Ethnic vigilantes and the state: The Oodua people's congress in South-Western Nigeria

International Relations

Volumn 21, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 217-235

  Nolte, Insa ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BIRMINGHAM   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Ethnicity; Frederick Fasheun; Gani Adams; Nigeria; Oodua People's Congress (OPC); Security; State; Vigilantes; Yoruba

Indexed keywords

EID: 34249005853     PISSN: 00471178     EISSN: 17412862     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0047117807077005     Document Type: Article

References (85)

1. The author gratefully acknowledges the ESRC's support for a research project entitled, 'The Rise of Yoruba Nationalism: Exclusion, Identity and Youth in Nigeria', Project No RES-000-22-0374. The author also thanks Aderemi Ajala and Bolaji Olarinmoye for their help in conducting and translating interviews. Beyond the discussion facilitated at Aberystwyth, an earlier version of this article was presented at CRISE, Queen Elizabeth House, Oxford, and the contributions of Raufu Mustapha, Yvan Guichaoua, Ukoha Ukiwo and other seminar participants were very helpful.
2. Robert I. Rotberg, 'Failed States in a World of Terror', Foreign Affairs, July-August 2002, pp. 127-40.
3. Deborah Avant, 'The Privatization of Security and Change in the Control of Force', International Studies Perspectives, 5, 2004, pp. 153-7; Lars Buur and Steffen Jensen, 'Introduction: Vigilantism and the Policing of Everyday Life in South Africa', African Studies, 63(2), 2004, pp. 139-52.
4. Achille Mbembe, 'Africa's Frontiers in Flux', Le Monde Diplomatique, November 1999.
5. Vigilantism is here used generically to refer to the private provision of security by groups and organisations whose primary existence is not economic, i.e. who are not security companies. This reflects typical Nigerian usage, where vigilantism is not normally perceived to be a pejorative description of a practice widely perceived as necessary or positive.
6. Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz, Africa Works: The Political Instrumentalisation of Disorder (London: James Currey, 1999), p. 45.
7. Bruce Baker, 'When the Bakassi Boys Came: Eastern Nigeria Confronts Vigilantism', Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 20(2), 2002, pp. 223-44, at p. 224.
8. Jean-François Bayart, The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly (London: Longman, 1993).
9. John D. Y. Peel, 'The Cultural Work of Yoruba Ethnogenesis', in E. Tonkin, M. McDonald and M. Chapman (eds), History and Ethnicity (London: Routledge, 1989).
10. Charles Gore and David Pratten, 'The Politics of Plunder: The Rhetorics of Order and Disorder in Southern Nigeria', African Affairs, 102(2), 2003, pp. 211-40.
11. Melissa Leach, 'Introduction to Special Issue: Security, Socioecology, Polity: Mande Hunters, Civil Society, and Nation-States in Contemporary West Africa', Africa Today, 50(4), 2004, pp. vii-xvi.
12. David Pratten, 'The Politics of Protection: Perspectives on Vigilantism in Nigeria', Africa (special issue on Nigerian vigilantes), forthcoming 2008.
13. Buur and Jensen, 'Vigilantism', pp. 139-46.
14. Laurent Fourchard, 'An Old Name for a New Practice: Vigilantes in South-Southwestern Nigeria', Africa, forthcoming 2008.
15. Cf. Suzette Heald's contribution to this issue, pp. 183-99; Suzette Heald, 'Mafias in Africa: The Rise of Drinking Companies and Vigilante Groups in Bugisu District, Uganda', Africa, 56(4), 1986, pp. 446-67.
16. Jon Rosenbaum and Peter Sederberg, 'Vigilantism: An Analysis of Establishment Violence', Comparative Politics, 6(4), 1974, pp. 541-70.
17. Charles Ukeje, 'From Aba to Ugborodo: Gender Identity and Alternative Discourse of Social Protest among Women in the Oil Delta of Nigeria', Oxford Development Studies, 32(4), 2004, pp.605-17.
18. Insa Nolte, 'Identity and Violence: The Politics of Youth in Ijebu-Remo, Nigeria', Journal of Modern African Studies, 42(1), 2004, pp. 61-89; Wale Adebanwi, 'The Carpenter's Revolt: Youth, Violence and the Reinvention of Culture in Nigeria', Journal of Modern African Studies, 43(3), 2005, pp. 339-65.
19. Insa Nolte, 'Federalism and Communal Conflict in Nigeria', Journal of Regional and Federal Studies, 12(1), 2002, pp. 186-8.
20. Patrimonialism refers to a system in which patron-client networks, usually centred on powerful men, dominate the political economy. As illustrated in Richard Joseph, Democracy and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria. The Rise and Fall of the Second Republic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), in patrimonial systems public office is often only used and understood as a facade for the private interests pursued by patrons.
