The narcotics trade: A threat to security? National and transnational implications

Global Crime

Volumn 8, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 1-25

  Swanstrom, Niklas ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

Drug trade; Grey area phenomena; Illegal narcotics; Security; Terrorism

Indexed keywords

EID: 34248545591     PISSN: 17440572     EISSN: 17440580     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/17440570601121829     Document Type: Article

References (161)

1. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) noticed a three times decrease in deaths related to interstate conflicts in the 1990s to 220,000, compared to the 1980s, but there were some 3.6 million deaths related to internal conflicts in the 1990s (United Nations Development Program (2002) Human Development Report 2002, Oxford, Oxford University Press, p. 11).
2. GAP have been defined as threats to the stability of sovereign states by non-state actors and nongovernmental processes and organisations. Chalk, P. (2000) 'Southeast Asian and the Golden Triangle's Heroin Trade: Threats and Response', Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, vol. 23, p. 2.
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9. Matthew, R. & Shambaugh, G. (1998) 'Sex, Narcotics, and Heavy Metal: Transnational Threats and National Vulnerabilities', Security Dialogue, vol. 29
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11. Smith, S. (2004) 'Singing Our World into Existence: International Relations Theory and September 11', International Studies Quarterly vol. 48, no. 3, pp. 504-507.
12. United Nations Office on Narcotics and Crime (2006) 2006 World Drug Report, United Nations, New York; Global Illicit Narcotics Trends 2003, United Nations, New York; Roston, A. (2002) 'Central Asia's Heroin Problem', Nation, 3 March.
13. Since 1998-2000 there has been a 4.7% increase in narcotics users and in 2006 it was estimated that 5% of the global population aged 15-64 use drugs. However, the world population of users has been stagnant between 2005 and 2006, a remarkable development. United Nations Office on Narcotics and Crime (2003, pp. 101-102)
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15. Thachuk, K. op cit (2001) UNODC, Global Program Against Money Laundering (20 October 2005) (http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/ money laundering). The assessments are incomplete and if the refineries have improved or if the smugglers are more effective than we have estimated, which is highly likely, the value of the narcotics trade will skyrocket (interviews in China, Central Asia and Iran during 2004-2005). However, it has been argued that the estimates are political tools created to stir up the public and more seriously that their methodology is seriously flawed or even absent which makes any calculation of the value of the narcotics trade useless.
16. Charters (2003).
17. After the fall of the Taliban we have seen an increased presence of European, Albanian, Turkish (Kurdish) etc networks in Afghanistan. These networks have increased their presence in the main production state (accounting for 77% of the world's opium) simply to gain a better control over the whole supply chain. Their increased presence may also be a response to increased competition from the different networks and the necessity to defend their markets and production sites.
18. Starr, F. (2000) Narcotrafficking and the Rise of Independent Militia Conference Report, Central Asia and the South Caucasus: Reorientations, Internal Transition, and Strategic Dynamics, October.
19. For more on corruption see Ivelaw, G. (1999) 'Organised Crime in the Western Hemisphere: Context, Consequences and Countermeasures', Low Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement, vol. 8, no. 1.
20. United Nations International Drug Control Program (2003) Investing in Drug Abuse Treatment.
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24. Swanström, N. & Cornell, S. (2005) 'Kyrgyzstan's 'Revolution': Poppies or Tulips?', Central Asia - Caucasus Analyst, 18 May.
25. Swanström, N. & Cornell, S. (2005); Kairat Osmonaliev, Developing Counter-Narcotics Policy in Central Asia: Legal and Political Dimensions, Silk Road Paper, Silk Road Studies Program, January
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29. Thachuk (2001) p. 51.
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31. Swanström, N. & Madi, M. (2005) 'International Cooperation Against Drug Trafficking, in Central Asia,' in United Nations: Multilateralism and International Security, ed. C. Uday Bhaskar, U. Sinha, K. Santhanam & T. Meenai, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses & SHIPRA Publications, New York
32. Swanström, N. (2005) 'Mulilateralism and Narotics control in Central Asia', CEF Quarterly, February; Interviews with senior officials within the police, customs and drug enforcement agencies in Central Asia, Southeast Asia, Iran and China during 2004-2005.
