'Social Poland' defeats 'liberal Poland'? The September-October 2005 Polish parliamentary and elections

Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics

Volumn 23, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 203-232

  Szczerbiak, Aleks ^a  

^a NONE

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 34249277444     PISSN: 13523279     EISSN: 17439116     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/13523270701317463     Document Type: Article

References (145)

1. The Law and Justice party was formed in April 2001 by Jarosław Kaczyński to capitalize on the popularity of his twin brother Lech, the politically independent justice minister in the previous government, led by Solidarity Electoral Action (Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność: AWS). Jarosław Kaczyński played a key role in securing Lech Wałȩsa's victory in the 1990 presidential election but then broke with the legendary Solidarity leader, and his Centre Agreement (Porozumienie Centrum: PC) party played a relatively minor role in Polish politics during the 1990s.
2. The Democratic Left Alliance was formed originally at the beginning of the 1990s as an electoral coalition comprising various parties and groupings clustered around Social Democracy of the Polish Republic (Socjaldemokracja Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej: SdRP), the direct organizational successor to the Polish communist party. It won the September 1993 parliamentary election and was the main government party during 1993-97 but, despite increasing its share of the vote, lost the September 1997 election to Solidarity Electoral Action; in June 1999 it was transformed into a single, unitary party.
3. See, for example, Anna Grzymała-Busse, Redeeming the Communist Past: The Regeneration of Communist Successor Parties in East Central Europe after 1989 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
4. The Labour Union was a small social democratic party set up in 1992 as a left-wing alternative to the Democratic Left Alliance, and included both former communists and leading members of Solidarity amongst its founders; the party was represented in the 1993-97 parliament but failed to cross the 5 per cent threshold in 1997.
5. See Aleks Szczerbiak, 'Poland's Unexpected Political Earthquake: The September 2001 Parliamentary Election', Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol.18, No.3 (2002), pp.41-76.
6. Frances Millard, 'Elections in Poland 2001: Electoral Manipulation and Party Upheaval', Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Vol.36, No.1 (2003), pp.69-86.
7. The Polish Peasant Party was formed in 1990 as the organizational successor to the former communist satellite United Peasant Party (Zjednoczone Stronnictwo Ludowe: ZSL). It was the junior government coalition partner during 1993-97 after it emerged as the second largest party at the 1993 election and its leader Walemar Pawlak was prime minister from October 1993 to February 1995; its vote slumped in 1997.
8. See, for example, 'Czarnowidza', Rzeczpospolita, 19 Aug. 2004.
9. See Janina Paradowska, 'Aparat na czȩaseci', Polityka, 14 Dec. 2002.
10. Piotr Zaremba, 'Zwyciȩski bakcyl chaosu', Rzeczpospolita, 14 Jan. 2003
11. Janina Paradowska, 'Miller we młynie', Polityka, 18 Jan. 2003.
12. Civic Platform was formed in January 2001 to capitalize on former finance and foreign minister Andrzej Olechowski's relative success as an independent liberal-conservative candidate in the 2000 presidential election. A triumvirate that included Olechowski, Solidarity Electoral Action Sejm speaker Maciej Płȧ zyński and Donald Tusk, a leading member of the liberal Freedom Union (Unia Wolnoí: UW) party (see note 25), originally led the party.
13. See Janina Paradowska, 'Przeciwko samym sobie', Polityka, 5 Oct. 2002.
14. A TNS-OBOP poll published in April 2004 found that when asked who (apart from Rywin himself) was most damaged by the affair, 27 per cent answered the government, 26 per cent the Democratic Left Alliance and 21 per cent premier Miller.
15. see Wiesła Władyka, 'Zyskał Rokita', Polityka, 3 April 2004.
16. For example, a September 2003 poll found that most respondents considered that Democratic Left Alliance politicians were concerned primarily with their personal or party interests (79 per cent) and susceptible to corruption (75 per cent), failed to observe the law (66 per cent), and were dishonest (63 per cent) and easily embroiled easily in 'dubious networks' (62 per cent).
