Deflating compositionality

Ratio

Volumn 14, Issue 4, 2001, Pages 369-385

  Horwich, Paul ^a  

^a CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 34248721345     PISSN: 00340006     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-9329.00170     Document Type: Article

References (12)

1. Davidson, D. (1967). 'Truth and Meaning'. Synthese 17, 304-323
2. Davidson, D. (1984). Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation. Oxford: Clarendon Press
3. Fodor, J. (1998). 'There Are No Recognitional Concepts; Not Even RED', in E. Villanueva, ed., Philosophical Issues, Vol. 9. Atascadero, Ca.: Ridgeview
4. Reprinted in Fodor (1998b) In Critical Condition. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 35-48
5. Fodor, J. and E. Lepore (1991a). 'Why Meaning (Probably) Isn't Conceptual Role'. Mind and Language 6, 329-43
6. Fodor, J. and E. Lepore (1991b). Holism. Oxford: Blackwell
7. Fodor, J. and E. Lepore (1996). 'The Pet Fish and the Red Herring; Why Concepts Aren't Prototypes'. Cognition 52, 243-276
8. Fodor, J. and E. Lepore (2001). 'Why Compositionality Won't Go Away'. Ratio 14, 350-368
9. Higginbotham, J. (1999). 'A Perspective on Truth and Meaning', in L. Hahn, ed., The Philosophy of Donald Davidson. La Salle, Illinois: Open Court
10. Horwich, P. (1997). 'The Composition of Meanings'. Philosophical Review 106, 503-31. Reprinted as Ch. 7, Horwich (1998)
11. Horwich, P. (1998). Meaning. Oxford: Oxford University Press
12. Quine, W.V. (1962). Word and Object. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press