33. Smith (2004), pp. 499-515. Keohane, R. & Nye, J. (eds) (1971) Transnational Relations and World Politics, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA
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35. Ivelaw, G. (1993-1994)
36. Matthew, R. & Shambaugh, G. (1998), pp. 163-175.
37. Dziedzic, M. (1989) 'The transnational narcotics trade and regional security', Survival, November/December; Thachuk (2001), pp. 47-67.
38. There are suspicions that North Korea is, for example, using narcotics money to fund its international and domestic strategies. There is an increasing rate of seizures of narcotics originating in North Korea and it is believed that it could be a part of a strategy to destabilise the western world, as well as making money.
39. Boyd, A. (2003) 'North Korea: Hand in the cookie jar', Asia Times, 1 September
40. Perl, R. (2004) 'State Crime: The North Korean drug trade', Global Crime, vol. 6, no. 1.
41. Cornell, S. (2004) 'The Growing Threat of Transnational Crime', in The South Caucasus: A Challenge for the EU, ed. Dov Lynch, Chaillot Papers, EU Institute of Security Studies
42. Ivelaw, G. (1997) Narcotics and security in the Caribbean: Sovereignty under siege, University Park, Pennsylvania State University Press.
43. Deutsch, K. et al. (1957) Political Community and the North Atlantic Area, Princeton University Press, Princeton
44. Wolfers, A. (1962) Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore
45. Waltz, K. (1979) Theory of International Politics, Addison-Wesley, Reading, MA.
46. Buzan, B., Waever, O. & Wilde, J. (1998) Security: A New Framework for Analysis, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, p. 37.
47. Security studies have traditionally focused on state or the classical phenomena of security complexes. This has changed as international and regional systems are increasingly important, but also because of the emergence of subunits of the states, such as regions or ethnic groups, as economic and political actors.
48. Swanström, N. (2003) Regional Cooperation and Conflict Management: Lessons from the Pacific Rim, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University
49. Hettne, B., Inotai, A. & Sunkel, O. (eds) (2001) The New Regionalism and the Future of Security and Development, Macmillan, Basingstoke, UK.
50. Lippman, W. (1943) U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic, Little, Brown and Company, Boston, p. 53.
51. Hirsh, F. & Doyle, M. (1977) 'Politisation in the World Economy: Necessary Conditions for an International Economic Order', in Alternatives to Monetary Disorder, eds. F. Hirsch, M. Doyle & E. Morse, McGraw-Hill, New York, pp. 11-66)
52. Meadows, D., et al. (1972) The Limits of Growth: A Report for the Club of Rome's Project on the Predicament of Mankind, Potomac Associates, New York
53. Ruggie, J. (1982) 'International Regimes, Transactions and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order', International Organisation, vol. 35, no. 2.
54. S. Smith has pointed out that despite these attempts we are still trapped in the old concepts of international relations (2004).
55. The arguments to keep it more narrow is that if the security concept was expanded it would include everything and nothing, each single factor could potentially be a security threat. The arguments for widening the security concept is simply that the world is more complicated than the classical definitions allowed for and that there are plenty of security threats out there that are equally or worse security threats to states, individuals and other sub-national entities.
56. For a more detailed discussion see: Buzan et al. (1998); Ullman, R. (1993) 'Redefining Security', International Security, vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 129-153
57. Waever, O. (1995) 'Securitisation and Desecuritisation' in On Security, ed. R. Lipschutz, Columbia University Press, New York.
58. Ayoob, M. (1995) The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict, and the International System, Lynne Rienner, Boulder; Gilpin, R. (1981) War and Change in World Politics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, MA
59. Mansfield, E. (1994) Power, Trade and War, Princeton University Press, Princeton.
60. Waltz, K. (1979) Theory of International Politics, Addision-Wesley, Boston
61. Waltz, K. (1986) 'Anarchic Orders and Balances of Power', in Neorealism and its critics, ed. R. Keohane, Columbia University Press, New York.
62. Swanström (2002); Josselin, D. & Wallace, W. (eds) (2001) Non-State Actors in World Politics, Palgrave, Basingstoke.
63. Both in China and Russia AIDS/HIV, organised crime and the narcotics problem were swept under the carpet for political reasons. It was inconceivable that these 'perfect' political systems c could have these problems, which were a result of Western decadence. The result is that high and increasing numbers suffer from these problems in both states.