17. See Eliza Olczyk, 'Socjaldemokracja tytularna', Rzeczpospolita, 2 Oct. 2003.
18. An April 2004 CBOS poll found that, when asked what had most damaged the Miller government, 66 per cent of respondents identified corruption and criminal scandals, 49 per cent continuing high levels of unemployment, 28 per cent the party's failure to implement its election promises, 22 per cent its arrogant style of government, 22 per cent the failure of ordinary citizens to feel the benefits of economic success, 20 per cent the 'Rywin affair' specifically, 19 per cent internal party conflicts and divisions, and 14 per cent public expenditure cuts and the Hausner plan.
19. See 'Korupcja, afery, bezrobocie', Rzeczpospolita, 10-12 April 2004.
20. Janina Paradowska, 'Takich dwóch jak ich trzech', Polityka, 6 Dec. 2003. As noted above, the Law and Justice party was established originally to capitalize on Lech Kaczynski's popularity as justice minister in the previous government.
21. The League of Polish Families was formed in the run-up to the September 2001 parliamentary election as a coalition of various right-wing and clerical-nationalist parties; however, it was registered and contested the election as just one party (in order to be eligible for the lower 5 per cent threshold for parliamentary representation, 8 per cent for electoral coalitions) and was reorganized subsequently as a single, unitary party.
22. See Filip Gawryś and PiotrŚmiłowicz, 'Platforma Konserwatywna', Rzeczpospolita, 18 Dec. 2003.
23. Witold Gadomski, 'Platforma do zwyciestwa', 27 Aug. 2004, at , accessed 2 Sept. 2004.
24. Janina Paradowska, 'PR dawniej PO',Polityka, 29 Jan. 2005.
25. See Aleks Szczerbiak, 'The European Parliament Election in Poland, June 13 2004', European Parties Elections and Referendums Network 2004 European Parliament Election Briefing, No.1 (June 2004), at , accessed 10 Jan. 2006.
26. See Janina Paradowska, 'Dwaj bracia i Ludek', Polityka, 14 Aug. 2004.
27. See Małgorzata Subotić and Piotr Śmiłowicz, 'Liga - naprzód marsz', Rzeczpospolita, 20 Oct. 2004.
28. Self-Defence was set up in the early 1990s as both a political party and farmers' union by Lepper, one of the most controversial figures in Polish politics, who first came to prominence as leader of radical farmers' protests against debt foreclosures. Lepper returned to front-line politics during farmers' blockades at the beginning of 1999 and surprised observers when Self-Defence emerged as the third largest party in the September 2001 election.
29. See Szczerbiak, 'The European Parliament Election in Poland, June 13 2004'.
30. For a good analysis of the nature of Self-Defence's support see Radosław Markowski, 'Jak gasna populizmy', 19 Nov. 2004 at , accessed 23 Nov. 2004.
31. See, for example, Krystyna Naszkowska, 'Jak z chłopa zrobić chadeka', Gazeta Wyborcza, 15 March 2004.
32. See, for example, 'Nic nie słyszeli w Sojuszu', Gazeta Wyborcza, 27-28 March 2004.
33. See Janina Paradowska, 'Trzy w jednym',Polityka, 14 May 2005.
34. The Freedom Union was formed in April 1995 through a merger of two 'post-Solidarity' liberal-centrist parties, the Democratic Union (Unia Demokratyczna: UD) and the Liberal Democratic Congress (Kongres Liberalno-Demokratyczny: KLD), which between them supplied three of Poland's first four post-1989 premiers: Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Jan Krzysztof Bielecki and Hanna Suchocka; the party was Solidarity Electoral Action's junior government coalition partner in 1997-2000 but failed to secure re-election to parliament in 2001.
