on down to a wide range of lesser posts - became big themes in the press in 2004 and 2005.
14. According to Transparency International, corruption is pervasive in 60 countries, Yemen included, and bribery haunts public sectors, TI's ranking for 2004 has Yemen as 112 of 146 countries (146 being most corrupt) and scoring 2.4 of 10 (10 being least corrupt). "Corruption is rampant in 60 countries, and the public sector is plagued by bribery, says TI," http://www.transparency.org/layout /set/print/news_room/latest_news/press_releases/2004 /2004_10_20_cpi2004.
15. See also Nasser Arrabyee, "Corruption Widespread in Yemen, Says Study," Gulf News, August 25, 2006, http://www.gulfnews.com/ region/yemen/10062606.html.
16. This was even more the case with the Yemeni imamate during the centuries before the Hamid al-Din imamate in the 20th century adopted some of the elements of statecraft of the "modern" Ottoman Turkish occupiers of Yemen. For the classic definition of the modern state, see Max Weber, "Politics as a Vocation," in H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds., From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (New York: Galazy Books, 1958), pp. 77-84.
17. See Robert D. Burrowes, "The Famous Forty and Their Companions: North Yemen's First-generation Modernists and Educational Emigrants," The Middle East Journal, Vol. 59, No. 1 (Winter 2005), pp. 81-97.
18. In combination, the kleptocratic and arrested nature of the Yemeni state raises big questions. Can a regime driven by such motives and values, and a state so limited as to how far and deep it can reach, do what has to be done to assure a country's survival and the well-being of its people in an increasingly globalized world? In short, does it have the will and capacity to adopt and implement quickly major socioeconomic reforms? If not, can such a regime, of its own volition or under pressure from others, acquire the appropriate motives and values, even if only for the sake of survival, and appropriately increase and redirect the capacities of the state?
19. Simply, Yemen's failing state has not met the needs of the broken economy and society and these unmet needs now threaten to reduce Yemen to a failed state. For a more optimistic assessment, albeit four years old, that says Yemen is a fragile state, but not a failed or failing one, see International Crisis Group (ICG), "Yemen: Coping with Terrorism and Violence in a Fragile State," January 8, 2002, http:// www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1675&1=1.
20. For a discussion of the "failed state" concept, see Robert I. Rotberg, "Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States: Causes and Indicators," in Robert I. Rotberg, ed., State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2003), pp. 1-25.
21. Dr. 'Abd al-Karim al-Iryani again took issue with this contention. In a discussion with the senior author in Sana'a in 2006, he said rightly that the concept of a "failed state" has often been ill-defined and misapplied, but then went on to say that, by any reasonable definition, the ROY does not qualify as a "failing state" at risk of becoming a "failed state." In his thinking, this is precluded by the degree to which the ROY, as the Yemen Arab Republic before it, is firmly rooted in the imamate state that prevailed before the 1962 Revolution. As indicated earlier, the senior author does not think the imamate came close to meeting Weber's definition of a state. The author admits to having difficulty in defining a failed state, but he thinks he knows one when he sees one. He resided in Lebanon from 1973 through 1975, and during this period he experienced a failing state become a failed state. Lebanon, as well as Somalia and Afghanistan, suggest that the unraveling of a seemingly functioning society and its descent into Hobbes' "state of nature" can be rapid and unexpected, best predicted in hindsight.
22. This is the argument of the op-ed by Robert D. Burrowes, "What Is to be Done - Now?" The Yemen Times, May 11, 2006.
23. Regarding partnering, there was by 2005 a new generation of operatives moving into senior positions in the GPC, and some of them seemed open both to fashioning the ruling party into an engine of reform and to collaborating with elements in the opposition towards this end.
24. The Ba'th Party, was in and out of the JMP - and then finally out.
25. Despite general agreement on all sides that the YSP's boycott of the parliamentary elections in 1997 had been a disaster for the party and for the opposition to the Salih regime in general, there was talk by some opposition leaders of a boycott again as politics heated up in early 2006. Postponement of the elections was also proposed - or threatened by others. (Discussions between the senior author and JMP figures in Sana'a in winter and spring 2006. See also 'Abdul-Aziz Oudah, "JMP Demands Postponement of Elections," Yemen Observer, July 23, 2006, www.yobserver.com/news_10560.php
26. and Muhammad bin Sallam, "Opposition Not Happy with SCER," Yemen Times, August 15, 2006, http://yementimes.com/ article.shtml?i=971&p=front&a=1.)
