The effects of the European Union's democratic conditionality: The case of Romania during accession

Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics

Volumn 23, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 233-258

  Pridham, Geoffrey ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 34249319422     PISSN: 13523279     EISSN: 17439116     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/13523270701317505     Document Type: Article

References (72)

1. See, for example, F. Schimmelfennig and U. Sedelmeier (eds.), The Politics of European Union Enlargement: Theoretical Approaches (London: Routledge, 2005), esp. chaps. 1 and 6.
2. Compare L. Miles, 'Theoretical Considerations', in N. Nugent (ed.), European Union Enlargement (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), for similar thinking on theoretical approaches to EU enlargement.
3. Some recent work has begun to look at political conditionality effects: see, for example, G. Pridham, Designing Democracy: EU Enlargement and Regime Change in Post-Communist Europe (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).
4. M.A. Vachudova, Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage and Integration after Communism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). This work is strictly cross-national and comparative, leaving scope for in-depth case-study research.
5. This approach is developed in Pridham, Designing Democracy: See pp.28, 143-4 and 221-2.
6. See R. Keohane and J. Nye, Transnational Relations and World Politics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1973), Introduction.
7. R. Putnam, 'Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-level Games', International Organization, Vol.42, No.3 (1988), pp.427-60.
8. A. Dimitrova and G. Pridham, 'International Actors and Democracy Promotion in Central and Eastern Europe: The Integration Model', Democratization, Vol.11, No.5 (2004), p.97.
9. Pridham, Designing Democracy, pp.39-40.
10. Ibid., p.43.
11. Author interview with Jonathan Scheele, EU Ambassador to Romania, in Bucharest, November 2005, in which he also noted that the Delegation sought 'regular contact with administrations [in Bucharest] that work in a better way - a form of peer pressure [on weaker administrations]' and that 'it's not looking great' on the question of administrative capacity.
12. A.U. Gabanyi, Rumänien vor dem EU-Beitritt, Studie 31, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (Berlin), October 2005, p.9.
13. European Parliament, Report on Romania's Progress towards Accession 24 Feb. 2004, pp.5-7 and 16.
14. According to the EU Ambassador to Romania, the 'safeguard clause' was 'intended to preserve leverage' on the part of the EU: The thinking was that 'we need to find some instrument that will maintain pressure after the Treaty is signed' (author interview with Jonathan Scheele, Bucharest, Nov. 2005.
15. European Commission, press information service handout, 5 Jan. 2005: 'The conditions to apply the postponement clause - Romanian case'.
16. V. Tismaneanu, 'Romanian Exceptionalism? Democracy, Ethnocracy and Uncertain Pluralism in Post-Ceauşescu Romania', in K. Dawisha and B. Parrott (eds.), Politics, Power and the Struggle for Democracy in South-East Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p.403.
17. Compare Iliescu's retrospective view that privatization was 'not a means in itself but an optimal solution for society', as 'the new dogma' which one should 'regard more pragmatically' providing 'some good, some bad' examples (author interview with Ion Iliescu, Bucharest, Dec. 2005). Compare also a statement of 1990 illustrating his reluctance over the speed of privatization, quoted in Tom Gallagher, Theft of a Nation: Romania since Communism (London: Hurst, 2005), p.99.
18. Tismaneanu, 'Romanian Exceptionalism?', p.420.
19. Ibid., pp.407, 439.
20. See ibid., pp.409-14.
21. According to Emil Constantinescu, President of Romania 1996-2000, this oligarchic system - essentially based on the Securitate (Ceauşescu's former secret police) and the nomenklatura - even grew during his term of office. He also commented that the oligarchy became very interested in Romania's integration once negotiations began because of the prospect of using EU funds (author interview with Constantinescu, Bucharest, Nov. 2005).
22. E. Constantinescu, Time of Tearing Down, Time of Building (Bucharest: Universalia, 2005), pp.338-9.
23. A. Mungiu Pippidi, Transformation Reloaded?, SAR Policy Brief, Romanian Academic Society (Bucharest), Aug. 2005, p.2.
24. S. Pârvulescu and B. Vetrici-Soimu, Evaluating EU Democratic Rule of Law Promotion: Country Report - Romania (Bucharest: National Association of the Romanian Bars, June 2005), pp.34-6.
25. According to a former Romanian ambassador to Germany, Chancellor Kohl - a key figure in EU affairs - had 'an ugly remembrance of Ceauşescu' and this remained because of Iliescu, reinforcing the impression that 'old Communists were still in power' (author interview with Tudor Dunca (Bucharest, May 2001).