35. See, for example, Radosław Markowski, 'Centrum: Jest czy go nie ma?', Polityka, 26 Feb. 2005.
36. Although the president nominates the prime minister on the first and third attempts to form a government, the candidacy must be approved by parliament and, in reality, is nominated by the largest party - or whichever can command a majority - in the Sejm. The president can dissolve parliament if the Sejm fails to approve a new government after three attempts or the annual budget within four months of its first reading. The president can also veto legislation, which requires a three-fifths majority in the Sejm to be overturned, or refer bills to the Constitutional Tribunal. In addition, the president has the right to initiate legislation and nominate a number of key state officials.
37. Maciej Giertych was chosen specifically because he had the same name as, but would not overshadow, his more charismatic son Roman who was too young to stand for the presidency in 2005.
38. See Wojciech Załuska, 'Trzy fronty PiS', 18 July 2005, at , accessed 19 July 2005.
39. See Małgorzata Subotić, 'Jak sobie strzelić samobójczego gola', Rzeczpospolita, 8 Sept. 2005.
40. See Jarosław Kurski, 'Trzy recepty PiS na zwyciestwo', 21 April 2005 at , accessed 22 April 2005.
41. See 'Znany kardiochirurg z nieznanym potencjałem', Rzeczpospolita 2 Feb. 2005.
42. For a good analysis see Ireneusz Krzeminłski, 'Oportunizm nagrodzony', Rzeczpospolita, 1 July 2005.
43. Compare Tadeusz Szawiel, 'Cimoszewicz w pierwszej turze?' Rzeczpospolita, 20 July 2005.
44. See Janina Paradowska, 'Marszałek rusza w pole', Polityka, 9 July 2005.
45. See Janusz Rolicki, 'Jak SLD uciekł z szafotu', Rzeczpospolita, 22 July 2005.
46. See Wojciech Załuska, 'Powbyorcza przysłość lewicy. Skad dobry wynik SLD', 27 Sept. 2005 at , accessed 27 Sept. 2005.
47. For good analyses, see Piotr Śmiłowicz, 'Wykorzystał wakacyjna przerwe', Rzeczpospolita, 9 Aug. 2005.
48. Paweł Wronski, 'Siła spokoju kampanii Tuska', 7 Sept. 2005 at , accessed 7 Sept. 2005.
49. See Janina Paradowska, 'Sprawa Jaruckiej', Polityka, 3 Sept. 2005.
50. A further 8 per cent said that Cimoszewicz made a mistake when completing his declaration, 6 per cent that it stemmed from Jarucka's desire for revenge, 4 per cent that it was a security service plot and 27 per cent did not know.
51. See Mariusz Janicki, 'Tusk ucieka peletonowi', Polityka, 3 Sept. 2005.
52. For interesting, and contrasting, analyses see Adam Leszcyńsski, 'Jak zabili Cimoszewicza', 27 Sept. 2005 at , accessed 27 Sept. 2005.
53. Dominika Wielowiejska, 'Zawiniłsam Cimoszewicz', 27 Sept.2005 at , accessed 28 Sept. 2005.
54. See, for example, Paweł Wronłski, 'Czy PO wytrzyma ataki innych partii', 21 Sept. 2005, at , accessed 21 Sept. 2005.
55. Jarosław Kurski, 'Dlaczego wygrało PiS?', 25 Sept. 2005, at , accessed 26 Sept.2005.
56. For a good analysis of how the 'solidaristic versus liberal' dichotomy fitted into Law and Justice's broader political discourse, see Mariusz Janicki, 'Śswiat ze słów', Polityka, 12 Nov. 2005.
57. Interestingly, however, an October 2005 GfK Polonia poll found that, within the context of general public opposition to further economic liberalization, 41 per cent of Poles actually supported Civic Platform's flat tax policy (15 per cent strongly) compared with only 32 per cent who opposed it (12 per cent strongly).
58. See Marcin Czekanski, 'Chcemy silnego panłstwa', Rzeczpospolita, 11 Oct. 2005.
59. Solidarity leader Janusz Śniadek admitted subsequently that the union's enthusiastic support for Lech Kaczyński was really a proxy to signal its more general support for the Law and Justice party; Solidarity held back from supporting the party more explicitly simply in order to avoid antagonizing union members who had bad memories of its most recent foray into party politics through its sponsorship of Solidarity Electoral Action.