27. The senior author monitored the parliamentary selections in Yemen in 1997 and 2003. For an assessment of the latter, see "The April 27, 2003 Parliamentary Elections in the Republic of Yemen," (Washington, DC: National Democratic Institute for International Affairs,) pp. 17-33, http://www.accessdemocracy.org/library /1701_yem_elect-rep.pdf.
28. 'Abdul-Aziz Oudah, "JMP Candidate's Platform Revealed," Yemen Observer, August 1, 2006.
29. In 2004, Husayn Badr al-Din a]-Huthi and his movement, the Believing Youth, based in Sa'ada far to the north, began publicly accusing the Salih regime of being in the service of the US and Israel and even questioning the legitimacy of the President and the Republic itself, this on the basis of political theory that called for rule by a Zaydi sayyid imam. In June 2004, when security forces tried to rein in al-Huthi, fighting broke out and continued until he was killed in September. Fighting erupted again in the spring of 2005, the movement now led by the religious leader Badr al-Din al-Huthi, Husayn's father. The rebellion was put down very violently after two months, only to re-erupt in the spring of 2006. The three rounds of fighting resulted in more that a 1,000 deaths on both sides, the displacement of thousands of residents in Sa'ada province and the destruction of much property and public infrastructure. President Salih granted a general amnesty in May 2006, just a few months before the elections. Nasser Arrabyee, "Opposition Accused of Supporting Rebellion in Yemen," Special to Gulf News, April 1, 2005;
30. James Brandon, "Insurgents Rattle the Edgy Yemen," Christian Science Monitor, April 20, 2005;
31. "Six Killed in Yemen Clashes Brings Week's Death Toil to 22," Comtex News Network, Feburary 21, 2006;
32. and "Yemen Frees Hundreds of Supporters of Shiite Group," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, March 3, 2006.
33. The initial and continuing pluralism of the JMP should not be forgotten, and is implicit in its plural,"Joint Meeting Parties."
34. The President and GPC have often used this tactic in the past - and often successfully.
35. When he made his announcement late in the campaign, Shaykh al-Ahmar said he was speaking only for himself, and not Islah. He was in Saudi Arabia and possibly terminally ill, and it is hard to say whether he spoke for many others and whether he carried them with him to President Salih. (Nasser Arrabyee, Gulf News, September 12, 2006.)
36. AI-Zindani, the leader of the Muslim Brotherhood in North Yemen in the 1970s, had been radicalized over the course of the Islamist involvement in Afghanistan in the 1980s; he has maintained this militant stance through the era of al-Qa'ida and the Taliban. See Paul Dresch,A History of Modern Yemen (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 142, 173, and 187.
37. See also the chapter entitled "Historical and Intellectual Origins of Yemen's Joint Meeting Parties," in Michaelle Brower, Contemporary Arab Political Ideologies: Accommodation and Transformation (manuscript).
38. For the strangeness of these bedfellows on the intellectual and ideological level, see Brower, Contemoprary Arab Political Ideologies. Aware of the wide range of ideologies in the JMP, spokesman Muhammad Qahtan said: "The talk about ideologies is merely a talk about the Cold War. When we thought about the future of Yemen and the country's current situation, we understood we had to leave behind the ideologies of the Cold War in order to make a better future for the country." Khalil al-Khaubari, "JMP: Last Attempt or Bridge to a Better Future," Yemen Times, October 26, 2006, http://yementimes.com/article.shtml?i=903&p=front&a=l.
39. AI-Zindani also may have marginalized himself and his associates by separately and more quietly breaking with the JMP and endorsing Salih for president. (Conversations with political activists in Sana'a, September 19-26, 2006.)
40. Sana'a University political science professor 'Abdullah al-Faqih proposed a three-month postponement in order to sort out the electoral rolls and procedures. This proposal was rejected outright by the ruling GPC and not embraced by the JMP. "Proposal for Yemeni Election Slammed," Yemen Mirror, May 16, 2006, http:// www.yemenmirror.com/index.php?action=showDetails&id= 19.