64. Swanström (2003); Chia, Y. & Yuan, L. 'Subregional economic zones in Southeast Asia', in Asia Pacific Regionalism: Readings in International Economic Relations, eds. R. Garnaut & P. Drysdale, HarperEducational Publishers, Pymble
65. Chen, E. & Kwan, C.H. (eds) (1997) Asia's Borderless Economy: The emergence of sub-regional zones, Allen & Unwin, St Leonards.
66. Buzan et al. (1998), p. 4.
67. Buzan et al. (1998), pp. 21-22.
68. Holsti, K. (1996) The State, the War and the State of War, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, MA, p. 15.
69. For a more elaborate discussion of the linkage between narcotics and weak states see: Madi, M. (2003) Narcotics Trafficking in Weak States, The Program for Silk Road Studies, Uppsala University, pp. 7-21.
70. Buzan, B. (1991) People, States and Fear(2 ed.), Harvester Wheatsheaf, New York, p. 100.
71. For an interesting discussion of the failure of international relations theory to include 'new' issues see: Smith (2004).
72. Madi (2003). International crime is an international phenomenon and it has even been suggested that it is an international unit that could best be described as an empire.
73. Mills, J. (1986) The Underground Empire, Doubleday, Garden City, NY.
74. Ayoob, (1995), p. 4.
75. 'Drug money funding Maoist war in Nepal' (2006) Only Punjab, 16 May
76. Piracha, S. (2004) 'China asks Pakistan to investigate Xinjiang terrorists list', Daily Times, 17 January
77. Aita, J. (2005) 'Indicted Burma Drug Syndicate Posed Grave Threat, U.S. Says', Washington File, 25 January.
78. Cornell (2004); Madi (2003).
79. Buzan (1991), p. 99; p. 114. Swanstrom̈ (2005).
80. Interviews with senior officials within the police, customs and drug enforcement agencies in Central Asia, Southeast Asia, Iran and China during 2004-2005.
81. Stachowiak, J. & Beyrer, C. (2003) HIV Follows Heroin Trafficking Routes, Presented at the Conference on Health Security in Central Asia: Narcotics use HIV and AIDS, avHilable at: http://www.eurasianet.org/health.security
82. UNFPA, HIV/AIDS and other sexually transmitted infections (2003), available at: http://www.unfpa.org/europe_asia/hivaids.htm. The STDs and HIV/AIDS epidemics are mostly prevalent among the intravenous users of heroin, even if the general health situation is affected by the usage of narcotics.
83. United Nations Office on Narcotics and Crime (2003: 119-123)
84. Lintner, B. (1995) 'The Narcotics Trade in Southeast Asia', Jane's Intelligence Review Special Report, No. 5, Jane's, London, pp. 12-13)
85. Chalk (2000: 94)
86. (White Papers of the Chinese Government) (2003: 146).
87. Dr. Mohraz, Infectious Disease Specialist of Tehran University Medical Sciences, available at: http://www.unodc.org/unodc/ newsletter_2003-11-30_1_page005.html#1
88. Ibid. Similar statistics are not available for the Central Asian and the states of the Caucasus, but there are no indications that the situation should be better.
89. US Department of State, Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000: Trafficking in Persons Report (2003). For more on the regional polices see: Najibullah, F. (2003) 'Central Asia: Governments Slowly Changing Approach To Human Trafficking', RFE/RL, 2 July; (Ting Chang) (2004) (China Always Says 'No' to Narcotics), Foreign Languages Press, Beijing.
90. Ivelaw (1993-1994)
91. Olcott, M. (2003) Unfulfilled Promise in Central Asia, 26 November, available at: http://www.ceip.org/files/programs/russia/ tenyears/presentation/olcott.htm.
92. The United Nations estimates that, for example, 70-80% of the populations of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan lives below the poverty level.
93. According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian affairs (www.irinnews.org).
94. Rubin, B. (2004) Road to Ruin: Afghanistan's Booming Opium Industry Center for American Progress and NYU Center for International Cooperation, Washington, p. 4)
95. Porteous, S. (1998) Organised Crime Impact Study Highlights, Public Works and Government Services of Canada, Ottawa, 18.
96. Chalk (2003), p. 92
97. Lintner, B. (1996) 'Narcopolitics in Burma', Current History, p. 605.
98. U.S. Department of State (2005) 2005 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Press Statement, Office of the Spokesman, Washington, DC, 4 March
99. Interviews with Senior officials within the police, customs, ministry of trade in states in Central Asia, Southeast Asia, China and Iran
100. Boorman, J. & Ingves, S. (2001) Financial System Abuse, Financial Crime and Money Laundering, International Monetary Fund, New York.