60. See Krzysztof Katka, 'Jak rozmawiac, to tylko z Lechem', 26 Jan. 2006, at , accessed 26 Jan. 2006.the largest party - or whichever can command a majority - in the Sejm. The president can dissolve parliament if the Sejm fails to approve a new government after three attempts or the annual budget within four months of its first reading. The president can also veto legislation, which requires a three-fifths majority in the Sejm to be overturned, or refer bills to the Constitutional Tribunal. In addition, the president has the right to initiate legislation and nominate a number of key state officials.
61. Maciej Giertych was chosen specifically because he had the same name as, but would not overshadow, his more charismatic son Roman who was too young to stand for the presidency in 2005.
62. See Wojciech Załuska, 'Trzy fronty PiS', 18 July 2005, at , accessed 19 July 2005.
63. See Małgorzata Subotić, 'Jak sobie strzelić samobójczego gola', Rzeczpospolita, 8 Sept. 2005.
64. See Jarosław Kurski, 'Trzy recepty PiS na zwyciestwo', 21 April 2005 at , accessed 22 April 2005.
65. See 'Znany kardiochirurg z nieznanym potencjałem', Rzeczpospolita, 2 Feb. 2005.
66. For a good analysis see Ireneusz Krzemiński, 'Oportunizm nagrodzony', Rzeczpospolita, 1 July 2005.
67. Compare Tadeusz Szawiel, 'Cimoszewicz w pierwszej turze?' Rzeczpospolita, 20 July 2005.
68. See Janina Paradowska, 'Marszałek rusza w pole', Polityka, 9 July 2005.
69. See Janusz Rolicki, 'Jak SLD uciekł z szafotu', Rzeczpospolita, 22 July 2005.
70. See Wojciech Zauska, 'Powbyorcza przysłość lewicy. Skad dobry wynik SLD', 27 Sept. 2005 at , accessed 27 Sept. 2005.
71. For good analyses, see Piotr Śmiłowicz, 'Wykorzysta wakacyjna przerwe', Rzeczpospolita, 9 Aug. 2005.
72. Paweł Wroński, 'Siła spokoju kampanii Tuska', 7 Sept. 2005 at , accessed 7 Sept. 2005.
73. See Janina Paradowska, 'Sprawa Jaruckiej', Polityka, 3 Sept. 2005.
74. A further 8 per cent said that Cimoszewicz made a mistake when completing his declaration, 6 per cent that it stemmed from Jarucka's desire for revenge, 4 per cent that it was a security service plot and 27 per cent did not know.
75. See Mariusz Janicki, 'Tusk ucieka peletonowi', Polityka, 3 Sept. 2005.
76. For interesting, and contrasting, analyses see Adam Leszcyński, 'Jak zabili Cimoszewicza', 27 Sept. 2005 at , accessed 27 Sept. 2005.
77. Dominika Wielowiejska, 'Zawinił sam Cimoszewicz', 27 Sept. 2005 at , accessed 28 Sept. 2005.
78. See, for example, Paweł Wroński, 'Czy PO wytrzyma ataki innych partii', 21 Sept. 2005, at , accessed 21 Sept. 2005.
79. Jarosław Kurski, 'Dlaczego wygrało PiS?', 25 Sept. 2005, at , accessed 26 Sept. 2005.
80. For a good analysis of how the 'solidaristic versus liberal' dichotomy fitted into Law and Justice's broader political discourse, see Mariusz Janicki, 'Słwiat ze słów', Polityka, 12 Nov. 2005.
81. Interestingly, however, an October 2005 GfK Polonia poll found that, within the context of general public opposition to further economic liberalization, 41 per cent of Poles actually supported Civic Platform's flat tax policy (15 per cent strongly) compared with only 32 per cent who opposed it (12 per cent strongly): See Marcin Czekański, 'Chcemy silnego państwa', Rzeczpospolita, 11 Oct. 2005.