21. Kate Meagher, 'Hijacking Civil Society: The Inside Story of the Bakassi Boys Vigilante Group of South-eastern Nigeria', Journal of Modern African Studies, forthcoming 2007; See also Ukoha Ukiwo, 'Deus ex Machina or Frankenstein Monster? The Changing Roles of Bakassi Boys in Eastern Nigeria', Democracy and Development. Journal of West African Studies, 3(1), 2002, pp. 39-51.
22. William Reno, 'The Politics of Insurgency in Collapsing States', Development and Change, 33(5), 2002, pp. 837-58; William Reno, 'The Politics of Violent Opposition in Collapsing States', Government and Opposition, 2005, pp. 127-51.
23. James Ferguson, Global Shadows. Africa in the Neoliberal World Order (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006), pp. 31-4.
24. Reno, 'Politics of Insurgency', p. 839.
25. Cf. R. T. Akinyele, 'Ethnic Militancy and National Stability in Nigeria: A Case Study of the Oodua People's Congress', African Affairs, 100, 2001, pp. 623-40, at p. 625.
26. John D. Y. Peel, Religious Encounter and the Making of the Yoruba (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2000), esp. pp. 281-318.
27. Peel, 'The Cultural Work', pp. 208-10.
28. Reflecting the fluid nature of Yoruba nationalism, Awolowo had support in some predominantly Muslim areas, including parts of Lagos. Stefan Reichmuth, 'Education and the Growth of Religious Associations among Yoruba Muslims: The Ansar-Ud-Deen Society of Nigeria', Journal of Religion in Africa, 26(4), 1996, pp. 385-6.
29. Interview with Popo Ade-Banjo, founder of the Oodua Liberation Front (OLF), Oodua Nation's People's International Council (ONPIC) and the Oodua Liberation Movement (OLM), 14 February 2005.
30. Baba Omojola, 'Self-determination Groups in Yorubaland', in Tunde Babawale (ed.), Urban Violence, Ethnic Militias and the Challenge of Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria (Lagos: Malthouse Press, 2003), p. 93.
31. Interview with Frederick Fasheun, founder of the OPC, 8 May 2004.
32. Interview with Oladapo Fafowora, diplomat and one of the founders of the OPC, on 16 February 2005.
33. Peel, 'The Cultural Work'.
34. Interview with Gani Adams, national coordinator of the OPC, 12 February 2005.
35. Among the OPC's founding members was Tony Ugurugbe, an opposition leader from the Niger Delta. Amadu Sesay, Charles Ukeje, Olabisi Aina and Adetanwa Odebiyi, Ethnic Militias and the Future of Democracy in Nigeria (Ile-Ife, Nigeria: Obafemi Awolowo University Press, 2003), pp. 144.
36. Karl Maier, This House Has Fallen. Nigeria in Crisis (London: Penguin, 2000), pp. 231-2.
37. Cf. Adebanwi, 'The Carpenter's Revolt'.
38. Akinyele, 'Ethnic Militancy', p. 631.
39. Insa Nolte, '"Without Women, Nothing Can Succeed": Yoruba Women, Violence and Vigilantism in the Oodua People's Congress (OPC), Nigeria', Africa, forthcoming 2008.
40. Nolte, 'Identity', p. 62.
41. However, some new forms of differentiation have emerged. Reflecting a successful political alliance between Abacha and a section of the Yoruba elite in the 1990s, support for the OPC has also been low in Ekiti State until recently. Also, the OPC draws very little support from Pentecostal Christians who oppose its revalidation of traditional religious practice.
42. Despite the strong presence of the OPC in most Yoruba communities, this self-reported number seems very high.
43. It is likely that the presence of some of these members in the OPC is explained by the fact that they had engaged in vigilantism before the establishment of the OPC and joined the OPC when it grew in importance.
44. Interview with Lasun Eweina, OPC leader in Osogbo, 31 August 2005.
45. Interview with Fasheun, 8 May 2004.
46. Similar concerns have been noted in recent research on northern Nigerian vigilante groups, cf. Fatima Adamu, 'Gender, Hisbah and Enforcement of Morality in Shariah Implementing States of Zamfara and Kano in Northern Nigeria', Africa, forthcoming 2008; Murray Last, 'The Search for Security in Muslim Northern Nigeria', Africa, forthcoming 2008.
47. Reno, 'Politics of Insurgency', pp. 840, 849.
48. Jean-François Bayart, Stephen Ellis and Beatrice Hibou (eds), The Criminalization of the State in Africa (Oxford: James Currey, 1999).
49. Maier, This House, p. 230.
50. Often such groups included migrants from northern (less frequently eastern) Nigeria who had settled in Yoruba communities.
51. Reno, 'Politics of Violent Opposition', p. 137.
52. Interview with Adams, 12 February 2005.