26. RFE/RL Newsline, 22 Nov. 2002, Part II.
27. According to Romania's Chief Negotiator with the EU 2000-2004, Romania's image problem 'didn't influence a lot' the negotiations, but it was 'a strong problem, not in Brussels only but in all EU capitals' and especially in Northern European ones (author interview with Vasile Puşcaş, Bucharest, Nov. 2005).
28. For example, the comment of Romania's ambassador to the EU that 'perceptions change slowly' and the answer to the problem was 'the capacity to show and convince that important transformations have been taking place' (author interview with Laxar Comanescu, Brussels, Oct. 2005).
29. Author interviews with Alin Teodorescu, adviser to Nǎstase on administrative reform and later PSD deputy, Bucharest, October 2003 and November 2005. This commitment was replicated in Nǎstase's strong wish for his party to be accepted into the Socialist International. According to Florin Lupescu, adviser to President Iliescu on EU and NATO affairs, Nǎstase 'needs acceptance [by the SI] like hell; they will at last belong to a European political family' (interview with Lupescu, Bucharest, May 2001).
30. T. Carothers, Assessing Democracy Assistance: The Case of Romania (Washington, DC: Carnegie, 1996), pp.90-91.
31. Interviews with Aurel Ciobanu-Dordea, EU delegation to Romania; with Florin Pogonaru, executive president, Central European Financial Services; and with Codru Vrabre, Transparency International, Bucharest, October 2003; see also S. Jora, 'Patterns of Democratization through Europeanization: The Case of Romania', in R. Di Quirico (ed.), Europeanization and Democratization: Institutional Adaptation, Conditionality and Democratization in European Union's Neighbour Countries (Florence: European Press Academic Publishing, 2005), p.118.
32. Compare the comment of a survey of EU affairs professionals on Romania that 'people's expectations that "the outside" will change or solve the problems inside the country is seen as a clear burden': Club RO-UE, Footprint Romania: Based on a Survey of European Affairs Circles 2006 (Brussels, June 2006), p.14.
33. These four imperatives are discussed generally with respect to the enlargement of 2004 in Pridham, Designing Democracy, Chap. 3, Section 4.
34. D. Phinnemore, 'Romania and Euro-Atlantic Integration since 1989: A Decade of Frustration?', in D. Light and D. Phinnemore (eds.), Post-Communist Romania: Coming to Terms with Transition (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), p.256.
35. According to Daniel Dǎianu, minister of finance 1997-98, the main external question when he was in office was NATO rather than EU accession because of the recent background of the Balkan wars (interview with Dǎianu, Bucharest, Nov. 2005).
36. Author interview with Emil Constantinescu, former President of Romania, Bucharest, Nov. 2005.
37. Constantinescu, Time of Tearing Down, pp.202-3
38. Author interview with Emil Constantinescu, Bucharest, Nov. 2005.
39. According to Daniel Dǎianu, economist and finance minister 1997-98, an EU invitation to negotiate in 1997 would have done damage to the Romanian economy because any move towards membership at this time would have been premature (interview with Dǎianu, Bucharest, Nov. 2005).
40. Author interviews with Alin Teodorescu, former adviser to prime minister on administrative reform, Bucharest, Oct. 2003 and Nov. 2005.
41. Author interview with Nicolae Idu, Director, European Institute, Bucharest, Nov. 2005.
42. Author interviews with Anca Ilinoiu, foreign policy adviser to President Bǎsescu, and Bogdan Chiriţoiu, social affairs adviser to President Bǎsescu, Bucharest, Nov. 2005.
43. Author interview with Viktor Sata, international secretary of the UDMR and European adviser to Deputy Prime Minister Béla Markó (leader of the UDMR), Bucharest, Dec. 2005.
44. The UDMR was continuously involved in government from 1996 (in effect, during the accession process), first as a coalition partner of the centre-right in 1996-2000, then in support of the PSD government (but outside the cabinet) in 2000-2004 and again in a coalition with the centre-right from 2004. These government alliances were formed in part to please the EU (and USA), although the EU Delegation took no direct part here (author interviews in Bucharest with Anton Niculescu, state secretary in the governments from 1996 and 2004 (May 2001, Oct. 2003 and Nov. 2005); with Aurel Ciobanu-Dordea of the EU Delegation (Oct. 2003) and with Jonathan Scheele, EU ambassador to Romania (Nov, 2005)).
45. Author interview with Vasile Puşcaş, professor of international relations, University of Cluj-Napoca and Romania's chief negotiator with the EU 2001-4.
46. Pǎrvulescu and Vetrici-Soimu, Evaluating EU Democratic Rule of Law Promotion, p.38.
47. Author interview with Ion Iliescu, President of Romania 1990-96 and 2000-2004, Bucharest, Dec. 2005.