82. Solidarity leader Janusz Śniadek admitted subsequently that the union's enthusiastic support for Lech Kaczyński was really a proxy to signal its more general support for the Law and Justice party; Solidarity held back from supporting the party more explicitly simply in order to avoid antagonizing union members who had bad memories of its most recent foray into party politics through its sponsorship of Solidarity Electoral Action: See Krzysztof Katka, 'Jak rozmawiac, to tylko z Lechem', 26 Jan. 2006, at , accessed 26 Jan. 2006.
83. Indeed, Belka's decision to join the Democrats ended up being a general disaster - disorientating the party's 'core' ex-Solidarity voters while draining support for his premiership by tarnishing his image as a non-party technocrat: See Janina Paradowska, 'Dziwny premier', Polityka, 2 July 2005.
84. See Janina Paradowska, 'Juz tylko POPiS', Polityka, 10 Sept. 2005.
85. See Reykowski, 'Trzy razy 60 proc'.
86. See Małgorzata Subotić, 'Jak przekuć porazke w sukces', Rzeczpospolita, 27 Sept. 2005.
87. See Mariusz Janicki, 'Kto lepszy', Polityka, 8 Oct. 2005. In a subsequent, post-election interview, Jarosław Kaczyński admitted that that party's own polling indicated that his brother would secure no more than 34 per cent support if he had accepted the premiership: See 'Kaczynski: Czekam na telefon od Tuska', 29 Oct. 2005, at , accessed 1 Nov. 2005.
88. See, for example, Piotr Adamowicz and Grazyna Rakowicz, 'Weekend Kaczyńskiego', Rzeczpospolita, 3 Oct. 2005.
89. See Witold Gadomski, 'Krajobraz po pierwszej bitwie', 10 Oct. 2005, at , accessed 11 Oct. 2005.
90. See, for example, 'Strategia rozwoju Warszawy czy chwyt wyborczy PiS', Rzeczpospolita, 5 Oct. 2005.
91. See 'POPiSowa wymiana ciosów miedzy koalicjantami', 5 Oct. 2005, at , accessed 5 Oct. 2005.
92. See 'Kurski: Nie jestem taki zły, jak mnie maluja', 14 Oct. 2005, at , accessed 17 Oct. 2005.
93. See Piotr Śmiłowicz, 'Na razie 1:0 dla Tusk's,Rzeczpospolita, 14 Oct. 2005.
94. For a good analysis of how Kaczyński captured the initiative during the last few days of the campaign see Janina Paradowska, 'Pod znakiem bliźniat', Polityka, 29 Oct. 2005.
95. For example, a September 2005 GfK Polonia poll found that, while voters thought that Tusk had more 'presidential qualities', they also felt that they had a much clearer idea of what Kaczyński actually stood for: see Andrzej Stankiewicz, 'Prezydent naszych marzeń', Rzeczpospolita, 5 Oct. 2005.
96. See Jarosław Kurski, 'Wszytkie błedy Tuska - analiza', 2 Oct. 2005, at , accessed 3 Oct. 2005.
97. Małgorzata Subotić, 'Skuteczne i nieskuteczne rad sposoby', Rzeczpospolita, 6 Oct. 2005.
98. See Piotr Pacewicz, 'Jak ulegaliśmy negatywnej kampanii', 21 Oct. 2005, at , accessed 21 Oct. 2005.
99. See, for example, Jacek Hołub, 'O. Rydzyk w Radiu Maryja o Tusku', 23 Oct. 2005, at , accessed 25 Oct. 2005.
100. Krzemiński argues that Law and Justice's 'solidaristic versus liberal' dichotomy also had a national-cultural sub-text in which a 'solidaristic, social Poland' was meant to contrast with a 'Poland for the (Catholic) Poles' with a 'ruthless (cosmopolitan) capitalism':
101. See Ireneusz Krzemiński, 'Kampania wyborcza, rzad i Polska', Rzeczpospolita, 7 Nov. 2005.
102. See Renata Grochal and Agata Kodzińska, 'Zwyciestwo wydawało nam sie prawie pewne', 25 Oct. 2005, at , accessed 27 Oct. 2005.