41. Bin Shamlan had been one of the founders of the branch of the Muslim Brotherhood in South Yemen before independence from Britain in 1967, and was clearly a man of faith. As to his honesty, he surprised many when he resigned as Minister of Oil and returned his auto to the ministry. "2006 Presidential Candidates Profiles," Yemen Times, http://yementimes.com.shtml?i=979&p--report&a=1;
42. and Faiza Saleh Ambah, "Technocrat Recasts Yemen's Presidential Race, Political Future," The Washington Post, September 20, 2006, p. A 14, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006 /9/19/ar200609/901554.htm.
43. 'Abdul-Aziz Oudah, "New Election Day: September 10th, JMP Nominates Bin Shamlan," Yemen Observer, June 20, 2006, http:// www.yobserver.com/news_10322.php
44. and "Yemeni Opposition Parties Name Candidate for Presidential Poll," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, September 1, 2006.
45. "Arrests, Murder Cast Pall Over Yemeni Elections," The Daily Star, August 31, 2006, http://www.dailystar.com.1b/ article.asp?edition_id=10&categ_id=2&article_id=7513.
46. Nasser Arrabyee, "Five Killed and Several Injured in Armed Clashes," Gulf News, September 21, 2006, http:// www.gulfnews.com/region/yemen/10069674.html.
47. This was so much the case that the sudden unavailability of art and glossy paper in Sana'a was commented on, as was the predicted post-election paper-pollution problem. Mohammed Al-Asaadi, "Paper Shortage, Environmental Threat as Election Day Approaches," Yemen Observer, September 18,2006.
48. Mohammed al-Asaadi and Abdul-Aziz Oudah, "GPC Candidate Slams Opposition," Yemen Observer, September 4, 2006, http:// www.yobserver.com/news_10838.php;
49. and Nasser Arrabyee, "President Flays Opposition for Failing to Name Poll Candidate," Gulf News, July 6, 2006, http:// www.gulf-news.com/region/Yemen/10052078.html.
50. Events very close to election day allowed President Salih to play the security and stability cards. On September 10, ten days before the elections, four French tourists were kidnapped in Shabwa, only to be released days after the voting. Even more to the issue, security forces foiled two attacks by suicide bombers on oil facilities in Ma'rib and the Hadramawt on September 15, and then on the next day security forces in Sana'a arrested four members of an "al-Qa'ida cell" who were allegedly planning an attack in the capital.
51. The rallies were big, boisterous, and noisy - and occasionally dangerous. In one instance, in the second week in September, about 50 partisans of the President were trampled to death in a stampede in an overcrowded arena in Ibb.
52. By early September, the political parties were saying that international observers were the key to the holding of free and fair elections and that they, rather than being mere onlookers, should be real partners in democratic reforms. "The international observers should not [be like] spectators of a football match with free tickets." Quoted in Nasser Arrabyee, "Parties Seek International Monitors," Gulf News, September 7, 2006, http://www.gulfnews.com/region /Yemen/10065492.html.Sheila Carapico, a sometime monitor of Yemeni elections, once told one of the authors that international monitors were "election tourists."
53. The senior author was a monitor of these elections and, while he did not witness serious transgressions, he did get verbal reports of the same. See Saddam al-Ashmori, "Election Results Claimed Rigged in Amran," Yemen Times, September 25, 2006
54. and Nasser Arrabyee, "Media'Favored Saleh'," Gulf News, September 23, 2006, http://www.gulfnews.com/region/yemen/10069506.html.
55. Nadia al-Sakkaf, "Observer: These Elections Were a Milesone in Yemeni Political History," Yemen Times, September 25, 2006, p. 1;
56. "Yemen Polls 'Genuine' Despite Breaches: EU Observers," Reuters, September 21, 2006, p. 1, http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/world/ international-yemen-elections.html. Opposition elements and other critics dismissed this and other positive assessments, claiming that the monitors had been hoodwinked and had confined themselves to the cities and not the countryside where most of the dirty tricks occurred. A leader of the EU observers disputed this and said that they had gone to 174 rural voting centers and 147 urban ones. However, the National Democratic Institute team had been confined to urban venues, after the US embassy issued a security alert.