48. Interview with Sorin Moisǎ, political adviser at the EU delegation, Bucharest, November 2005, who considered that the young reformist group around former Foreign Minister Mircea Geoanǎ in the PSD 'has internalized European values'; according to him, the EU delegation took the pragmatic view towards Romanian authorities: 'push them so far as you can, and look to the future'.
49. Interview with Aurel Ciobanu-Dordea, pre-accession adviser at the EU delegation and former Romanian chief negotiator with the EU 1999-2000, Bucharest, Oct. 2003. It should be pointed out that he was close to the centre-right Liberal party PNL and therefore likely to be fairly critical of the PSD government of 2000-2004.
50. Compare the comment of President Bǎsescu's foreign political adviser that on the corruption issue his 'motivation here is intrinsic, but the EU factor strengthens it' (interview with Anca Ilinoiu, Bucharest, Nov. 2005).
51. Interviews with Nicola Bulte, EU delegation, Bucharest, May 2001, and with Jonathan Scheele, EU ambassador to Romania, Bucharest, Nov. 2005. This criticism was also heard in other EU circles, including member state embassies in the Romanian capital.
52. European Commission, Agenda 2000: Commission Opinion on Romania's Application for Membership of the European Union (Brussels, 1997), p.73.
53. This was the basic conclusion to the Commission's regular report on Romania published in October 2005: European Commission, Romania: 2005 Comprehensive Monitoring Report (Brussels, 2005), pp.10, 21.
54. Interviews with Leonard Orban, deputy chief negotiator with the EU, and Radu Dobre, department for EU affairs, ministry of foreign affairs, Bucharest, Oct. 2003.
55. Pridham, Designing Democracy, pp.120-21; some saw these 'islands of excellence' within an 'archipelago of incompetence'.
56. Interviews with Mircea Kivu, director of the Institute of Marketing and Polls (IMAS), Bucharest, October 2003 and November 2005; Romanian and European Values and Beliefs: Are They Different or Not?: A Quantitative Survey, IRSOP Market Research and Consulting, Bucharest, June 2005, pp.12, 40 and 43.
57. One of these was the ministry of justice, in the forefront of conditionality affairs, not least thanks to a committed minister (and former NGO leader) appointed in late 2004; this ministry now had an information office and a spokesperson's office which organized relations with the media (interview with Ion Codescu, state secretary for European integration, ministry of justice, Bucharest, Nov. 2005).
58. Interview with Bogdan Vetrici-Soimu, National Association of the Romanian Bars, Bucharest, Nov. 2005.
59. Interview with Simona Teodoriou, state secretary for EU affairs, ministry of justice, Bucharest, Oct. 2003; according to her, there was an internal need for judicial reform but the rhythm for this came from the EU.
60. Notable here was the leaking to the press in November 2004 of transcripts of PSD standing committee meetings in 2003 where various leaders blatantly discussed ways of manipulating the judiciary and bribing journalists over this matter.
61. Pârvulescu and Vetrici-Soimu, Evaluating EU Democratic Rule of Law Promotion, p.11. According to Vetrici-Soimu, 'everybody is afraid of it; before this clause was introduced the pressure was not felt' (interview, Bucharest, Nov. 2005).
62. Author interview with Ion Codescu, state secretary for European integration, ministry of justice, Bucharest, Nov. 2005.
63. European Commission, 2000 Regular Report from the Commission on Romania's Progress towards Accession (Brussels, 2000), p.18.
64. According to the deputy director of the NGO'Pro-Democracy Association', the PSDgovernment adopted their proposals but 'they didn't have the culture [for consultation]; they considered themselves very powerful and didn't care' (interview with Costel Popa, Bucharest, Nov. 2005).
65. Jora, 'Patterns of Democratization', p.125.
66. Interview with Victor Alistar, director of Transparency International Romania, Bucharest, Nov. 2005.
67. European Commission, 2004 Regular Report on Romania's Progress towards Accession (Brussels, 2004), pp.21-2.
68. Interview with Onno Simons, counsellor, EU delegation to Romania, Bucharest, Nov. 2005. There are informal indications from different EU sources that Brussels hopes that the limited change forced through during accession will have longer-term effects; as one respondent commented, 'if we can instil enough change within the system, even if that is a time bomb, that might explode after EU entry'.
69. Interview with Rupert Vining, senior adviser to the Romanian presidency on anti-corruption, Bucharest, Nov. 2005.
70. Interview with Vasile Puşcaş, Romania's chief negotiator with the EU, Bucharest, Oct. 2003.
71. Interview with Aurel Ciobanu-Dordea, pre-accession adviser to EU delegation, Bucharest, May 2001.
72. Interview with Sorin Ioniţa., director, Romanian Academic Society (SAR), Bucharest, Nov. 2005.