103. See 'Kwaśniewski "miekko za Tuskem"', 20 Oct. 2005, at , accessed 21 Oct. 2005.
104. Jerzy Sadecki and Aleksandra Majda, 'Wsparcie na finiszu', Rzeczpospolita, 21 Oct. 2005.
105. See Pacewicz, 'Jak ulegaliśmy negatywnej kampanii'. Jacek Protasiewicz, Tusk's campaign manager, estimated that the 8 per cent of first-round Tusk voters who switched to Kaczyński in the second round did so largely as a result of this issue.
106. See Grochal and Kodźinska, 'Zwyciestwo wydawało nam sie prawie pewne'.
107. See Dominik Uhlig, 'Kaczyński: Balcerowicz musi odejsc', 19 Oct. 2005, at , accessed 19 Oct. 2005.
108. See 'Razem przeciw liberaóm', Rzeczpospolita, 19 Oct. 2005. Lepper argued that this was to defeat the 'greater evil' of a liberal presidency under Tusk; however, at the time Lepper made his declaration of support, Law and Justice was helping him to secure the influential post of Sejm deputy speaker, from which he been sacked in disgrace in November 2001 after making a serious of false allegations of corruption against other parliamentarians.
109. See 'Lepper chce być marszałkiem', Rzeczpospolita, 13 Oct. 2005.
110. See 'Kogo poparł elektorat przegranych', Rzeczpospolita, 24 Oct. 2005.
111. See Marek Borowski, 'Borowski: Jednak Tusk', 20 Oct. 2005, at , accessed 21 Oct. 2005.
112. 'SLD nie poperia zadnego kandydata', 18 Oct. 2005, at , accessed 19 Oct. 2005.
113. See Krzysztof Pankowski. 'Lewicowość-prawicowość: Deklaracje polityczne Polaków 1990-1997', in Lena Kolarska-Bobińska and Radołsaw Markowski (eds.), Prognozy i wybory. Polska Demokracja '95 (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Sejmowe, 1997), pp.69-108.
114. Tadeusz Szawiel. 'Zróźnicowanie lewicowo-prawicowe i jego korelaty', in Radosław Markowski (ed.), Wybory Parlamentarne 1997: System partyjny, postawy polityczne, zachowanie wyborcze (Warsaw: ISP PAN, 1999), pp.111-48.
115. Tadeusz Szawiel. 'Podział lewicaprawicaw polityce oraz w szerszym kontekście kulturowym', in Mirosława Grabowska and Tadeusz Szawiel (eds.), Budowanie demokracji: Podziały społeczne, partie polityczne i społeczeństwo obywatelskie w postkomunistycznej Polsce (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, 2001), pp.216-66.
116. Tadeusz Szawiel, 'Podział na lewice i prawice w Polsce po 1989 roku - jego sens i trwałość', in Radosław Markowski (ed.), System Partyjny i Zachowanie Wyborcze: Dekada Polskich Doświadczen' (Warsaw: ISP PAN, 2002), pp.178-216.
117. See Mirosława Grabowska, Podział postkomunistyczny: Społeczne podstawy polityki w Polsce po 1989 roku (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, 2004).
118. See Krzysztof Jasiewicz', 'Portfel czy róźanieć? Wzory zachowań wyborczych polaków w latach 1995-2001, in Radosław Markowski (ed.), System Partyjny i Zachowanie Wyborcze:DEkada Polskich Doświadczeń' (Warsaw: ISP PAN, 2002), pp.75-100.
119. Mirosława Grabowska, 'Religijność i kośció ł a polityka w III Rzeczpospolitej', in Radosław Markowski (ed.), System Partyjny i Zachowanie Wyborcze: Dekada Polskich Doświadczeń (Warsaw: ISP PAN, 2002), pp.100-146.
