Your network or mine? The economics of routing rules

RAND Journal of Economics

Volumn 37, Issue 3, 2006, Pages 692-719

  Hermalin, Benjamin E ^a   Katz, Michael L ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 34248396016     PISSN: 07416261     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1756-2171.2006.tb00038.x     Document Type: Conference Paper

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