101. Wortzel, L. (2003) North Korea's Connection to International Trade in Drugs, Counterfeiting, and Arms (Testimony), The Heritage Foundation, May 20; 103 Hwang, B. (2003) Curtailing North Korea's Illicit Activities, Backgrounder #1679, The Heritage Foundation, August 25.
102. Cornell, S. (2002) The Nexus of Narcotics, Conflict and Radical Islamism in Central Asia, Cornell Caspian Consulting; Cornell (2004)
103. Makarenko, T. (2003) Crime, Terror, and the Central AsianNarcotics Trade, available at: http:///wwwcornellcaspian.com/briefs/ 25_0207CA_Narcoticss.pdf
104. Olcott, M. & Udalova, N. (2000) Narcotics Trafficking on the Great Silk Route: The Security Environment in Central Asia, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC
105. Swanström (2003).
106. Gibson, R. & Haeman, J. (2003) 'Prospects for Controlling Narcotics Production and Trafficking in Myanmar', Contemporary Southeast Asia; Dziedzic (1989)
107. Steinitz, M. (2002) The Terrorism and Drug Connection in Latin America's Andean Region, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Policy Papers on the Americas, Washington, DC, vol. XIII, study 5.
108. Transparency International, Corruption Perception Index, http://www.transparency.org. The question of cause and effect arises when considering this. Is the corruption an effect of the narcotics trade or is the narcotics trade an effect of the corruption? In most production and transit states there already was a high level of corruption before the narcotics trade established itself, but the trade has increased the magnitude of corruption. It is also clear countries with a relatively low level of corruption, such as the UK or the US are still greatly affected by the drug trade. This would indicate that the drug trade is an independent force, but that corruption makes it easier for the narcotics networks which handle it.
109. Thachuk (2001: 56)
110. Swanström, N., Cornell, S. & Tabyshalieva, A. (2005) A Strategic Conflict Analysis of Central Asia with a Focus on Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, Report to Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, June, available at: http://www.silkroadstudies.org/docs/publications/2005/SIDA_CA.pdf.
111. It is however not correct to say that the drug trade always has entirely negative consequences, as in some cases the narcotics lords provide their communities with money and resources in the form of schools, medical care etc. In regions with desperate conditions and weak infrastructure the trade can be the only income for many families.
112. Winer, J. & Roule, T. (2002) 'Fighting Terrorist Finance', Survival vol. 44, no. 3
113. Winer, J. & Roule, T. (2003) 'Follow the Money: The Finance of Illicit Resource Extraction', in Natural Resources and Violent Conflict, eds. I. Bennon and P. Collier, The World Bank, Washington, DC. It has been argued that the very basis of these calculations can be challenged; nevertheless it is evident for the author that the increase is rapid and the size of the industry is extremely large.
114. Thachuk (2001), p. 59 Ivelaw (1993-1994), p. 4. According to the UNODC in 2005, the international trade in Afghan opiates alone generates a total turnover of $30 billion worldwide.
115. For one example from Central Asia see: Osmonaliev (2005).
116. Chalk (2000), p. 95.
117. Swanström, N. et al. (2005) Organised Crime and Narcotics in the Baltic a Region: Issues of National and Regional Security, available at: www.silkroadstudies.org (accessed on 26 October 2005).
118. Ivelaw (1994), p. 26.
119. Starr (October 2000); Cornell (2004); Pantilova, V. (2003) 'A Romance with Heroin', Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 3 March
120. The Economist (US edition), 29 March 2003
121. Seger, A. (1996) Narcotics and Development in the Central Asian Republics, report for Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), Bonn. 70.
122. Shelley, L. (2002) 'Crime as the Defining Problem: Voices of Another Criminology', International Annals of Criminology, vol. 39, no. 1-2, p. 79.
123. Seger (1996); Tongeren, P., et al. (2002) Searching for Peace in Europe and Eurasia, Lynne Rienner Publishers, London.
124. Osmonaliev (2005); BBC (2000) 'Afghan Drugs Endangering Central Asia', 20 October, available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asiapacific/ 982134.stm
125. Baldauf, S. (2003) 'Afghan Military Tied to Narcotics Trade', Christian Science Monitor, 4 September
126. Orszag-Land, T. (2000) 'Islamic Terrorists and the Russian Mafia', Contemporary Review, pp. 264-267
127. Chalk (2000), pp. 94-95.
128. U.S. Office of National Narcotics Control Policy (2002) 2002 National Narcotics Control Strategy, National Priorities III: Disrupting the Market.