57. Yasser al-Mayasi, "Salih Wins Another Term," Yemen Times, September 25, 2006, http://yementimes.com/ article.shtml?i=984&p=front&a=1.
58. 'Abdul-Aziz Oudah, Yemen Observer, September 10, 2006. The results in 'Amran and Ta'iz provinces, where many observers assumed that the JMP would do very well, were most surprising, with the GPC scoring decisive victories. See Saddam al-Ashmori, "Election Results Claimed Rigged in Amran," Yemen Times, September 25, 2006, p. 1;
59. for Ta'iz, see Mohammed al-Asaadi, "GPC Trounces JMP in Local Councils," Yemen Observer, September 30, 2006, http:// www.yobserver.net/article-10999.php.
60. The response of the JMP to the preliminary results may have been shaped by a poll conducted over the first ten days of September that had Salih at 49% and Bin Shamlan at 30%. The poll was conducted by a Yemeni group funded by the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI). Adel al-Khawlani, "49% Salih, 30% Bin Shamlan, Survey Finds," Yemen Times, September 13, 2006, http://yementimes.com/article.shtml?i=981&p=local&a=l;
61. and Nasser Arrabyee, "Yemen Poll Predicts Victory for Saleh," Gulf News, September 18, 2006, http://www.gulfnews.com/region /Yemen/10068184.html.
62. "Yemeni Opposition Threatens Street Protests to Contest Elections," Daily Star, September 23, 2006, http: //www.dailystar.com.lb/ article.asp?edition_id=10&categ_id=2&article_id=7564.
63. The JMP was under pressures coming from different directions. While some elements were urging the JMP to refuse to accept the results, other elements were urging it to give up its initial rejectionist position. Rumors also had the GPC entering into talks with the JMP, perhaps to offer inducements for the JMP to back down from its position. The JMP denied that its acceptance of the results was made after a deal with the GPC that would give the JMP the votes in the yet uncounted or delayed ballot boxes. Nasser Arrabyee, "Intellectuals Flay Opposition Call for Protest," Gulf News, September 25, 2006, http://www.gulf news.com/region/Yemen/10069971.html.
64. 'Abdul-Aziz Oudah, "JMP Acceptance of Results Creates Controversy," Yemen Observer, September 30, 2006, http:// www.yobserver.net/article-10997.php.
65. "Yemen Opposition Accepts Salih's Re-election Win," Reuters, September 26. 2006, http://khaleejtime.com /DisplayArticleNew.asp?xfile=data/2006/ september.
66. Although he early on acknowledged the outcome of the elections, Bin Shamlan continued to refuse to congratulate Salih on his victory in October. Yasser al-Mayasi, "Bin Shamlan: I Won't Congratulate Salih," Yemen Times, October 10, 2006, http://yementimes.com/ article.shtml?i+989&p=front&a=1.
67. "Al-Ansi: JMP Puts National Interest First," Yemen Observer, October 3, 2006, http://www.yobserver.net /article_111022.php.
68. Muhammad Sabri, a JMP spokesman, was quoted as saying that the JMP had never been interested in winning the councils. "They mean nothing to us because they have no teeth and power and cannot help or change the rules of the game in Yemen .... The JMP invested its popularity to show its strength as a serious opposition against the powers of the ruling party and the current president and we succeeded in our mission." Overstating the point and probably defensive, Sabri may be largely correct. Durail al-Baik, "Opposition Must Reform Program," Gulf News, October 2, 2006, http://www.gulfnews.com/region/Yemen /10071654.html.
69. Dr. 'Abd al-Karim al-Iryani thought this likely, but preferred to call it the President's (and the GPC's) "horsetail effect," a rearing black horse being the symbol of the GPC. (Conversation with senior author in Sana'a after September 2006 elections.)
70. Islah, known for its grassroots organization, did do far better than the YSP on the governorate- and especially on the district-level. This may point to the other JMP parties' relative absence of organization on the local level - and their inability to reach, much less coordinate on, this level. Tariq al-Shami, head of the GPC's Media Department, seemed to think so: "[The] JMP ... managed to overcome all the ideological differences at the level of leadership, but they failed to coordinate at the level of members in local constituencies. This negatively influenced the performance of these parties in local council elections." See Khalil al-Khaubani, "JMP: Last Attempt or Bridge to a Better Future," Yemen Times, October 26, 2006, http:// yementimes.com/article.shtml?i=993&p=front&a=1.