120. See Tadeusz Szawiel, 'Cimoszewicz w pierwszej turze?', Rzeczpospolita 20 July 2005.
121. See Herbert Kitschelt, 'The Formation of Party Systems in East Central Europe', Politics and Society, Vol.20, No.1 (1992), pp.7-50
122. Geoffrey Evans and Stephen Whitefield, 'Identifying the Bases of Competition in Eastern Europe', British Journal of Political Science, Vol.23, No.4 (1993), pp.521-48.
123. See, for example, Lena Kolarska-Bobińska, 'Co innego bedzie dzielić Polaków', Rzeczpospolita, 26 Nov. 1998.
124. Klaus Bachman, 'Historyczny kompromis inaczej', Rzeczpospolita, 9 June 2000.
125. See Aleks Szczerbiak, 'Old and New Divisions in Polish Politics: Polish Parties' Electoral Strategies and Bases of Support', Europe-Asia Studies, Vol.55, No.5 (2003), pp.729-46.
126. See Radosław Markowski, 'Dynamika wspołzawodnictwa w Polskim systemie partyjnym 1997-2001', in Radosław Markowski (ed.), System Partyjny i Zachowanie Wyborcze: Dekada Polskich Doświadczeń (Warsaw: ISP PAN, 2002), pp. 147-75.
127. Jasiewicz, 'Portfel czy r óźanieć?'.
128. See CBOS, Potencjalne elektoraty o istotnych kwestiach społeczno-politycznych (Warsaw: CBOS, August 2005: April-May 2005 data).
129. See Szczerbiak, 'Old and New Divisions in Polish Politics'.
130. See Janusz Majcherek, 'Realne podziały, realne problemy', Rzeczpospolita, 25 Nov. 2005.
131. Compare Mirosław Czech, 'Dlaczego Polacy nie głosuja', 18 Oct. 2005, at , accessed 19 Oct. 2005.
132. Assuming both parliament and president serve full terms, this will next occur in 2025.
133. See Maciej Kochanowski, 'Co sie stało z wyborcami SLD z 2001 roku?, Rozsypka elektoratu SLD', 18 Oct. 2005, at , accessed 21 March 2006.
134. See Czech, 'Dlaczego Polacy nie głosuja'.
135. See Mirosława Grabowska, 'Polska dzieli sie na nowo', 17 Feb. 2006, at , accessed 19 Feb. 2006.
136. See, for example, Dominik Uhlig, 'Samoobrona sciaga ludzi z SLD', 12 July 2005 at , accessed 12 July 2005.
137. See Kochanowski, 'Co sie stało z wyborcami SLD z 2001 roku?'.
138. See Teresa Bogucka, 'Peknieta Polska', 28 Jan. 2005, at , accessed 31 Jan. 2005.
139. See Paradowska, 'Juz tylko POPiS'.
140. See Janina Paradowska, 'Ostatnia prosta', Polityka, 24 Sept. 2005. A September 2005 CBOS survey carried out just two weeks before the parliamentary election found that 71 per cent of respondents said that they faced a difficult choice in deciding whom to vote for, compared with 52 per cent and 58 per cent at the same point in the 1997 and 2001 campaigns; this also suggests that the 'post-communist' divide was still a very important point of orientation for many voters.
141. See CBOS, Trudny wybór Polaków (Warsaw: CBOS, Sept. 2005: Sept. 2005 data).
142. See, for example, Adamowicz and Rakowicz, 'Weekend Kaczynskiego'.
143. See Grabowska, 'Polska dzieli sie na nowo'.
144. See Radosław Markowski and Mariusz Cześnik, 'Polski system partyjny: Dekada zmian', in Radosław Markowski (ed.), System Partyjny i Zachowanie Wyborcze: Dekada Polskich Doś-wiadczeń (Warsaw: ISP PAN, 2002), pp.17-47 (pp.26-7).
145. See Radosław Markowski, 'EU Membership and the Polish Party System', in Paul G. Lewis and Zdenka Mansfeldova (eds.), The European Union and Party Politics in Central and Eastern Europe (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), pp.128-48.