129. Zerkola, 20 July 2002, p. 11; Media Press News Agency (4 March 2003). I am indebted to Svante Cornell for his help with Azeri, Armenia and Georgian sources.
130. Cornell (2004).
131. Kyshtobaev, D. (2000) 'Wahhabits are planning to strike: Kyrgyzstan is preparing to reflect new aggression by Islamic fundamentalists', Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 29 March
132. for more on the topic see: Makarenko, T. (2003) The Changing Dynamics of Central Asian Terrorism, available at: http://cornellcaspian.com/ briefs/020201_CA_Terrorism.html.
133. Madi (2003), p. 44.
134. Williams, E. (2001) Burma Drugs, ABC News, 20 June, available at: http://www.abc.net.au/foreign/stories/s316849.htm
135. Jamieson, A. (1990) 'Global Narcotics Trafficking', Conflict Studies no.234
136. Chalk (2000: 95); 2005 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Washington, DC, 4 March 2005, available at: http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/rm/43006.htm.
137. Steinitz (2002, vol. XIII, study 5); Keen, D. (1999) The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars, Adelphi Paper no. 320, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London
138. Keen, D. (2000) 'Incentives and Disincentives for Violence', in Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars, eds. M. Berdal and D. Malone, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, CO, pp. 19-42)
139. Roule, T. 'The Terrorist Financial Network of the PKK', Jane's Terrorism and Security Monitor, 17 June.
140. Matthew & Shambaugh (1998).
141. Thachuk (2001),p. 49.
142. Williams (2001, June 20)
143. Fawthorp, T. (2003) Thai-Myanmar ties: Drug lords cash in, Asia Times 17 January
144. Senate Foreign Relations Committee (2004) Establishing the rule of law in Afghanistan, Testimony By R. Perito, Special Advisor, Rule of Law Program, United States Institute of Peace, 12 May.
145. Matveeva, A. (2003) 'Arms and Security in the Caucasus' in The Caucasus: Armed and Divided, ed. A Matveeva, Saferworld, London.
146. Thachuk (2001), p. 56.
147. Frantz, D. (2003) 'Nuclear Booty: More Smugglers Use Asian Route', The New York Times, 11 September
148. Cornell (2003).
149. Erlanger, S. (2001) 'Lax Nuclear Security in Russia is Cited as Way for Bin Laden to Get Arms', New York Times, 12 November
150. Washington Post (2002) 'U.N. Seeks Nuclear Devices in Georgia'., 1 February
151. Frantz (2003, September 11).
152. United States Government Accountability Office (2005) Testimony Before the Subcommittees on the Prevention of Nuclear and Biological Attack and on Emergency Preparedness, Science, and Technology, Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives, Combating Nuclear Smuggling, Statement of G. Aloise, Director Natural Resources and Environment, 21 June
153. Orlov, V. 'Illicit Nuclear Trafficking & the new agenda', IAEA Bullentin, vol. 46, no. 1.
154. Swanström, N., et al. (2005) Organised Crime and Narcotics in the Baltic Sea Region: Issues of National and Regional Security, available at: www.silkroadstudies.org (accessed on 26 October 2005)
155. Interviews with drug enforcement, legal and customs personnel in Europe, Asia and the US, 2004-2005.
156. Swanstrom̈, N. & Björnehed, E. (2004) 'Conflict resolution of terrorist conflicts in Southeast Asia?', Journal of Terrorism and Political Violence, vol. 16, no. 2.
157. Swanström & Madi (2004)
158. Most of the leaders of separatist organisations in Burma has been tied to narcotrafficking at some time, these include, but are not excluded to,: Peng Jiasheng and Liu Goushi of the MNDAA
159. Pao Yuqiang, Li Zuru, and Wei Xuekang of the UWSA; Mahtu Naw of the Kachin Defense Army (KDA)
160. and Yawd Serk of the Shan State Army South (SSA South), U Sai Lin (Lin Mingxian) of the Eastern Shan State Army (ESSA). U Sai Lins territory is most likely the most used trafficking route because of its strategic location along the border with China. http://www.globalsecurity.org/ military/world/para/wa.htm
161. United Nations (2004), p. 59; pp. 165-166.