71. According to the Yemen Times, one reason for the GPC's good showing could be the result of the bonus of one month's salary awarded to all government employees just before the elections. Another possible reason given by the paper was the fact that the election of opposition candidates in the 2001 local council elections had not yielded any local benefits. Further, there was the fact that the GPC's surprisingly modest showing in the 2001 local council elections may have caused it to focus greater effort on the local level than did the JMP. Finally, there was the fact that many Yemenis did not distinguish between the presidential and the local council elections - and just voted for the GPC "horse" as they were coached to do. "Local Council Result Analysis," Yemen Times, October 15, 2006, http:// yementimes.com/article.shtm/?i=99&p=view&a=1.
72. Nasser Arrabyee, "Decline in Female Candidates Causes Worry," Gulf News, September 28, 2006, http://www.gulfnews.com/region/ Yemenl0070981.html;
73. GPC Female Candidates Rock Opposition," Yemen Observer, September 22, 2006, http://www.yobserver.net /article-11012.php.
74. Whether and how women voted were tied by the EU Mission and others to the problem of female illiteracy in Yemen. See Thilo Maluch, "Illiteracy: A Major Obstacle to Democracy," Yemen Observer, October 3, 2006, http://www.yobserver.net /article-11012.php.
75. Nasser Arrabyee and Kawkab al-Thaibani, "Zero Women Nominated From Islah Party," Yemen Observer, August 23, 2006, http:// www.yobserver.net/article-10779.php.
76. See Sheila Carapico, Civil Society in Yemen: The Political Economy of Activism in Modern Arabia (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 107-34.
77. "Now that All Is Said and Done," Yemen Times, September 25, 2006;
78. Nabil Sultan, "Opposition Loses, But Gains in Yemen Elections," September 24, 2006, http://www.dawn.com/2006/09/24.
79. Conversations between senior author and political figures in Sana'a, September 23-27, 2006.
80. Quoted in Duraid al-Baik, "Opposition Must Reform Programme, Say Yemen Analysts," Gulf News, October 2, 2006, http:// www.gulfnews.com/region/Yemen/10071654.html.
81. Quoted in Khalil al-Khaubari, "JMP: Last Attempt or Bridge to a Better Future," Yemen Times, October 26, 2006, http:// yementimes.com/article.shtml?i=993&p=front&a-1.
82. Regarding refinement, the program adopted in December 2005 and the platform used in the presidential campaign called first and foremost for the replacement of the presidential system with a parliamentary one. Some would argue that this is a waste of precious time and energy - that it is largely irrelevant and probably impossible to achieve politically.
83. Muhammad al-Kipsi, "Opposition Parties Form Shadow Government," Yemen Observer, January 21, 2007, http://www.yobserver.com/ article-11542.php.
84. The big donors' conference held in mid-November 2006 in London surely contributed to this awareness. The successful conference yielded pledges of $4.7 billion over four years - and further indications that the donor community was determined to make delivery of that aid conditional on major reforms. It remains to be seen whether, with the conference behind it, the Salih regime will slip back into its old ways and renege on the promised reforms.
85. Mohammad al-Asaadi, "Saleh Vows to Fight Corruption, Maintain Political Stability," Yemen Observer, October 10, 2006, http://yobserver.net/article-11050.php.
86. Yasser al-Mayasi, "Yemeni Political Parties Agree to Strengthen Democracy," Yemen Times, December 12,2006, http:// yementimes.com/article.shtml?i=1007&p=front&a=3.
87. Gregory Johnsen, "Empty Economic Reforms Slow Yemen's Bid to Join the GCC," The Daily Star, February 19, 2007, http:// www.dailystar.lb/ article.asp?edition_1d=10&categ_id=5&article_id=7963;
88. Mohamed al-Azaki, "Economic Growth in Yemen Fails to Reduce Poverty," Middle East Online, March 13, 2007, http:// www.middle-east-online.com/english?id-19964.