The cluster account of art defended

British Journal of Aesthetics

Volumn 45, Issue 3, 2005, Pages 273-288

  Gaut, Berys ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ST ANDREWS   (United Kingdom)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 34249432769     PISSN: 00070904     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/aesthj/ayi032     Document Type: Article

References (24)

1. Berys Gaut,' "Art" as a Cluster Concept', in N. Carroll (ed.), Theories of Art Today (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2000), pp. 25-44. Henceforth I will refer to this paper as 'Cluster' in the main text
2. Thomas Adajian, 'On the Cluster Account of Art', British Journal of Aesthetics, vol. 43 (2003), pp. 379-385
3. Stephen Davies, 'The Cluster Theory of Art', British Journal of Aesthetics, vol. 44 (2004), pp. 297-300
4. and Robert Stecker, 'Is it Reasonable to Attempt to Define Art?' in Carroll (ed.), Tlieories of Art Today, pp. 45-64
5. Morris Weitz, 'The Role of Theory in Aesthetics', Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, vol. 15 (1956), pp. 27-35; reprinted in P. Lamarque and S. H. Olsen (eds), Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art: The Analytic Tradition (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), pp. 12-18. Page references in the rest of this paper are to the reprinted paper
6. ' "Art" as a Cluster Concept', pp. 26-28. I also hold that there is one necessary condition for something's being an artwork, namely its being the product of an action. This applies by virtue of the notion of a work, rather than of art. So, strictly, the view defended is a modified version of a cluster account
7. Adajian, 'On the Cluster Account of Art', p. 385
8. Davies, 'The Cluster Theory of Art', p. 298; arid Davies, Definitions of Art (Ithaca, NY: Cornell U.P., 1991), ch. 1
9. Robert Stecker is similarly sceptical about inductive arguments against definitions in 'Is It Reasonable to Attempt to Define Art?', p. 54
10. Weitz, 'The Role of Theory in Aesthetics', p. 16
11. See Davies, Definitions of Art, ch. 1, for a comprehensive rebuttal of Weitz's argument
12. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, third edn, trans. G. E, M, Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell, 1978), part I, proposition 66
13. Maurice Mandelbaum, 'Family Resemblances and Generalizations Concerning the Arts', American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 2 (1965), pp. 219-228; reprinted in Alex Neill and Aaron Ridley (eds), The Philosophy of Art: Readings Ancient and Modern (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1995), pp. 192-201
14. See '"Art" as a Cluster Concept', p. 28. Historical definitions can also allow for a variety of factors that are relevant to something's being art and thereby have some of the merits of cluster theories of art. But they allow for this variety of factors only indirectly and fall to objections about the projectability of our concept of art. On the latter, see Gregory Currie, 'Aliens, Too', Analysis, vol. 53 (1993), pp. 116-118
15. Denis Dutton, '"But They Don't Have Our Concept of Art"', in Carroll (ed.), Theories of Art Today, pp. 217-238. Dutton thinks that there are other potential candidates for his list. It is not clear whether he understands his account as a definition or as cluster account, hut this does not matter for the point under discussion
16. '"Art" as a Cluster Concept', p. 36-38
17. '"Art" as a Cluster Concept', pp. 40-41
18. Clive Bell, Art, ed. J. B. Bullen (Oxford: Oxford U.P., 1987), ch. 1
19. Stecker, 'Is it Reasonable to Attempt to Define Art?', quotations are from p. 47 and from n. 11, p. 62; and Davies, 'The Cluster Theory of Art', quotation is from p. 299
20. '"Art" as a Cluster Concept', p. 27
21. Stecker, 'Is it Reasonable to Attempt to Define Art?', p. 47, I say 'on the surface', since Stecker holds that there is a wide range of functions that art has had historically. Depending on how wide and variegated they are, his definition might start to approximate a highly disjunctive and variegated account
22. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, part I, propositions 66-69
23. Weitz's claim about the ubiquity of open concepts also raises a puzzle as to why he thought that he needed an argument from creativity to show the openness of the concept of art, since practices with open concepts are vastly more common than those that are creative
24. I would like to thank Peter Lamarque for his helpful comments on this paper