53. In Kwara and Kogi States, which have large Yoruba populations but were not situated on the territory of the South-Western Region associated with the Yoruba politics originally defined by Obafemi Awolowo, the All People's Party (APP) won the gubernatorial elections.
54. Maier, This House, pp. 234-5.
55. Maier, This House, p. 235.
56. Nolte, 'Identity', pp. 78-84.
57. Adams has estimated that the OPC lost about 1000 members to police violence between 1998 and 2001. Interview with Adams, 12 February 2005.
58. Nolte, 'Federalism', p. 186.
59. Interview with Mr Olubi, leader of the OPC 'Alaka' faction in Ibadan, 16 April 2005.]
60. For example, Obasanjo set up a Human Rights Violations Investigation Commission (Oputa Panel) and undertook a redistribution of the national revenue.
61. Offering political influence and respect as well as posts and contracts, the president's People's Democratic Party (PDP) successfully attracted a number of opposition (AD) politicians and leaders into its fold between 1999 and 2003. It also won the support of a number of established members - Or relatives of members - Of the Yoruba elite closely associated with the AD, including members of the Awolowo family.
62. Interview with Adams, 12 February 2005.
63. In many cases, the AD leaders used their influence to decide party primaries according to age and experience, thus marginalising younger and female politicians, and in particular those who were too young to have been involved in party politics during Nigeria's Second Republic (1979-83).
64. For a detailed post-mortem of this astonishingly ill-advised political strategy, see Olawale Oshun, The Kiss of Death. Afenifere and the Infi dels (Wiltshire: Josel, 2005).
65. For example, Bisi Akande, the governor of Osun State, was widely criticised for owing public sector workers' salaries. When Lam Adesina, the governor of Oyo State, was asked why the masses were suffering when his children lived in ostentatious wealth, he simply replied that they should be allowed to enjoy themselves.
66. The relationship between Lagos State governor Tinubu and the local OPC was particularly close because his mother, the leader of a powerful market women's association, was also an important OPC supporter.
67. Human Rights Watch, Nigeria's 2003 Elections: The Unacknowledged Violence (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2004), pp. 11-39, discusses the political use of vigilantes during the 2003 elections in several Nigerian states.
68. Nolte, 'Identity'.
69. Interview with Lateef Sodeinde, OPC chairman in Sagamu, 15 February 2005.
70. Interview with Eweina, 31 August 2005.
71. Human Rights Watch, Nigeria's 2003 Elections.
72. 'Accept Results in Good Faith, OPC Pleads with Govs', This Day, 18 April 2003.
73. 'Back to the Wild, Wild West', The Guardian, 18 April 2003.
74. Why PDP Swept South-West Polls', This Day, 21 April 2003.
75. 'April Polls: The New Face of South-West Politics', This Day, 21 April 2003.
76. Interview with Gbenga Daniel, Governor of Ogun State, 11 February 2005.
77. On the basis of present findings, the degree of insertion of local OPC vigilantes in state and regional networks of patronage is strongly dependent on the locality, with much higher levels of OPC involvement in large cities such as Lagos and Ibadan.
78. Reno, 'Politics of Insurgency', p. 852.
79. Reflecting the OPC's centrality as a broker of Yoruba national interests, rival OPC leaders Adams and Fasheun officially put their disagreements aside in March 2005. (Their agreement was brokered by PDP member and Ogun State governor Gbenga Daniel.)
80. Jimoh Shakirudeen, 'The Oodua People's Congress. A Study in Origin, Goals and Organisation', unpublished BA dissertation, University of Ibadan, 2000, pp. 28-32.
81. 'OPC: Afenifere Carpets FG', News, 9 March 2006.
82. 'Third Term Beyond Treason', Vanguard, 28 November 2005.
83. Reno, 'Politics of Violent Opposition', p. 129.
84. northern Nigerian Arewa Youth Consultative Forum is one of the northern Nigerian groups that have appealed to the government to release Adams and his co-prisoners. See 'Activists Call for Release of Gani Adams', Vanguard, 22 September 2006.
85. There is some indication that this is currently happening in parts of south-western Nigeria, and especially in Lagos. A relatively recent survey of popular attitudes towards the OPC in Lagos found that while roughly 87 per cent of Yoruba speakers supported the OPC as a vigilante group, so did 47 per cent of (eastern Nigerian) Igbo speakers and even 20 per cent of (northern Nigerian) Hausa speakers. Cf. Toyin Mopelola Olanrewaju, 'Oodua People's Congress [OPC] and Vigilantism: A Case Study of their Activities in Lagos State', unpublished MA dissertation, University of Ibadan, 2003, pp. 107-8.