Poverty-efficient programme reforms with heterogeneous agents: the role of targeting and allocation rules

Research on Economic Inequality

Volumn 14, Issue , 2007, Pages 281-300

  Garcia Diaz, Rocio ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 34248584091     PISSN: 10492585     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1016/S1049-2585(06)14013-2     Document Type: Review

References (20)

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