'There cannot be a transparent white': A defence of Wittgenstein's account of the puzzle propositions

Philosophical Investigations

Volumn 23, Issue 3, 2000, Pages 218-241

  Horner, Elaine ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF YORK   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 34248742038     PISSN: 01900536     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-9205.00123     Document Type: Article

References (10)

1. Goethe, Theory of Colours (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1970), §725
2. Newton, Opticks (New York: Dover, 1952), p. 124
3. Wittgenstein, Remarks on Colour (Oxford: Blackwell, 1977) I §70
4. Westphal, Colour (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987)
5. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Remarks (Oxford: Blackwell, 1975), p. 4
6. quoting Colin McGinn in The Subjective View (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), p. 37
7. Marie McGinn, 'Wittgenstein's Remarks on Colour, Philosophy, 66, 1991, pp. 435-53
8. Westphal's approach is defended by C.L. Hardin in 'A Transparent Case for Subjectivism', Analysis, 45, 2, (1985), pp. 117-19
9. and in 'Could White be Green', Mind, vol. xcviii, no. 390, April 1989
10. McGinn's view is defended by D.K. Buckner in 'Transparently False: Reply to Hardin', Analysis, 46, 2, pp. 86-7